While making references to historic facts the author of the present paper shows that tolerance in communities is absolutely necessary. It is founded on: 1) acceptance of the objective sense of fundamental values; 2) justice in mutual relationships; 3) love as a force that stimulates co-existence of human beings.
The article discusses the problem of natural justice which has been considered by Aristotle in his (1) Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics and (2) Magna Moralia. In his Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics Aristotle says of natural justice that it is changeable and not the same everywhere. The implication seems to be that no action, not even murder, is always wrong. But, as is evident especially from his Magna Moralia, Aristotle distinguishes justice into the “what” (equality), the “in what” (proportion between persons and things), and the “about what” (what things are exchanged with which persons). The article concludes that Aristotle allows for variability only in the “about what,” while in the “what” and the “in what” he allows for no variability.
Hannah Arendt’s concept “the banality of evil” was subverted by Bettina Stangneth’s recent research. But with the concept of the banality of evil, the inherent continuity of her “radical evil,” Arendt enriched the discourse of evil which allows us to gain insight into the relationship between evil and ordinary human beings. At the same time, Arendt also raised the question about law, ethics and politics when evil was put to justice. In fact, what she cares about, is justice to everyone; what she wants is to under-stand the evil and to make her own critical thinking about it.
The author has made an attempt to portray the concept of justice in the context of the ethos of social struggle. He tried to put the principles of justice Maria Ossowska and Zygmunt Ziembiński social reality assuming a process of socialization of the concept and the ethos of martial understood as a continuous social changes shaped by culture. The outline is based on three formulas developed by Ossowska justice and eleven conglomerates behavior that presented Ziembiński. The final conclusion is that the ethos of social justice as the value used may be reflected only in lawful activities.
In the context of penal fiscal law there has been a discussion over a proper reaction to a fiscal tort. This is even more important in connection with the increase of the number of criminal offences, particularly in terms of tax offences and the decrease in effectiveness of administrative proceedings of public levies1. Beyond doubt, the proposals tabled in the discussions aim at objective settlements. This paper comprises an attempt to answer the question of how the justice is perceived in the context of penal fiscal law.
The social dispute over justice that is in a great crisis, must not be limited to social and economical criteria only. This is proved by the elementary experience, since attempts to overcome injustice only on this level are not effective. The anthropological and personalist criterion is necessary here. Only this criterion allows one to integrally define a man – also in his relations with others – as a person. Also justice has a personalist character, and because of this it is not a value that is only added to a man. As such, it is also an objective value that has an obligatory character, which is difficult to justify, and the more so to make it come true, without the Christian Revelation. The event of Jesus Christ, with the preparation given in the Old Testament, shows man’s sin as the fundamental source of injustice. This is why in an encounter with injustice only God’s mercy is effective, as the only factor – through Jesus’ paschal mystery – that overcomes sin. It is not tantamount to giving up justice, but to practicing it – as in Jesus’ understanding surrendering to the criteria of justice is a necessary condition of mercy, so that the sin can be judged and overcome, and the man can be saved.
The process instruction Dignitas connubii was a document long anticipated by the employees of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Poland, all the more so that it had been announced by Pope John Paul II in his speech to Roma Rota. In addition, in those not so distant times, some employees of ecclesiastical courts in Poland still remembered previous process instruction Provida Mater (1936), alongside its great signi cance for ecclesiastical jurisdic- tion after Pio-Benedictine codi cation of 1917, thus, hopes and expectations related to the new process instruction were considerable. Today, ten years after the publication of Dignitas connubii, it is a special moment to discuss the question of canonical matrimonial process because we are between the meetings of the synod of bishops on the institution of marriage and family, and a commission for the study of reform of the canonical matrimonial process has been appointed. What is more, the fact has been also reported by mass media which, for obvious reasons, have taken particular interest in that issue. Of course, the above situation generates a lot of attention in the Church itself, for a number of reasons. Being aware that our role is not to create or modify the existing church procedural law but virtually to apply it accurately, it should be emphasized that instruction Dignitas connubii was accepted with due respect and obedience by the employees of ecclesiastical jurisdic- tion in Poland, particularly because it was published in the last year of the ponti cate of John Paul II and also on his initiative. Therefore, from the very beginning it was perceived as vademecum for the canonical matrimonial process as Pope Benedict XVI said about the instruction Dignitas connubii in His rst speech to Roman Rota in 2006. Undoubtedly, today we should take care about indicating clearly that the matrimonial process is something exceptional in the Church; in the ecclesiastic community it should not be perceived as a standard but as an exceptional situation. It is an important mission of the Church now and a serious pastoral problem: how to protect the indissolubity of marriage, not only in the process but also in the doctrinal aspect? However, when it comes to the marriage process, we should ensure that it is right, transparent and just.
