Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Around 1948: The “Gentle Revolution” and Art History

100%

Markowska A.

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nr 30

137-160

EN

Just like after World War I Italy experienced a transition from modernism to fascism, after World II Poland experienced a passage from modernism to quasi-communism. The symbol of the first stage of the communist revolution in Poland right after the war, the so-called “gentle revolution,” was Pablo Picasso, whose work was popularized not so much because of its artistic value, but because of his membership in the communist party. The second, repressive stage of the continued came in 1949–1955, to return after the so-called thaw to Picasso and the exemplars of the École de Paris. However, the imagery of the revolution was associated only with the socialist realism connected to the USSR even though actually it was the adaptation of the École de Paris that best expressed the revolution’s victory. In the beginning, its moderate program, strongly emphasizing the national heritage as well as financial promises, made the cultural offer of the communist regime quite attractive not only for the left. Thus, the gentle revolution proved to be a Machiavellian move, disseminating power to centralize it later more effectively. On the other hand, the return to the Paris exemplars resulted in the aestheticization of radical and undemocratic changes. The received idea that the evil regime was visualized only by the ugly socialist realism is a disguise of the Polish dream of innocence and historical purity, while it was the war which gave way to the revolution, and right after the war artists not only played games with the regime, but gladly accepted social comfort guaranteed by authoritarianism. Neither artists, nor art historians started a discussion about the totalizing stain on modernity and the exclusion of the other. Even the folk art was instrumentalized by the state which manipulated folk artists to such an extent that they often lost their original skills. Horrified by the war atrocities and their consequences, art historians limited their activities to the most urgent local tasks, such as making inventories of artworks, reorganization of institutions, and reconstruction. Mass expropriation, a consequence of the revolution, was not perceived by museum personnel as a serious problem, since thanks to it museums acquired more and more exhibits, while architects and restorers could implement their boldest plans. The academic and social neutralization of expropriation favored the birth of a new human being, which was one of the goals of the revolution. Along the ethnic homogenization of society, focusing on Polish art meant getting used to monophony. No cultural opposition to the authoritarian ideas of modernity appeared – neither the École de Paris as a paradigm of the high art, nor the folklore manipulated by the state were able to come up with the ideas of the weak subject or counter-history. Despite the social revolution, the class distinction of ethnography and high art remained unchanged.

2

Wokół roku 1948: „rewolucja łagodna” i historia sztuki

100%

Markowska A.

|

nr 30

367-391

PL

Just like after World War I Italy experienced a transition from modernism to fascism, after World War II Poland experienced a passage from modernism to quasi-communism. The symbol of the first stage of the communist revolution in Poland right after the war, the so-called “gentle revolution,” was Pablo Picasso, whose work was popularized not so much because of its artistic value, but because of his membership in the communist party. The second, repressive stage of the continued came in 1949–1955, to return after the so-called thaw to Picasso and the exemplars of the École de Paris. However, the imagery of the revolution was associated only with the socialist realism connected to the USSR even though actually it was the adaptation of the École de Paris that best expressed the revolution’s victory. In the beginning, its moderate program, strongly emphasizing the national heritage as well as financial promises, made the cultural offer of the communist regime quite attractive not only for the left. Thus, the gentle revolution proved to be a Machiavellian move, disseminating power to centralize it later more effectively. On the other hand, the return to the Paris exemplars resulted in the aestheticization of radical and undemocratic changes. The received idea that the evil regime was visualized only by the ugly socialist realism is a disguise of the Polish dream of innocence and historical purity, while it was the war which gave way to the revolution, and right after the war artists not only played games with the regime, but gladly accepted social comfort guaranteed by authoritarianism. Neither artists, nor art historians started a discussion about the totalizing stain on modernity and the exclusion of the other. Even the folk art was instrumentalized by the state which manipulated folk artists to such an extent that they often lost their original skills. Horrified by the war atrocities and their consequences, art historians limited their activities to the most urgent local tasks, such as making inventories of artworks, reorganization of institutions, and reconstruction. Mass expropriation, a consequence of the revolution, was not perceived by museum personnel as a serious problem, since thanks to it museums acquired more and more exhibits, while architects and restorers could implement their boldest plans. The academic and social neutralization of expropriation favored the birth of a new human being, which was one of the goals of the revolution. Along the ethnic homogenization of society, focusing on Polish art meant getting used to monophony. No cultural opposition to the authoritarian ideas of modernity appeared – neither the École de Paris as a paradigm of the high art, nor the folklore manipulated by the state were able to come up with the ideas of the weak subject or counter-history. Despite the social revolution, the class distinction of ethnography and high art remained unchanged.

