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EN
It is shown that, nowadays, the notion of the rationality of science has been subjected to deflation. This deflation occurs, because every philosophical conception of science generates its own notion of rationality that is arbitrary, particular, closed in one conception of science, not applicable to comparative appraisals of science in respect to rationality, and, therefore, non-effective, useless. In order to restitute the value of the category of rationality it is necessary to return to fundamental and non-particular rooting of its sense, namely to rationality viewed as rational character human being.
EN
The paper analyses the semantic theories of empirical sciences, mainly their newest, structuralist version from the philosophical perspective. It is proved that structuralism interprets in various ways its fundamental categories: of model, of empirical theory, and of satisfaction relation. Some of the interpretations are inconsistent with the initial basis, that is, with the logical model theory. In constructing the conception of empirical theory, structuralists transgresses in a special way the logical model theory.
EN
Two proposals of the ontological elucidating of multi-dimensional human nature are considered: the nature as an object in a special phase space, and as a complementary entity. Both the ontological constructions, loosely inspired by results of contemporary physics, view the man as a heteregenous whole, not being consisted, however, of such parts as emotions, body, individual and social consciousness etc. The man is also not a structure of elements of humanity.
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