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The Cognitive System as a Representational System

100%

Żegleń U.

Filozofia Nauki

2005

tom 13

nr 4

37-57

The main thesis of the paper is very simple, namely that the cognitive system is a representational system. The cognitive system will be defined as a system which is able to realize cognitive functions such as perception, symbolic thinking, understanding and reflection. Such a system is further characterized as: cognitively open and at the same time relatively isolated, representational, structurally complex and many-dimensional, dynamic and having functional plasticity (cognitively adaptive) and also having the capacity for self-determination. The analysis will be focused on the characterization of representation (which will be defined as a certain kind of content) and on the types of representations in the cognitive system (i.e. perceptual and conceptual representations, the representation of the body and the representation of "self").

Głos w debacie na temat: „Czym jest i jak istnieje umysł?”

100%

Żegleń U.

Diametros

2005

nr 3

169-172

Głos w debacie: Czym jest i jak istnieje umysł?

A voice in the debate: What the mind is and how it exists?

Multi-Dimensionalities of the Mind

100%

Żegleń U.

Filozofia Nauki

2004

tom 12

nr 3-4

153-170

In this paper I defend the multi-dimensional conception of the mind according to which an account of one-dimension, for example biological or computational or cultural, is insufficient for an adequate theory of the mind. The systematic account of this conception was presented in my book Philosophy of mind. The debate with naturalistic conceptions of mind (in Polish, Marszałek 2003). Here I only focus on some problems which have been raised by Robert Poczobut in his review of my book (presented in this volume). They are the following problems: the problem of unification of research in the paradigm of cognitive science (i.e., unification via information); the problem of reduction and emergence discussed on Searle's approach to the mind; the problem of causality and determinations of the mind (Does the mind have only causal, i.e. physical determination or not?, Does the determination of the mind have any influence on the causal complementation of the physical universe?, Is possible a system without any causal determination?); the problem of consciousness (Is consciousness possible in artificial intelligence? What is the conclusion from the known Searle's principle of connection saying about the connection between the intentional and conscious states?); and the problem of compatibility of descriptions given in the philosophy of mind at the psychological level, and in neuroscience at the neuronal level (I'd presented this compatibility on the analysis of the experience of pain). In the conclusion, entitled "Conclusion without dialectics," I reply to the objection of my reviewer that I admit the dialectics of naturalism with non-naturalism. I agree for such "dialectics" as a starting point from where I speak for certain continuity in research of the mind conducted by science and philosophy, but I also admit such dimensions of the mind which can be studied autonomically (in non-naturalistic philosophical approach).

Przedmowa

63%

Żegleń U.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

2014

tom 50

nr 3(201)

171-173