PL
Instrukcja procesowa Dignitas connubii była dokumentem wyczekiwanym przez pra- cowników sądownictwa kościelnego w Polsce, tym bardziej że została ona zapowiedziana przez papieża Jana Pawła II w przemówieniu rotalnym z 1998 roku. Dzisiaj, dziesięć lat po opublikowaniu Dignitas connubii, jest też szczególny moment, aby dyskutować na temat kanonicznego procesu małżeńskiego, gdyż została powołana specjalna komisja papieska do reformy kanonicznego procesu małżeńskiego. Dobrze funkcjonujące sądownictwo kościelne winno pozostawać jasnym oraz wymownym znakiem, że Kościół pozostaje sprawnie funkcjonującą instytucją. Był to niewątpliwie jeden z celów prac nad instrukcją Dignitas connubii, ale – jak uczy doświadczenie – nie wystarczy mieć tylko dobre prawo, trzeba je także dobrze stosować, przede wszystkim poprzez dobrze przygotowaną kadrę pracowników sądownictwa kościelnego. Należy podkreślić, że instrukcja Dignitas connubii została z należytym szacunkiem oraz posłuszeństwem przyjęta przez pracowników polskiego sądownictwa kościelnego, tym bardziej że została ona opublikowana w ostatni roku ponty katu papieża Jana Pawła II, jak również powstała z jego inicjatywy. Stąd też od samego początku była ona postrzegana jako vademecum dla kanonicznego procesu małżeńskiego, jak powiedział o instrukcji Dignitas connubii papież Benedykt XVI w swoim pierwszym przemówieniu rotalnym z 2006 roku. Życzliwe przyjęcie w Polsce instrukcji Dignitas connubii nie oznacza automatycznie, że jej opublikowanie nie spowodowało pytań dotyczących natury dokumentu oraz sposobu jego ogłoszenia, które to wątpliwości pojawiły się także w światowej kanonistyce. Trzeba powiedzieć, że kościelny wymiar sprawiedliwość jest dzisiaj w bardzo trudnej sytu- acji – przede wszystkim biskupi winni być tego świadomi oraz winni uważać ten sektor życia Kościoła, często w przeszłości zaniedbywany, za przedmiot ich szczególnej odpowiedzialności osobistej o pierwszoplanowym znaczeniu. Do sytuacji, w której pracują dzisiejsze sądy kościelne, trzeba także dodać bardzo powszechny relatywizm moralny oraz idący za nim, niestety zakorzeniający się także w środowiskach kościelnych, relatywizm dotyczący swobodnego oraz wybiórczego interpretowania normy prawnej. Niestety znakomita w tej materii alokucja rotalna papieża Benedykta XVI z 2012 roku została bardzo została szybko zapomniana.
This paper is a comparative study on the concept of God according to Pope Benedict in his encyclical letter Deus Caritas Est and Pope Francis in his inter-view book The Name of God is Mercy. Their particular concept of God is complementary as exemplified in the Parable of the Good Samaritan.
