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tom 5
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nr 5
243-258
EN
The aim in the article is to explain why we fall in dualism of content and conceptual scheme. The dualism says that there is a relation between languages and the world (meant as an object). The first cause is mechanistic way of thinking which characterizes Indoeuropean mind. The way on thinking is to treat every object as if it had formal properties of physical objects. The term is taken from Whorf’s works. Concequences of mechanistic thinking for research in abstract sciences is considered. It is demonstrated how mechanistic thinking lets to pass from belief that there are some relations between expressions of a language and elements of the world to belief that there is a relation between the language as a whole and the whole world. The fallowing causes of the dualism are also considered: 1. literal understanding of metaphores used in philosophy of language, 2. wrong understanding of suppositions, 4. attempts to explain language in natural terms, e.g. causal theory of meaning.
EN
There is an interesting common feature of all pragmatic philosophers. Their subtle considerations, accurate analysis and brilliant criticism often lead to trivial conclusions. The consequence of this is methodological trivialism whose examples we can find in the leading representatives of pragmatism: James, Dewey, Rorty and Putnam. In this article I am trying to characterize this trivialism as well as to answer a question about its source. I defend the hypothesis that this trivialism results from the fact that pragmatists do not have theoretical goals, but practical ones – very often political. Their attitude can be described as a variant of puritanism, because by promising to liberate from repressive philosophical tradition they ultimately offer a much more doctrinaire position.
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Content available remote Prawda, schemat pojęciowy i świat
88%
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nr 7
181-205
EN
In my article I criticize the conception which says that the conceptual character of human cognition makes false the theory of truth understood as a kind of correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker. Arguing against the conceptions of Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty and Andrzej Szahaj, I defend the claim that the conceptual character of human cognition is irrelevant to the critique of correspondence theories of truth. I justify this claim with the example of Nicholas Rescher’s conception of conceptual idealism, which is similar to the internal realism of Hilary Putnam but does not rule out the truth as a kind of correspondence.
EN
This paper explores the notion of Affective Pedagogy of Human Rights Education (APHRE) on a theoretical level and suggests a concept of curricular framework. APHRE highlights the significance of affectivity and body in the process of learning, factors usually neglected in the mainstream intellectualistic approach to learning, especially in areas under the Confucian tradition. The paper’s first section explores the thinking of three philosophers - Rorty, Merleau-Ponty, and Beardsley - who serve as sources for APHRE. The second section explains how their concepts contribute to APHRE’s development. In the third section, a practical curricular framework is presented. Finally, the paper discusses implementing the framework and concludes by recognizing APHRE as a pedagogic approach for crossing borders among nationalities, cultures, and languages.
EN
The paper gives a concise account of Rorty’s conception of intellectuals and their role in society, politics and culture. This topic is an integral part of Rorty’s writings, in particular those on ethics and politics since the 1990s. The author describes his attitude towards Central-European intellectuals such as Patočka and Havel; his views on the contemporary leftist intellectuals in relation to the problem of the poor; his cultural typology of intellectuals as related to cultural politics; his concept of post-philosophical culture. In conclusion he depicts Rorty’s hope in future intellectual culture radically different from that of our days.
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Content available remote PRAGMATISTS ON THE EVERYDAY AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
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nr 2
66 – 74
EN
Although the first ‘pragmatist aesthetics’ was devised by John Dewey in his Art as Experience (1934), Richard Shusterman has been the only scholar to use the notion of “pragmatist aesthetics” in his Pragmatist Aesthetics (1992). In this paper, I show that Dewey already refuses the gap between the practices of the ‘art world’ and that of everyday life. In Art as Experience, he criticizes the ‘museum conception’ of art to argue that some aesthetic experiences in our daily life have the same essential structure as the experience of art. While Rorty has revised Dewey’s basic premises, Shusterman has rather restated them. Since the end of the 1980s, he has started developing his own philosophical project, named ‘somaesthetics’. Shusterman’s somaesthetics does not simply incorporate many Deweyan views, but also develops them further. Accepting a Deweyan framework, Shusterman rejects the sharp dualism of the so-called “lower and higher levels of art”. What is more, he considers philosophy as an art of the living, embracing in somaesthetics the ancient Greek and Asian traditions.
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