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EN
In the situation of the global SARS-COV-2 coronavirus pandemic, epidemic threats are dominant and ubiquitous. The article attempted to estimate the hazards of virus transmission in various transport services. In the author's opinion, numerous and very serious problems in the transport sector and transport services are in this case the result of a lack of a methodical approach to the problem of epidemic threats, including infection in a global epidemic. The paper presents a proposal for an original DHI method for assessing epidemic hazards in transportation services, taking into account various hazards and routes of virus transmission (droplet and contact) based on dedicated scales of hazard evaluation and multi-criteria assessment. This methodology is named Deep Hazard Identification (DHI). The primary stage of the methodology is the identification and estimation of transmission mechanisms of pathogen that can occur in transport services. For this purpose 15 criteria and weighting factors were defined and used for a multi-criteria epidemic hazards assessment. It enables the determination of the matrix of hazard assessment separately for the passenger transport and freight transport groups, which allows for the comparison of the DHI hazard factor between different transport services.
EN
Elements that participate in operational risk analysis procedures are hazard sources, hazards, and undesirable events. Following the International Civil Aviation Organization, the continuous hazard identification process allows the safety level in civil aviation to be reduced and maintained at an acceptable level or below that level. For hazard detection to be a systemic process, tools are needed to achieve this goal. The main stages of formulating hazards are task assessment, description of hazards, and description of causes. The description of hazards should be prepared based on information about the hazard sources. Brainstorming, engineering knowledge, or checklists can be used to obtain information about the hazard sources in a selected area. Checklists for the areas of analysis are a frequently used tool to identify hazard sources. The safety of air operations begins at the airport and apron. That is why assessing the risk at ground handling workstations is so essential. After analyzing the regulations on the safety of ground handling workers in terms of safety and occupational health and safety, many issues remain unregulated. Ground handling workers are an essential link affecting the safety of air operations. It is important that when starting the performance of their duties, employees are adequately trained, equipped with the necessary tools, and have a good level of well-being so that an accident does not occur. A checklist was developed to determine whether the employee has the appropriate equipment, is adequately trained, and whether his mental and physical health condition allows him to perform his duties. Forms were proposed for the airport equipment operator, airport apron worker, and operations coordination specialist. Declaring a response to the hazard allows the decision on whether or not to allow an employee to work.
PL
Elementami, które uczestniczą w procedurach analizy ryzyka operacyjnego są: źródła zagrożeń, zagrożenia, zdarzenia niepożądane. Zgodnie z International Civil Aviation Organization, ciągły proces identyfikacji zagrożeń pozwala zredukować i utrzymać na akceptowalnym poziomie lub poniżej tego poziomu stan bezpieczeństwa w lotnictwie cywilnym. Aby wykrycie zagrożeń było procesem systemowym, niezbędne są narzędzia do realizacji tego celu. Zasadnicze etapy formułowania zagrożeń to: ocena zadania, opis zagrożeń, opis przyczyn. Opis zagrożeń powinien zostać opracowany na podstawie informacji o źródłach zagrożenia. Do pozyskania informacji o źródłach zagrożeń w wybranym obszarze można wykorzystać burzę mózgów, wiedzę inżynierską lub listy kontrolne. Listy kontrolne dla obszarów analiz są często wykorzystywanym narzędziem do identyfikacji źródeł zagrożeń. Bezpieczeństwo operacji lotniczych rozpoczyna się na ternie lotniska i portu lotniczego. Dlatego tak istotna jest prawidłowa ocena ryzyka na stanowiskach pracy obsługi naziemnej. Po przeanalizowaniu przepisów dotyczących bezpieczeństwa pracowników obsługi naziemnej w rozumieniu safety jak i bezpieczeństwa i higieny pracy wiele kwestii pozostaje nieuregulowanych. Pracownicy obsługi naziemnej są bardzo ważnym ogniwem mającym wpływ na bezpieczeństwo operacji lotniczych. Ważne jest, aby przystępując do realizacji swoich obowiązków pracownicy byli odpowiednio przeszkoleni, wyposażeni w niezbędny sprzęt oraz mieli odpowiednie samopoczucie tak, aby nie doszło do wypadku. W celu określenia czy pracownik dysponuje odpowiednim wyposażeniem, jest odpowiednio przeszkolony oraz jego stan zdrowia psychicznego i fizycznego pozwala na wykonanie obowiązków opracowano checklisty. Zaproponowano formularze dla operatora sprzętu lotniskowego, pracownika obsługi płytowej oraz dla specjalisty do spraw koordynacji operacji. Zadeklarowanie odpowiedzi o wystąpienie źródła zagrożenia pozwala sformułować zagrożenia i na tej podstawie podjąć decyzję o dopuszczeniu lub nie pracownika do pracy.
