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Analiza pojęć to za mało (w odpowiedzi Karolowi Polcynowi)

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Poczobut R.

nr 3

198-202

Głos w debacie: Czym jest i jak istnieje umysł?

A voice in the debate: What the mind is and how it exists?

Supervenience. An Outline of the Concept

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Poczobut R.

nr 2

25-44

„Supervenience” is now a part of the philosophical vocabulary of the analytical tradition. The basic ontological idea of supervenience is an attempt to characterize the relationship between families of properties, such as moral and natural properties, mental and physical properties, or macro-properties and micro-properties. The aim of the paper is to discuss recent variants of supervenience relation (microphysical supervenience, global and local supervenience, weak and strong supervenience, natural and logical supervenience). Supervenience relations are almost always unexplanatory, that is, supervenience itself merely picks out a certain kind of covariation or corelation - it does not explain why that covariation holds.

Monizm neutralny a teorie redukcji i emergencji

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Poczobut R.

nr 4

367-381

The aim of the article is presentation and critical analysis of various interpretations of neutral monism (in Bertrand Russell’s version). The subject of the author’s particular interest is the analysis of the main methodological assumptions of neutral monism, which are presented as a method of deriving logical constructions. The article discusses problems inspired by the following questions: What is the declared neutrality of base objects? Is neutral monism a kind of reductionism? Is it an ontological or logical‑epistemological position? What is the place of phenomenal consciousness in the universe of neutral monism? Can neutral monism be reconciled with different versions of emergence theory? Does neutral monism solve the mind‑body problem? Finally, the possibility of non‑standard interpretation of neutral monism is outlined by reference to information theory.

In Search of a New Paradigm. A Reply to Joanna Komorowska-Mach

100%

Poczobut R.

nr 4

143-155

In the article I am answering some questions posed by J. Komorowska-Mach (in her review of my book) concerning such problems as: (a) relation between cognitive science and ontology of mind, (b) nature of downward causation, (c) methodological status of the theory of psychophysical emergence, (d) nature and mode of existence of the mind in a physical world, (e) ontological commitments of cognitive neuroscience, and (f) fundamentals of emergentist world-picture. The main aim of the paper is demonstration of a connection between the theory of psychophysical emergence and the problem of interdisciplinarity within the context of mind research.