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In the text I take a closer look at the political paradigm of self-sufficiency as outlined by French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. The paradigm is at work in all traditional Western political views, ideologies and practices, and can be reduced to two schematic models of politics: that of the subject, and of the citizen. The models are seen by Nancy to be no longer relevant to the urgent demands of contemporary social and political reality; they are also held to be responsible for contemporary problems and crises in, and of, democracy. Nancy tries to present an another approach to political practice and focuses on the issue of the (social) tie as one that is not given in any substantial way but always remains to be tied, always to be decided and continually reshaped in a response to unforeseeable events. As a part of a sketch of a political philosophy of relation and non-self-sufficiency, Nancy discusses the issues of singularity, incommensurability, justice and ,,equaliberty'', and stresses the need for constant invention of new forms of a democratic politics. The latter is meant as a politics of ,,democracy to-come'', democracy that always remains in statu nascendi, in the process of eventual transformation.
Historical memory can be divided into three main levels: collective (national), mass and individual. The ratio between them can be different: the same, overlap or contradicting each other. So when forming the collective historical memory should be made of the three main factors: political order, their own interests’ agents, the desire not to offend or not to initiate an active disagreement from those who have personal experience that has formed an opinion on this period, or event. Memory is expressed in signs and symbols, affecting both the mind and the subconscious mind; it constantly recharges sense of national identity, loyalty lifestyle and righteous actions. The history of society during war clearly identifies basic principles of nature as an individual and society as a whole. The military component is one of the most accurate tests of justice and legality, correctness of life as individuals, social groups and the whole society. Therefore, the study of the formation of national memory, using military experience, allows high accuracy to determine the major features of mentality. For the history of formation of the memory of the American society, exactly the Vietnam War can be called the most striking example of the use of memory about it to prove its creditability.
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This study focuses upon the role of a judge in the Cisleithian part of the Habsburg Monarchy. The judge as a formally independent and impartial representative of one of the three branches of state power was fully dependent on the executive branch decision-making in terms of his material and social standing. Efforts to improve their status led the judges to co-operate with the political representation, resulting in the ever increasing interference of political parties in the sphere of judicial administration.
This paper presents human rights in connection with the dispute between legal posi-tivism and legal non-positivism. The importance of this topic can be evaluated by the debate that took place between Hart and Dworkin. Indeed, much of Dworkin’s work can be considered a reaction to Hart’s positivism. The presented study argues for the defense of the thesis that in order to understand such a debate it is important to take a position between moral noncognitivism and moral cognitivism. The hypothesis is that legal positivism does depend on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism. There-fore, only based on strong moral cognitivism would it be consistent to sustain the typi-cal non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Human rights are in the center of this debate because they constitute the core of the current morality, especially the most important core of justice.
Identity has long since been a key concept within historical, sociological and philosophical enquires into sport. This article asserts that identity politics in sport is not enough and alternative forms of thinking about identity need to challenge the conventional wisdom that identity for identity sake is sufficient. By introducing the notions recognition and re-distribution this research attempts to move the field of sport on. Only by looking at alternative conceptions of the links between identity, redistribution and recognition can we meet the requirements of justice for all through and in sport. This article addresses the following concerns (i) sport in the age of identity politics; (ii) from identity politics to recognition through sport and (iii) from recognition through sport to redistribution and social justice.
The issue of values is essential for Amartya Sen’s political philosophy, likewise for the early works of John Rawls. Considering the fundamental political value of social justice, Sen rejects the Rawlsian attitude because of the erroneous concept of human nature, adopted by him, which led him to a „blind” morality. He proposes a diff erent approach, referring to the notion of human capabilities on which his own theory of justice is based and he investigates it in the framework of political philosophy, which takes into account the qualitative dimension of human choices. Martha Nussbaum also builds her theory of justice on this notion, however, she derives it from the Aristotelian concept of man so that it takes on a deeper philosophical meaning. The aim of this paper is to compare and to assess both these concepts of justice, referring to human capabilities, as well as to shed some light on the new path of research in political philosophy opened by them.
In the discussion concerning the understanding of what hell is, the opinion of the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev is very important. He is strongly opposed to the attempts to rationalize the problem saying that, sooner or later, they breed fear and anxiety. Hell is pure subjectivity, the inability to go beyond the circle of our spirit’s constant torment. Therefore, hell is not related to objectivity. Rather, it is a total confinement, a state of helplessness. It is being imprisoned in time, which has no end, a dream, from which it is impossible to wake up. Thus, it is not the result of God’s decision, a punishment for committed sins. On the contrary, it is the result of choice, being in favor of your own loneliness. Ultimately, it will remain only a creation of our rationalization. Therefore, we must have hope (which perhaps will be false) that hell does not exist.