3

The Shameless Official in an Aggressive State: Educational Consequences

72%

Kobylarek A. , Madej M. , Máhrik T.

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nr 2

7-13

EN

Modern democracy in the Polish State, as well as respect for minorities of all kinds and women themselves, is collapsing in favour of a particularly close affiliation between the State and the Church. The separation of these two institutions is becoming negligible, if it still exists, and the state and the church have become allies of each other with any educated and/or intelligent element that does not support such a practice. The medieval practices, the stigmatisation of individual groups, patriarchy and the lack of respect for the constitution oppress societies, oppress the rights of citizens and show their place in the ranks. More and more rights are granted only to privileged groups, while others, such as women, LGBTQA+, migrants, the disabled, political opponents, or anyone else who does not support the current actions of the most influential institutions, remain ignored or muddled, vis-à-vis potential voters of the ruling party. Meanwhile, influential citizens can afford to do almost anything. At present, the lord and master decides the fate of all his subjects irrespective of how many protests and on what issues take place in the state, the utter shamelessness of the official can be observed here. Those who invoke God do not seem to believe in Him and, moreover, they act contrary to His principles. What stands out most in their actions is their total ignorance, their hatred of anyone who is against them and their lack of thought for the consequences that will come to them once they lose their power. The only hope seems to be for future voters with full civic awareness.

4

Democratization and federalization. A comparative perspective between Russia’s and Spain’s early forays into a federal system

72%

Suárez A. P.

Krakowskie Studia Małopolskie

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2023

|

tom 2(38)

51-61

EN

Undoubtedly, Russia occupies a distinct position within the political landscape, differentiating it from Western democracies that themselves exhibit considerable variation. This uniqueness can be attributed, in part, to Russia’s geographic characteristics, encompassing diverse subdivisions characterized by variations in population, natural resources, territorial expanse, and distance from the central authority. However, what truly distinguishes Russia is its contemporary history and recent experiences with federalization- a framework that has defined its operations since it became the Russian Federation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The objective of this paper is to analyze the distinctive features of Russian federalism in its early stages, employing a comparative perspective against the Spanish case, in order to ascertain the consequences of the legal, organizational, and territorial arrangements established during Russia’s early democratization period. The focus is to evaluate the implications of these changes on the establishment of a legally-binding democracy and a well-functioning federation, ultimately questioning whether Russia genuinely qualifies for either of these classifications.

5

University Leadership, Abyssal Responsibility, Sovereign Exception: An Argument for a New Form of Disciplinary Decision-Making

72%

Dronsfield J.

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nr 1(24) New Sociology of Leadership

271-288

EN

A critique of university leadership, in particular as it is manifest in disciplinary processes. The basic problem is the separation of the leader from the institution she leads. Separation is an all-too-common problem with university leadership, and gives rise to a fundamental crisis of responsibility – what I name the problem of abyssal responsibility: a non-locatable responsibility for which no-one answers fully – making it unfairly difficult for the academic sanctioned to challenge the disciplinary decision. The gap created by the separation of the person deciding from evidence and reasons can be exploited for abusing power. In abyssal responsibility, the right to punish is intimately linked to the right to grant clemency, what I call sovereign exception. I ask whether the separation internal to the structure of abyssal responsibility might allow for a creative corrective to it. And I answer no, because then the only responsible decision would to abolish the leader. Responsibility in such cases must be made transparent and visible. I propose a form of leadership which is non-personalist and de-hierarchised, one which involves co-learning and co-responsivity, and above all is not separate. In short, a leadership which is democratic.

6

Zrewidowany paradygmat systemowy. Wyjaśnienia i dodatkowe elementy w świetle doświadczeń państw postsocjalistycznych – część druga

58%

Kornai J.

|

2017

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nr 4(42)

