Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

THE MEANING OF INTENTIONAL EXPRESSIONS IN WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PHILOSOPHY

100%

Czesna E.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2008

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tom 36

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nr 2

141-157

EN

The issue of intentionality occurs in Wittgenstein's later philosophy in at least two contexts. In the first one, the author of the 'Philosophical Investigations' approaches the classical problem of thoughts referring to reality, showing that the relationship between thought and reality is a matter of grammar. The second context concerns the concept of intention connected with human actions, both verbal and nonverbal. According to Wittgenstein intention is not a psychological or mentalistic category, since it is 'embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions'. On the basis of 'On Certainty' the authoress considers the issue of the relation between the philosophical intention of making knowledge claims and the rules of epistemic language games. On the basis of Moore-type propositions (the scheme: 'I know that p'), Wittgenstein points out the existence of a hiatus between how Moore wants to use an expression, i.e. what he wants to say, and how he can use it, i.e. what can meaningfully be said in given circumstances. Considerations on this subject can be formulated as the issue of how the feature of intentionality is related to the meaningfulness of expressions.

2

RADICAL RATIONALIZATION ACCOMMODATES RAMPANT IRRATIONALITY

100%

Lipski J.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2018

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tom 25

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nr 1

53 – 73

EN

According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper the author will offer one such criterion. More specifically, he argues that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.

3

HUSSERL'S AND INGARDEN'S CONCEPTION OF THE COGNITIVE IMPASSE

100%

Chadzynski A.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2008

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tom 36

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nr 2

93-99

EN

The main thesis of this paper is that, in their epistemological views, both Husserl and Ingarden accept two non-controversial theses that lead to logico-ontological problems. One of them is the conception of the intentionality of consciousness. The second is the conception of cognition as a synthesis of identification. The acceptance of both at the same time does not seem to be controversial at first glance. However, deeper investigation shows that one who accepts them both stands in the face of the logico-ontological problem of the identification of a kind of being with nothing in cognitional syntheses, or of the infinite identification of two intentional objects in every act of consciousness. Both consequences lead to the actual impossibility of active acts of cognition, even if we accept that most cognitional syntheses occur in the domain of passivity. The problem is shared by Husserl's conception of knowledge from his 'Logical Investigations' through the later writings, where he uses the concept of noema. There is a contemporary interpretation of the latter concept as identical to Ingarden's concept of intentional object. Therefore, the problem remains in Ingarden's theory of knowledge, which is based on Husserl's original theory of cognition as a synthesis of identification.

4

INTENTIONALITY AND AWARENESS OF SUBJECT (Intencjonalnosc i swiadomosc podmiotu)

100%

Drabarek A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2010

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tom 46

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nr 2

253-269

EN

Authors and supporters of the category of intentionality claim that the foundations of all knowledge on the really existing world is perception approached as a subjective act of awareness thanks to which we recognize things directly. Perception of things is based on an individual seeing, hearing or touching; it is an experience of awareness which concerns a specific object. Many philosophers and psychologists connects awareness with emotional states. However, we cannot evoke emotions as we like and get rid of them even though we want it very much. Conscious emotions though - or the logic of emotions as F. Brentano used to terms them has a very intense and essential influence on the direction of actions and choices made by man.

5

Actions as a Context for Realization of Meaning

100%

Duraj J.

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2007

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tom 16

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nr 1(61)

281-290

EN

The article shows how 'early' Heidegger approached the problem of intentionality. It begins with a reconstruction of Husserlian concept of intentionality understood as a perceptive act in which the object of experience is first constituted. The author shows subsequently that the Heideggerian understanding of intentionality does not apply to objects of perception but to meaning which can be 'grasped' in the practical attitude only. This attitude determines the pre-theoretical context of intentionality. In consequence, an overcoming of Husserl's 'methodical solipsism' is required if such a context of intentionality is to be understood. The experienced meanings express past intersubjective practices and the knowledge developed within it. An understanding based on the participation in the common world determines the perceptual situation. In consequence Husserl's idea of identifying the bare experience data becomes very questionable in this context.

6

MISREPRESENTATION AND ROBUSTNESS OF MEANING

88%

Aytekin T. , Sayan E.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2010

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tom 17

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nr 1

21-38

EN

According to Fodor, robustness of meaning is an essential aspect of intentionality and his causal theory of content can account for it. The robustness of meaning refers to the fact that kennings of a symbol are occasionally caused by instantiations of properties which are not expressed by the symbol. This, according to Fodor, is the source of the phenomenon of misrepresentation. The authors claim that Fodor's treatment of content and misrepresentation is infected with a couple of flaws. After criticizing Fodor's theory of content, they propose a new theory of content which explains how misrepresentation is possible as a result of meaning-forming causation, and extend it to account for the property of robustness of meaning.

7

DO EMOTIONS REPRESENT VALUES BY REGISTERING BODILY CHANGES?

