A review of Jakub Orzeszek’s Ph.D. dissertation titled Differentiating Schulz. The First and Second Body of the Writer, in which the reviewer engages in a polemic with reading Schulz in terms of negative materiality. In her opinion, Orzeszek, as learned, insightful, and meticulous as he is, fell into a trap of reducing Schulz’s work to thanatocentric corporeality. Emphasis on the negative aspects of somatic materiality, such as pain, disfigurement, death, and the wish to be annihilated in the nothingness of the uterus/night, ignores other aspects of corporeality in Schulz’s fiction. Contrary to Orzeszek’s alleged logophobia opposed to her logophilia, the reviewer proposes a different reading of the topic, calling for a more affirmative and positive interpretation of corporeality present in Schulz’s work and suggesting an alternative version of materiality.
Preview: Almost twenty-five years have passed after the publication of Jacques Derrida’s 1996 seminal essay, “Faith and Knowledge: Religion at the Limits of Reason Alone,” one of the most important, but also most enigmatic post-secular texts of late modernity. Six articles in this issue are devoted directly to Derrida’s essay. The other two can also be read along them as dealing with broadly conceived post-secular issues. They all can be brought under the traditional heading of “faith and knowledge” – simultaneously in recognition of Derrida’s title and in opening a wider perspective on fides et ratio today (a few decades after the famous 1994 Capri seminar on religion). Derrida participated in the seminar with his 2000 essay (Glauben und Wissen), on the same subject, along with the equally famous intervention of Jürgen Habermas. The main theme of Derrida’s take on the confrontation between fides and ratio is the analysis of the relation between modern philosophy/knowledge and modern religion/faith: a complex co-dependence which challenges Hegel’s conviction that philosophy had managed to sublate religion completely and allowed for the survival of its most valuable contents in a new rational form. Pace Martin Hägglund’s thesis, (according to which Derrida’s philosophy should be classified as “radical atheism” in the Hegelian vein), the essays in this volume present Derrida’s thinking on religion as far more ambivalent, leaning toward not so much atheism as radical iconoclasm which does not annul the idea of divinity, but rather hides it away from sight.
The article presents Stanisław Brzozowski as a philosopher who, at the beginning of the 20th century, initiated a new reception of romantic thought and poetry which is called nowadays a “revision of romanticism”, i.e. a critical reexamination of main High Romantic ideas under the auspices of the School of Suspicion. Brzozowski, very well versed in readings of Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, applied the techiques of suspicion in his interpretation of Polish and British romantic writings, and achieved a highly original conclusion: in the “suspicious” vein, he rejected the grand romantic claim for absolute subjective autonomy, at the same time, however, maintained the value of the struggle for autonomy itself as a indispensable resistance to reifying tendency of modernist philosophies. He thus proposed a romantic- -modernist theoretical hybrid, insisting on the neccessity of an individual agon in the world of objectifying influences, perceived either as economic conditionings (Marx) or instinctual forces of nature (Nietzsche, Freud). By diminishing the romantic “high expectations”, Brzozowski attempted to save the most precious core of the romantic thought – the individual striving for subjective autonomy – and in this manner to secure its place within more sceptical, less idealistic conditions of late modernity.
Irony, Tragedy, Community: Richard Rorty in the Eyes of a Barbarian Abstract in English The essay is a perverse attempt at interpreting Richard Rorty from the perspective of a barbarian, that is, a person whom the author of “Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity” excludes from the conversation of civilised people. For Rorty, the basic criterion of barbarity is adherence to a culture which has retained distinctly pre-modem characteristics, i.e., those which predate “the process of civilisation.” The author, by identifying herself with the excluded "barbarian," seeks to indicate the merits of the pre-modem paradigm which has been unjustly disparaged by the leading philosopher of American postmodernism. Thus the author wants to redress the postmodernist tum from a pre-modern position; by evoking those categories that modernity has made to sink into oblivion - e.g. ritual un-differentiation and the catharsis experience – Agata Bielik-Robson argues that they are a natural supplement to Rorty's “call for universal solidarity.” Without this supplement, Rorty's call is just a vacuous declaration.
This essay is a theologico-philosophical meditation on Bruno Schulz, focusing on his “love for the marginal”: a special attention paid to tandeta, in other words all things trashy, located on the eponymous edges of the world, far away from the center. Contrary to the assumed mode of interpretation, which reads Schulz’s fascination with the “dark forces of life” in terms of the depth subversive toward the surface, I propose a different scheme: an opposition of center and edges/margins, deriving from the Kabbalistic metaphysics of Isaac Luria, which constituted the primary matrix of the Hasidic Kabbalah, known to Schulz as the member of the pre-war Drohobycz Jewry. I then juxtapose Schulz’s intuition of a life thriving on the cosmological margins with Freud’s early theory of the drives, especially his concept of perversion as a “libido on the edge.” In both writers we find a similar echo of the spatial Kabbalistic imagining of the relation between the emptied center and the rich diaspora of life, dispersing and multiplying on the fringes of the “cosmic exile.”