7-22

PL

Termin paradygmat został wprowadzony do filozofii nauki przez Thomasa Kuhna, który posłużył się nim do określenia specyficznego podejścia wykorzystanego przez daną szkołę badawczą do analizowania przedmiotu badań. Badacze używając tego samego paradygmatu, szukają odpowiedzi na podobne pytania badawcze i wykorzystują zbliżone metody i podejścia. W pracy opublikowanej w 2000 roku autor tego eseju wprowadził termin paradygmatu systemowego (system paradigm), który odnosi się do systemów funkcjonujących w społeczeństwie. Niniejsze studium rozwija teoretyczne zagadnienia zarysowane we wcześniejszym artykule, uwzględniając doświadczenia z transformacji państw postsocjalistycznych. Pierwsza część jest porównaniem systemu socjalistycznego i kapitalistycznego, autor opisuje ich główne cechy i konkluduje, że system kapitalistyczny został wprowadzony w państwach poprzednio socjalistycznych z wyjątkiem Korei Północnej i Kuby. Część druga to analiza różnych postaci kapitalizmu na podstawie typologii zbudowanej na dominujących formach polityki i rządów. Wyróżnione zostały trzy istotnie różniące się między sobą typy kapitalizmu: demokratyczny, autokratyczny i dyktatorski. Huntington pisał o „trzeciej fali” demokratyzacji. Studium to kończyła konkluzja, że trzecia fala dobiegła kresu (has dried up): tylko w jednej dziesiątej z 47 państw postsocjalistycznych społeczeństwa żyją w ustroju demokratycznym, podczas gdy we wszystkich pozostałych państwach tej grupy przeważają autokratyzm i dyktatura. W trzeciej części eseju autor podejmuje wątki aparatu konceptualnego i analitycznego w odniesieniu do Węgier, gdzie funkcjonuje kapitalizm, natomiast przeważającą formą w polityce i rządzeniu jest autokratyzm – tu można znaleźć ważne cechy wspólne dla Węgier i innych państw kapitalistycznych czy innych ustrojów autokratycznych. Taki rezultat jest zgodny z obserwacją, że istnieją mniej fundamentalne cechy typowe dla Węgier („hungarica”), które odróżniają się od cech innych państw.

EN

The term paradigm was introduced to the philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn – he used this term to denote the specific approach applied by a school of research to examine its subject matter. Using the same paradigm, researchers seek answers to similar questions, and employ similar methods and concepts. In an article published in 2000, the author of this essay introduced the term system paradigm, which focuses on the systems functioning in a society. This study develops the theoretical considerations outlined in that earlier article on the basis of experience of post-socialist transition. The first part compares the socialist and capitalist systems, describing their main characteristics, and concludes that the capitalist system has become established in former socialist countries, except for North Korea and Cuba. The second part analyzes varieties of capitalism within a typology which classifies prevailing forms of politics and government. Three markedly different types are identified: democracy, autocracy, and dictatorship. Huntington wrote about the “third wave” of democratization. This study concludes the third wave has dried up: for the 47 postsocialist countries, only a tenth of the population live in democracies, while autocracy or dictatorship prevails in all other countries in this group. The third part of this essay applies the conceptual and analytical apparatus to Hungary, where capitalism exists, and autocracy is the prevailing politico-governmental form – here we can find important characteristics common to other capitalist countries or other autocracies. This finding is compatible with the observation that there are some less fundamental characteristics unique to Hungary, or “Hungarica”, which differ from the characteristics of all other countries.

7

Zrewidowany paradygmat systemowy. Wyjaśnienia i dodatkowe elementy w świetle doświadczeń państw postsocjalistycznych – część trzecia

58%

Kornai J.

|

nr 1(43)

7-18

PL

Termin paradygmat został wprowadzony do filozofii nauki przez Thomasa Kuhna, który posłużył się nim do określenia specyficznego podejścia wykorzystanego przez daną szkołę badawczą do analizowania przedmiotu badań. Badacze używając tego samego paradygmatu, szukają odpowiedzi na podobne pytania badawcze i wykorzystują zbliżone metody i podejścia. W pracy opublikowanej w 2000 roku autor tego eseju wprowadził termin paradygmatu systemowego (system paradigm), który odnosi się do systemów funkcjonujących w społeczeństwie. Niniejsze studium rozwija teoretyczne zagadnienia zarysowane we wcześniejszym artykule, uwzględniając doświadczenia z transformacji państw postsocjalistycznych. Pierwsza część jest porównaniem systemu socjalistycznego i kapitalistycznego, autor opisuje ich główne cechy i konkluduje, że system kapitalistyczny został wprowadzony w państwach poprzednio socjalistycznych z wyjątkiem Korei Północnej i Kuby. Część druga to analiza różnych postaci kapitalizmu na podstawie typologii zbudowanej na dominujących formach polityki i rządów. Wyróżnione zostały trzy istotnie różniące się między sobą typy kapitalizmu: demokratyczny, autokratyczny i dyktatorski. Huntington pisał o „trzeciej fali” demokratyzacji. Studium to kończyła konkluzja, że trzecia fala dobiegła kresu (has dried up): tylko w jednej dziesiątej z 47 państw postsocjalistycznych społeczeństwa żyją w ustroju demokratycznym, podczas gdy we wszystkich pozostałych państwach tej grupy przeważają autokratyzm i dyktatura. W trzeciej części eseju autor podejmuje wątki aparatu konceptualnego i analitycznego w odniesieniu do Węgier, gdzie funkcjonuje kapitalizm, natomiast przeważającą formą w polityce i rządzeniu jest autokratyzm – tu można znaleźć ważne cechy wspólne dla Węgier i innych państw kapitalistycznych czy innych ustrojów autokratycznych. Taki rezultat jest zgodny z obserwacją, że istnieją mniej fundamentalne cechy typowe dla Węgier („hungarica”), które odróżniają się od cech innych państw.