88%

Duringer E. M.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2009

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tom 16

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nr 1

62-81

EN

This paper outlines Jesse Prinz's theory that emotions represent values by registering bodily changes, discusses two objections, and concludes that Prinz's theory stands in need of modification: while emotions do represent values, they do not do so in the first place by registering bodily changes, but by processing information about how things we care about fare in the world. The function of bodily changes is primarily to motivate and prepare us for action.

8

Theory of Intentionality in 'Logische Ungersuchungen' by Edmund Husserl

88%

Plotka W.

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2008

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tom 17

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nr 1(65)

111-123

EN

The article examines the problem of intentionality in the Husserlian philosophy. The author is interested especially in the theory of intentionality, which is presented by the philosopher in the 'Logical Investigations'. According to Husserl phenomenology is the science which is founded on the genuine knowledge. The genuine character of knowledge means that it has direct character. Also scientist would have infallible and unmediated link to the reality. Consideration about relationship between the structures of intentionality and the language, could question legitimacy of the postulate of the direct experience. Syntactical and semantical structures of language seem to determine Husserl's considerations about the intentionality of consciousness. If it was so, knowledge about the intentionality always would be indirect. The knowledge mediates in the earlier pre-reflective understanding of expressions. The postulate of the direct character of knowledge had been specific to the 'Logical Investigations', but Husserl's attitude to that postulate was changed in his mature philosophy. The author suggests that we could find in Husserl's mature philosophy the new model of science. The new science is founded on the confidence that the knowledge is always indirect.

9

Twórczość z punktu widzenia teorii czynności. Twórca czy szaleniec? Demiurg czy bricoleur?

75%

Bobryk J.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2011

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tom 47

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nr 4(190)

533-541

EN

The main aim of the paper is rethinking Descartes’s concept of cogito in the framework of the theory of actions and products and the general theory of human creativity. The final conclusion is that Descartes’s cogito is not a subject but an act. It is the act (or the string of acts) connecting the subject with the object. This conclusion is a bridge between Cartesian methodological skepticism and Brentano’s theory of intentional acts.

10

LEVINAS' THINKING ALONG WITH HUSSERL (commentary to the Polish edition of E. Levinas' 'En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger) (Emmanuela Levinasa mysIenie z Husserlem (na marginesie polskiego wydania ksiazki E. Levinasa ....))

75%

Sowa E.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2009

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tom 37

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nr 1

61-75

EN

The subject of this article is Levinas's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology and the influence of the latter on the philosophy of Levinas himself. By discovering the intentionality of consciousness, Husserl de facto discovered the transitiveness (la transitivité) of thinking and existence and therefore revolutionized the understanding of transcendentalism. This interpretation has an essential influence on the idea of immanence and transcendence in Levinas' philosophy, according to whom the sphere of immanence is the human universum, while transcendence, or the exterior (l'exteriorité) is radical otherism from this universum, and it can only be detected as a trace. The authoress also points out the analogies between Levinas' understanding of Husserl and the interpretations of his philosophy (especially intentionality) by Polish phenomenologists belonging to Roman Ingarden's post-war school in Krakow (Jan Szewczyk, Józef Tischner).

11

Rola stosunków aktywność-pasywność w Husserlowskiej teorii świadomości

63%

Maciejczak M.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2014

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tom 42

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nr 3

31-45

EN

At the very basis of the cognitive efficacy of consciousness there is a domain of passive synthesis, a pre-linguistic and pre-predicative intentionality that Husserl called world-experiencing life (welterfahrenes Leben). It also makes possible thematic consciousness and its connection to the world. Husserl holds the opposed notions of passivity and activity to be functional. What has been actively constituted becomes passive and a basis for higher forms of understanding. The article offers arguments for the above mentioned thesis, taking into account the systematic unity of consciousness. It presents the formal and material aspects of consciousness, the domain of passive synthesis and also the role of reflection for its peculiar autonomy. In the broader view it is easier to explain the meaning of the opposed notions of passivity and activity. The opposition depicts the dynamics of the system of consciousness.

12

Realita mysle ako podmienka identity ľudskej osoby

63%

Volek P.

Studia theologica

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2008

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tom 10

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nr 4

33-51

EN

This paper argues for the thesis that the reality of mind is a necessary as well as sufficient condition for a diachronic identity of human person. The impossibility of elimination of qualia and intentionality and thus the impossibility of eliminative materialism was proved here. An impossibility of the theory of identity of types and individuals, together with the impossibility of functionalism as one of the versions of eliminative materialism was proven through a careful consideration of Libet's experiments. Subsequently, dualism surfaced as further option. The views of interactive dualism of Popper and Eccles and that of pragmatic dualism of Carrier and Mittelstrass turned out to be unsuitable in some of their consequences. Hylemorphic dualism turned out to be the best explanation from the sorts of dualism discussed in this paper. Through its understanding of mind as a form, hylemorphic dualism enables us to explain causality as formal and final and thus to separate it form the efficient causality of empirical objects. By this, it also explains the diachronic identity of human person possible.