Informed by a research problem of explaining the relationships between the specificity of civic education and public support for authoritarian politicians, this paper aims to propose and test an analytical tool for measuring media engagement in civic education. It contributes methodologically to studies on civic education by delivering a tool that applies to identify and trace state media’s efforts to shape either democratic or autocratic citizenship models. Thereby, it allows monitoring current challenges to civic education for democracy in individual countries. The test contributes empirically to the studies on state-orchestrated civic education by revealing civic education for autocracy in pandemic-driven Poland. It enriches the knowledge of the use of Polish state media by the anti-democratic ruling actors to maintain the status quo.
After the fall of the “Iron Curtain,” Francis Fukuyama formulated a thesis on structural victory of liberal democracy and its fundamental values, such as freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of worldview, freedom of the press etc. This thesis was demonstrably erroneous, as at the beginning of the 21st century, the crisis of liberal democracy in relation to the growth of populist movements is mentioned more and more frequently. While seizing power through democratic means, populist parties abandon the ideals of liberal democracy and values and pivot towards an autocratic governance model while ostensibly adhering to the rules of formal democracy. It was Hannah Arendt, who warned against such a situation saying that tendencies to move towards autocracy within democracies are specific for multi-party systems, while two-party systems in democracies are relatively less prone to such transformation. With regard to the above, the problem which philosophy of politics calls a “paradox of democracy” reappears. Among other things, it is related to the question on the limit of tolerance the liberal democracy has for thoughts, attitudes, actions and words which are substantially opposed to democracy and may lead to autocracy. At the same time, we are observing the fact of reappearance of the militant democracy theory, formulated by Karl Loewenstein. The aim of this article is to look closely at the theory and its suggested modifications (described as neo-militant democracy), as well as to answer the questions on what tools are needed and if they are even possible to be used to defend not only procedures, but also values of democracy from its progressive destabilisation in the face of digital revolution.
The article aims to formulate a theoretical category of neo-militant democracy that applies to study the nature and dynamics of democratic regimes after the 2008 economic crisis. It conducts an empirical test to verify the analytical effectiveness of the redeveloped category. The test takes a form of the case study of the Hungarian political system. Apart from a verification-objective, the research aims to identify and account for the dynamics of the Hungarian regime in terms of the neo-militant democracy principle. The qualitative method of source analysis serves to collect data on the processes of becoming neo-militant democracy. The selection of sources is deliberate and oriented on finding information about the implementation of neo-militant democracy measures in Hungary (2008-2019). The technique of qualitative content analysis applies to identify the nature of these processes. The theoretical tool is the category of neo-militant democracy, which simultaneously undergoes the empirical test. The main argument is that the process of becoming neo-militant democracy took a traditional form since the Hungarian neo-militant democracy principle drew on the traditional means introduced by Loewenstein rather than innovations advanced by the current research
Embedded in scholarship on militant democracy, this research aims to explain how Italian legislation was positioned to militant democratic measures and how this changed over time. Drawing on the qualitative source analysis and the explanatory frameworks of democratic vulnerability tests two competing theory-grounded assumptions. While the first one assumes that Italian democracy became vulnerable when traditional militant democracy instruments were outmoded, the second considers the misuse or abandonment of those means with social consent as the source of vulnerability. The crisis-induced socioeconomic inequality and uncertainty weakened the Italian political nation. As a result, the latter supported populists in return for a promise of political change. The anti-democratic legal means employed to extend power competencies and prevent the exchange of ruling parties were the way to and the costs of the expected political change. At the same time, the political nation became unable to self-organize to strengthen democracy self-defense. As a result, Italians co-produced a quasi-militant democracy that turned vulnerable because militant democracy measures were misused or not used with the consent of Italians that relinquished their political subjectivity in favor of the Northern League and the Five Star Movement.
W tym artykule głównym założeniem jest to, że Portugalia staje się nową demokracją opancerzoną od czasu zaistnienia pierwszego poważnego kryzysu finansowego w Unii Europejskiej, który wystąpił w latach 2008–2009. Dostrzeżono, że proces ten znacznie przyspieszył również w czasie tzw. kryzysu uchodźczego i pandemii koronawirusa. Istotę tak postawionego założenia stanowi wprowadzenie ograniczeń praw i wolności obywateli, szczególnie widocznych w czasie kryzysów, a także demobilizacja ruchów społecznych, zapoczątkowana w związku z nadejściem tendencji antydemokratycznych. Na podstawie przeprowadzonej analizy można zauważyć, że Portugalia w coraz większym stopniu staje się nową demokracją opancerzoną. Mogą na to wskazywać m.in. wprowadzone i istniejące regulacje prawne ograniczające prawa i wolności obywateli.
EN
In this paper the main assumption is that Portugal becomes a neo-militant democracy since the first major finance crisis in the European Union, which occurred in 2008– 2009 years. This process has also accelerated significantly at the time of the so-called refugee crisis and the coronavirus pandemic. The clue of the assumption is the introduction of restrictions on the rights and freedoms of citizens, especially visible during crises, as well as the demobilization of social movements which began in connection with the beginning of anti-democratic tendencies. Based on the analysis, it can be observed that Portugal becomes a neo-militant democracy to an increasing extent. This may be indicated by introduced and existing legal regulations limiting the rights and freedoms of citizens.
Po transformacji ustrojowej w Polsce aborcja została po raz pierwszy uregulowana ustawą z dnia 7 stycznia 1993 r. o ochronie płodu ludzkiego i warunkach dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży. Od tego czasu podejmowane są próby zmiany dotychczasowego rozporządzenia. Jednak dopiero w 2016 r. doszło do ogólnopolskich protestów przeciwko zmianom w przepisach dotyczących aborcji, a następnie w 2020 r., kiedy orzeczenie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego ograniczyło możliwość przerywania ciąży w Polsce. Protesty te można rozpatrywać w kontekście procesu wdrażania rządów demokracji opancerzonej, czyli przejmowania cech niedemokratycznych reżimów przez istniejące demokracje pod przykrywką samozachowania reżimu. Celem artykułu jest zidentyfikowanie i wyjaśnienie stosunku władz do kobiet jako wroga demokracji na poziomie instytucjonalnym podczas obu fal protestów. Z badania wynika, że w badanym okresie specyficzne dla demokracji opancerzonej ograniczenia w obszarze zgromadzeń i stowarzyszeń, wypowiedzi i prasy oraz ograniczenia wolności wyznania zostały wprowadzone w celu ograniczenia aktywności protestujących postrzeganych jako wrogowie systemu demokratycznego.
EN
After the political transformation in Poland, abortion was first regulated by the Law of 7 January 1993, Protection of the Human Fetus and Conditions Permitting Pregnancy Termination. Since then, attempts have been made to change the existing regulation. However, it was in 2016 that there were nationwide protests against changes to abortion provisions, and then in 2020, when the constitutional court ruling limited the possibility of termination of pregnancy in Poland. These protests can be seen in the context of the process of neo-militant democracy rule implementation, that is, the taking over the characteristics of non-democratic regimes by existing democracies under the cover of the regime self-preservation. The aim of this article is to identify and explain the government’s attitude towards women as an enemy of democracy at the institutional level during the two waves of protests. The study shows that during the period considered, restrictions specific to neo-militant democracies in the area of assembly and association, speech and press and restrictions on religious freedom were imposed in order to limit the activity of protesters viewed as enemies of the democratic system.
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