In the present study, we explored the role of liking in the social induction of affect. Dispositional likeability was manipulated by written reports describing a sender as a likeable or dislikeable character. Afterwards participants watched short videos presenting the sender displaying happy or sad emotional expressions. We expected that exposure to the likeable sender would lead to reactions concordant with his emotional expression (assimilation), whereas exposure to the dislikeable sender would result in discordant reactions (contrast). The results indicated that dispositional likeability influenced the social induction of affect when the sender expressed positive emotions. Moreover, liking mediated the effects of the happy sender’s dispositional likeability on participants’ affective state. Exposure to the sad sender, however, led to assimilation regardless of the sender’s dispositional likeability.
Mimicry is known to produce benefits for the mimicker such as liking, increased prosocial tendencies (e.g., higher donations), and trust. Little is known about the benefits or costs to the mimickee. The aim of this study is to explore this issue. Participants were mimicked or not by a confederate. The confederate then dropped pens and checked if the participants picked them up (a proxy for prosocial behavior). Finally, questionnaires were administered that assessed each participant’s liking of the confederate and self-liking, and self-esteem. As expected, mimicked participants picked up more pens and liked the mimicker more. Surprisingly, mimicked participants reported significantly lower self-like when compared to non-mimicked participants, and their self-esteem tended towards being lower. This research fills an important theoretical gap showing that there is a great cost to mimicry.
The literature shows that researchers used a wide variety of types of guilt manipulation. A common feature of these studies was that the subjects were not able to doubt their guilt. Additionally, these methods did not take into account the psychometric measurement of this emotion, as well as the possibility of simultaneously inducing other feelings, such as sadness or anger. In a carefully designed experiments, we found a method that is approachable to arrange, which additionally seems to be free from these methodological flaws. In our study participants were shown an arranged message suggesting that the experimenter’s work has been destroyed. In experiment 1 (N = 44), we showed that the method proposed by us significantly affects guilt. In experiment 2 (N = 89), we replicated our result, additionally demonstrating that our procedure significantly affected only the emotion of guilt (compared to other emotions) - which is a novelty. It also has been shown that complying with the request of the victim (conditional forgiveness) makes us feel less guilty, but it does not restore liking to this person - which was established by previous research. The discussion section summarizes the results, indicates their limitations, and proposes directions for future research.
In the present study, we explored the role of liking in the social induction of affect. Dispositional likeability was manipulated by written reports describing a sender as a likeable or dislikeable character. Afterwards participants watched short videos presenting the sender displaying happy or sad emotional expressions. We expected that exposure to the likeable sender would lead to reactions concordant with his emotional expression (assimilation), whereas exposure to the dislikeable sender would result in discordant reactions (contrast). The results indicated that dispositional likeability influenced the social induction of affect when the sender expressed positive emotions. Moreover, liking mediated the effects of the happy sender’s dispositional likeability on participants’ affective state. Exposure to the sad sender, however, led to assimilation regardless of the sender’s dispositional likeability.
Mimicry is known to produce benefits for the mimicker such as liking, increased prosocial tendencies (e.g., higher donations), and trust. Little is known about the benefits or costs to the mimickee. The aim of this study is to explore this issue. Participants were mimicked or not by a confederate. The confederate then dropped pens and checked if the participants picked them up (a proxy for prosocial behavior). Finally, questionnaires were administered that assessed each participant’s liking of the confederate and self-liking, and self-esteem. As expected, mimicked participants picked up more pens and liked the mimicker more. Surprisingly, mimicked participants reported significantly lower self-like when compared to non-mimicked participants, and their self-esteem tended towards being lower. This research fills an important theoretical gap showing that there is a great cost to mimicry.
Mimicry has been proven to be responsible for many social consequences linked to social bonding: improved trust, liking, and rapport. This accumulating empirical evidence has mostly been based on experimental designs focused on comparisons between two conditions: an experimental condition involving mimicking behavior versus a control condition in which any movement or direct verbal reaction is withdrawn. Thus, it is unclear whether the observed differences stem from a potential increase in liking, trust, or rapport in the mimicry condition or a decrease thereof when naturally occurring gestures are not present during the interaction. To address this potential confound, we included an additional control condition involving responsiveness (but not mimicry) aimed at increasing both internal and external validity. We found significant differences between the mimicry condition and both control conditions, thereby lending support to the original mimicry-as-a-social-glue hypothesis.