This essay focuses on political implications of Derrida’s messianicité as a form of Marrano messianism: a universal vision of community “out of joints” which, despite its disjointedness and inner separation, nonetheless addresses itself as “we” (although always in inverted commas). By referring to the generalized “Marrano experience” – the fate of those Sephardic Jews who were forced to convert to Christianity and, in consequence, became neither Jewish nor Christian – Derrida takes the Marrano as his paradigmatic political figure of a “rogue” (voyou) who escapes every identity politics. In Derrida’s project of “living together” (vivre ensemble), the Marrano stands for the non-participatory remnant of otherness which is not just the other of this or that particular tradition, but becomes a bearer of a new universalism, based not on the abstract notion of human nature but on the non-identity, a distance-from-identity or what Yirmijahu Yovel calls the “non-integral identity.”
Irony, Tragedy, Community: Richard Rorty in the Eyes of a Barbarian Abstract in English The essay is a perverse attempt at interpreting Richard Rorty from the perspective of a barbarian, that is, a person whom the author of “Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity” excludes from the conversation of civilised people. For Rorty, the basic criterion of barbarity is adherence to a culture which has retained distinctly pre-modem characteristics, i.e., those which predate “the process of civilisation.” The author, by identifying herself with the excluded "barbarian," seeks to indicate the merits of the pre-modem paradigm which has been unjustly disparaged by the leading philosopher of American postmodernism. Thus the author wants to redress the postmodernist tum from a pre-modern position; by evoking those categories that modernity has made to sink into oblivion - e.g. ritual un-differentiation and the catharsis experience – Agata Bielik-Robson argues that they are a natural supplement to Rorty's “call for universal solidarity.” Without this supplement, Rorty's call is just a vacuous declaration.
This paper analyzes Jacques Derrida’s statements on modern Marranismo and on his own identity in the context of his entire body of work. For philosopher, marranismo is not only “tormented Judaism” of the Jewish inhabitants of Toledo who were forced to take the Christian identity. It is also a chance – a paradoxical occasion – to search for a philosophical language, which would oppose the canonical hegemony of the Western thought as a whole and therefore escape the measuring patterns of tradition which is characterised by “the stern shine of that which is canonical.” Derrida chooses his Maranism as an expression of the affirmation of life: the condition of the survivor who preferred to go on living rather than submit to an honorable martyrdom. At the same time, he turns against the traditional systems of symbolic life, which demand sacrifices in the name of preserving the purity of their canons and leave no room for ordinary survie.
PL
Artykuł analizuje wypowiedzi Jacques’a Derridy na temat nowoczesnego maranizmu i własnej tożsamości w kontekście całej jego twórczości. Marranismo to dla filozofa nie tylko kondycja żydowskich obywateli Toledo, którym siłą narzucono chrześcijańską tożsamość. To także szansa, by poszukać filozoficznego języka, który przeciwstawiłby się kanonicznej hegemonii myśli zachodniej, a tym samym wymknął się mierniczym schematom tradycji. Utożsamiając się z marańskim wyborem przeżycia jako właśnie wyborem, Derrida również wybiera swój maranizm jako wyraz afirmacji życia: kondycji przeżywca-ocalałego, który wolał żyć dalej, niż poddać się honorowej martyrologicznej śmierci. Zarazem zwraca się przeciw tradycyjnym systemom życia symbolicznego, które żądają ofiar w imię zachowania czystości swych kanonów i nie pozostawiają miejsca dla zwykłego survie. Szczególny związek z tym, co unikatowe, o jakim mówi Derrida, wyłania się jako alternatywa dla kanonu i jego „surowego blasku”.
The aim of this essay is mainly critical: it intends to demonstrate that despite all the promises to give account of a "deconstructive subjectivity," Derrida failed to do so, postponing the moment of positive delivery and providing in the end only excuses. This charge relies on the thesis that Derrida - again, despite his overt declarations - proved unable to rethink critically the concept of narcissism which he himself saw as crucial for the future philosophical understanding of subjectivity. And although Derrida draws the concept of narcissism from the writings of Freud, it can be nonetheless easily shown that the meaning he attaches to this notion is much older: its true source appears to be Hegel's famous critique of the beautiful soul. My purpose here will be to show that what Derrida calls the aporia of narcissism is, in fact, nothing more than the deconstructive version of the Hegelian dilemma of the beautiful soul - and, theoretically speaking, a rather "defunct" one, for it explicitly prohibits any dialectical procedure that could lead us out of this aporetic predicament.
One of the most common clichés of our culture defines Judaism as the “religion of the Father.” For some this is just a neutral description referring to the fatherly aspect of the JewishGod; for others this is the very epitome of the patriarchal prejudice which privileges the masculine Father Figure at the expense of everything maternal. In my essay, however, I would like to challenge this staple association, by pointing to the simple fact that Jews themselves very rarely – if ever – describe their religion in openly patriarchal terms. In fact, when described in psychoanalytic terms, the role of the Father is here merely transitory: he is to inaugurate a series of subsequent detachments, starting from the disintegration of the first bonds of love (to maternal body and, more generally, to the body of nature) and ending with the complete neutralisation of the “family romance.” The Father Figure, therefore, is called upon only to counteract the power of the primordial “attachments” and initiate a process of separation which will allow the subject to establish himself as a free and mature moral agent, truly “born” into the world.
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