EN

The term paradigm was introduced to the philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn – he used this term to denote the specific approach applied by a school of research to examine its subject matter. Using the same paradigm, researchers seek answers to similar questions, and employ similar methods and concepts. In an article published in 2000, the author of this essay introduced the term system paradigm, which focuses on the systems functioning in a society. This study develops the theoretical considerations outlined in that earlier article on the basis of experience of post-socialist transition. The first part compares the socialist and capitalist systems, describing their main characteristics, and concludes that the capitalist system has become established in former socialist countries, except for North Korea and Cuba. The second part analyzes varieties of capitalism within a typology which classifies prevailing forms of politics and government. Three markedly different types are identified: democracy, autocracy, and dictatorship. Huntington wrote about the “third wave” of democratization. This study concludes the third wave has dried up: for the 47 postsocialist countries, only a tenth of the population live in democracies, while autocracy or dictatorship prevails in all other countries in this group. The third part of this essay applies the conceptual and analytical apparatus to Hungary, where capitalism exists, and autocracy is the prevailing politico-governmental form – here we can find important characteristics common to other capitalist countries or other autocracies. This finding is compatible with the observation that there are some less fundamental characteristics unique to Hungary, or “Hungarica”, which differ from the characteristics of all other countries.

8

Filozofia wolności i władzy w piśmiennictwie Filareta Drozdowa

58%

Mazuś M.

|

nr 3

9

Etnokratyczno-klanowy wymiar reżimu politycznego Tatarstanu

44%

Bodio T. , Zuzankiewicz P.

|

2014

|

tom 33

313-332

PL

W artykule podjęto próbę opisu i wyjaśnienia specyfiki reżimu politycznego Tatarstanu – podmiotu Federacji Rosyjskiej, kładąc nacisk na jego wymiar etnokratyczny. Diagnozowany jest reżim polityczny Rosji, wyjaśnione źródła i konsekwencje asymetrii reżimu federalnego z regionalnymi reżimami politycznymi. Z diagnozy generalnie wynika, że istniejący kształt reżimu federalnego i reżimów regionalnych jest kryzosogenny i wymaga daleko idącej modernizacji. Autorzy artykułu przejęli założenie, że etnopolityka jest istotnym składnikiem reżimu politycznego państw etnopolitycznych. Szczegółowo uzasadniają ten pogląd badając etnokratyczne wymiary reżimu politycznego Tatarstanu. Dochodzą do wniosku, że w tatarstańskim reżimie ujawnia się swoista symbioza etatyzmu, etnokratyzmu, paternalizmu i trybalizmu. Definiują ten reżim jako autorytarno-etnokratyczny budowany na bazie korporatywizmu klanowo-politycznego, w którym szczególna pozycję zajmuje przywódca.

XX

This article attempts to describe and explain the specificity of the political regime of Tatarstan, a federal subject of the Russian Federation, with emphasis on its ethnocratic dimension. The subject of diagnosis is the Russian political system, as well as sources and consequences of asymmetry between the federal regime and regional political regimes. The diagnosis generally indicates that the existing form of the federal and regional regimes causes the political crises and requires a far-reaching modernization. The authors took an assumption that in the ethnopolitical countries the ethnopolitics is an essential component of the political regimes. They justify this thesis by examining ethnocratic dimensions of the political regime of Tatarstan. They come to a conclusion that the Tatarstani regime reveals a peculiar symbiosis of etatism, ethnocratism, paternalism and tribalism. This regime is defined as authoritarian and ethnocratic, built on the basis of the clannish and political corporatism, with a particular position held by the leader.