Many studies confirmed the positive effect of trust on human relations and performance in organizations. As a social judgment, trust should be related to perceived competence and warmth as two basic dimensions of person perception. Surprisingly, to date no attempts have been made to examine the influence of attributed competence and warmth on social judgments in interpersonal relations at work. To this end, we examine the influence of perceived competence and warmth on trust, liking and respect in upward and downward work relations. A study involving 190 middle-stage managers revealed that the two fundamental dimensions of social cognition (competence and warmth) influence respect, liking and trust. Competence had a stronger effect on respect than warmth; the opposite was true for liking. Trust was conditioned by both competence and warmth to an equal, high extent. At the same time, warmth expressed by supervisors led to higher results in liking, respect and trust in them than warmth expressed by subordinates.
In most individualistic cultures, pride is regarded as a positive emotion that follows a positive evaluation of one’s competence or effort when achieving a goal. Fredrickson (2001) suggests that pride may expand individuals’ scope of attention and broaden their action repertoires by driving them toward greater achievements in the future. In the present study, we show that proud individuals may search for greater achievements by stronger willingness to cooperate with agentic though immoral individuals. We demonstrate that proud participants in comparison to participants in the control condition rely to a higher degree on information on agency and respect, and less on information on morality and liking of their potential partners of cooperation.
In theory, knowing an individual’s attitude about a topic should allow us to predict his or her behavior. However, in a classic study, Wicker (1969) came to the surprising conclusion that attitudes and behaviors are only weakly related. We present a new theoretical perspective that describes the conditions necessary for an attitude to be translated into a behavior. More specifically, we propose that an attitude (i.e., liking of an end state) is not sufficient to cause behavior. Rather, that liking must first become a desire, which will only occur if an individual likes a potential future state more than the present state. The desire must subsequently be transformed into a goal, which will only occur if the desire is perceived as attainable. The goal must then become a focal goal (i.e., be momentarily dominant in an individual’s goal system). Lastly, in order for a particular behavior to be enacted, it must be selected as a means that serves the focal goal. We offer empirical evidence for our theory and describe how it goes beyond previous models of attitude-behavior relations, such as the Theory of Planned Behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and the MODE model (Fazio, 1990).
The main theme of the article centers on the methods of expressing liking which is understood as a positive attitude towards another person functioning in the Internet. The aim of the paper is to show and discuss elements of communication and language pragmatics typical for emotive speech, including the elements which are results of the new media. The theoretical part concerns two aspects: 1) definition of the emotive (expressive) function In linguistics and of the terms describing phenomena which are related to the science of communication; 2) the Internet as a new tool and an environment for social communication. The analysis is conducted on the written data produced by the Facebook community. Conclusions concern the observed patterns of form, intentional content and functions of written production expressing liking.
Liking and respect are postulated as two dimensions of interpersonal attitudes. Liking-disliking is an idiosyncratic response which depends mostly on how target persons influence interests and well-being of the attitude holder and is accompanied by beliefs in their communal traits. Respect-disrespect is a socially shared response which depends mostly on the social status of target persons and is accompanied by beliefs in their agency. This Self-interest /Status Model (SSM) of differences between liking and respect was tested in two studies. It was predicted and found that respect responses (and underlying judgments of agentic traits) are socially shared to higher extent than liking responses (and underlying judgments of communal traits).
Liking and respect are postulated as two dimensions of interpersonal attitudes. Liking-disliking is an idiosyncratic response which depends mostly on how target persons influence interests and well-being of the attitude holder and is accompanied by beliefs in their communal traits. Respect-disrespect is a socially shared response which depends mostly on the social status of target persons and is accompanied by beliefs in their agency. This Self-interest /Status Model (SSM) of differences between liking and respect was tested in two studies. It was predicted and found that respect responses (and underlying judgments of agentic traits) are socially shared to higher extent than liking responses (and underlying judgments of communal traits).
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