The idea of human rights is connected to the modern perception of law founded on subjectivity, in the context of which rights are authorizations of individual action versus a higher authority, resulting in a subjectivity of law. The huge importance of the thomistic perception of the person is connected with the issue of relations between the individual and society, as well as relations between law and state, since Thomas Aquinas foresaw what we call ‘rights of man’. Thus, the person, in a metaphysical context, is associated with natural order, since natural sociability forms the basis of a person’s supernatural fulfillment. Because of his social nature, the person is also a carrier of social relations and a product of his own encounter with other persons. In this way, Thomas Aquinas makes a synthesis of man per se, as part of mankind, and man as a person vis-à-vis others in the sphere of justice, consisting ‘in rendering to each one his right’. Ius is a relation of justice concerning what is right (iustum) from the point of view of the other, “to whom something is due.” Aquinas can be considered a forerunner of human rights of the modern era, as demonstrated by the issue of natural equity, the issue of unjust law and obedience and the issue of political legitimization. In this framework, “human” or “natural” rights are considered moral rights. However, in the sphere of law they are perceived only within the community and common good, by no means constituting exclusive and absolute rights but only rights corresponding with duties and obligations. The Thomistic approach expresses both the free side of man vis-à-vis the state and its structures (in the spiritual level) and the egalitarian demand of law within social relations. Furthermore, it places the sphere of law on the background of common good and common interest. The Thomistic approach of the human person is a response to the modern perception of legal subjectivity and the priority of individuals, associated with the ideology of rights and leading to a confrontation of individual and society and a division of man to natural man and citizen, a product of the antithesis between society and state.
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This article examines the dimension of the tragic experience in Levinas’s ethics. This dimension seems at odds with this ethics’ claim to define justice in a new way – no longer as a relation of reciprocity between members of a community, but newly according to the individual and asymmetrical relation to the Other. On several occa-sions, Levinas expresses the intention to overcome the fatality of being and to break with the totalitarian effects of the State logic by revealing the ethical meaning beyond being. His philosophy has therefore been interpreted as an ethics of transcendence, based upon the reference to the idea of the Good, but which is unable to account for the tragic dimension of conflicting values and for the finitude of the subjectivity’s capabilities for doing good. In this article, however, I argue that Levinas does not ignore a dimension of the tragic in the ethical relation to the other. Reconsidering the notion of the “there is” (the il y a) within the relation to the other, I show in the first part of this paper how Levinas’s ethics of transcendence enables us to consider a new sense of the tragic experience, given with the responsibility for the other. In the second part, I examine how this sense of the tragic experience relates to Levinas’s understanding of justice. Confronting Levinas with Ricœur’s approach to tragic action in One-self as another, I point to a gap between Levinas’s ethical concept of justice and the political realisation of justice, the articulation of which also reveals several major problems in Levinas’s understanding of justice.
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This empirical study shows that Swedish upper secondary students and teachers perceive the control of procedures for knowledge checks and grading so inadequate that the distribution of fi nal assessment risks being unfair. In a market-oriented competitive school system, managed by objectives and results, grades tend to be regarded as the best measure of educational quality. Student grades thus become important for individual students, teachers and schools. Particularly important as educational hard currency is the lowest acceptable grade level, that distinguishes failures from result-achievement. Data from discussions on norms indicate that students and teachers (all of whom discussed the matters separetely) show a clear justice-based tolerance for school-cheatingperceived as re-securing a fair distribution of grades. The teachers are particularly tolerant to cheating students who would risk failing grades had they not cheated. Explicit prohibitions of cheating are thereby outcompeted by negotiated social norms of justice that implicitly encourages some forms of cheating. The well-known double agenda is kept as a hidden truth and thereby reproduced.
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