3
EN
In parallel with the dynamic development of rail transport in terms of vehicle design, control systems, infrastructure issues, the development of processes and procedures in the area of safety management must also progress. This growing awareness was confirmed, among other things, by harmonising the content of the regulations on railway safety and interoperability, the safety certification of railway undertakings and the definition of the tasks and roles of national safety authorities. In effect, this was to enable the development of a single European railway area. An implementation tool that allows for a systematic approach to safety management processes and that enables the above requirements to be met is, among other things, RAMS analyses. A key step in the safety management process for specifying RAMS is hazard identification, which is particularly highlighted in PN EN 50126-2:2018 through the holistic model for risk assessment and control of railway system hazards (hourglass model). It places the hazard identification process in two stages, i.e. in the early development stage of the analysis (similar to other known risk management models) and in the hazard control stage. This positioning alone indicates the importance of the hazard identification process. On the comprehensiveness and detail of its implementation depends the validity of the final outcome of the RAMS analysis. The development of such a process for real technical facilities in a way that is consistent with the needs of RAMS analyses and, at the same time, ensures that satisfactory results of these analyses are achieved, has become the subject of this article.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia tematykę identyfikacji zagrożeń środowiska pracy za pomocą listy kontrolnej. Formy kontroli na terenie krajów unii europejskiej nie są jasno sprecyzowane z wykorzystaniem jakich narzędzi mają zostać one wykonane. Istnieje wiele form prowadzenia stanu bezpieczeństwa i higieny pracy, które mogą zostać wykorzystanie do badania ryzyka występującego na danym stanowisku pracy. Jedną z form wykorzystywanych jest lista kontrolną. Prawidłowo skonstruowana lista kontrolna powinna zawierać odpowiednio sformułowane pytania, które jasno wykazują niezgodności w procesach pracy na poszczególnych stanowiskach. Zmienność doboru pytań uwarunkowana jest charakterem prowadzanych prac oraz zagrożeń na stanowiskach pracy w danym przedsiębiorstwie lub organizacji. Aby listy kontrolne aby były jak najbardziej dopasowane do danego stanowiska pracy muszą podlegać częstej aktualizacji celem dążenia do zmniejszania ryzyka pracy co w konsekwencji zmniejsza również ryzyko wystąpienia wypadku przy pracy lub sytuacji potencjalnej wypadkowej.
EN
This article presents the topic of identifying the hazards of the working environment by means of a checklist. Forms of inspections within the European Union countries are not clearly specified with what tools they are to be performed. There are many forms of conducting the state of occupational health and safety, which can be used to study the risks present at the workplace. One form used is the checklist. A properly constructed checklist should contain appropriately formulated questions that clearly demonstrate inconsistencies in the work processes of each position. Variability in the selection of questions is determined by the nature of the work carried out and the hazards at the workstations in a particular company or organization. In order for the checklists to be the most suitable for a particular workstation, they must be subject to frequent updating in order to strive to reduce the risk of work, which consequently also reduces the risk of an accident at work or a potential accident situation.
5
Content available Risk assessment approaches for offshore structures
EN
Risk assessment and management was established as a scientific field some 30–40 years ago. Principles and methods were developed for how to conceptualize, assess, and manage risk. These principles and methods still represent largely the foundation of this field today, but many advances have been made, linked to both the theoretical platform and practical models and procedures. The purpose of the thesis is to perform a review of these advances, with a special focus on the fundamental ideas and thinking on which these are based. We have looked for trends in perspectives and approaches, and we reflect on where further development of the risk field is needed and should be encouraged. The present study is written for readers with different types of background, not only for experts on risk. However, there is a conflict between the cost impact and safety aspect. E&P managers as well as government supervisor authorities are constantly faced with decisions to be made regarding of safety. In order to ensure comparability and to set priorities application of QRA is a useful tool to justify choices made with regard to personnel safety, environmental protection, asset damage and business reputation, it is recommended to apply the systematic cause analysis method and develop the risk management models which contains an integral approach toward the health, safety and environmental aspect.
EN
The paper highlights the results of a study that examined the employees' expertise and awareness of occupational hazards in their work environment. The research involved a survey conducted in the form of a short questionnaire among employees responsible for loading and hauling of excavated material in an opencast mine. Among 23 major hazards that were thus identified, there were global hazards (affecting the entire mining process) as well as local, task-specific hazards. Depending on the number of responses, 10 local and 3 global hazards were identified in the analyzed area, involving noise, stress and dust. Active participation of the crew in the risk identification process helped in the assessment of their criticality levels, according to employees carrying out various task, highlighting the benefits of such approach for effective work safety management in a mining company. The conducted research demonstrated yet another goal to be achieved - i.e. the comparison of criticality levels of hazards as identified by employees and those reported in occupational risk assessment reports in the mine
PL
Dokonano analizy pozwalającej na zidentyfikowanie zakładów tzw. niesevesowskich (podprogowych), mogących stwarzać zagrożenie wystąpienia skutków awarii poza swoim terenem przy wykorzystaniu ogólnie dostępnych danych. Metodologia identyfikacji zakładów opierała się na analizie przeznaczenia terenów, profili działalności, złożoności procesów technologicznych oraz rodzajów i ilości substancji niebezpiecznych.
EN
A review, with 15 refs., of legislative regulations used for identifying non-Seveso establishments, which may pose a risk of accident consequences outside their territory by using generally available data. The methodol. was based on the anal. of destination of industrials plants areas, activity profiles, complexity of technol. processes, types and amts. of hazardous substances.
EN
Purpose: Improving the systematic approach to planning and rationalizing labour protection measures at oil and gas enterprises, based on the results of hazard identification and industrial risk assessment. At the same time, the main task of the risk management process is to ensure the rights of employees guaranteed by the current legislation, namely, to create proper, safe and healthy working conditions. Design/methodology/approach: A comparative legal method for identifying the features of European and Ukrainian legislation in the occupational safety and health field; a structural-logical method for determining the main directions for the further development of the occupational safety and health management system at enterprises; analysis and generalization of well-known scientific results on the research topic; statistical analysis to identify the relationship between the industrial risk' level and various factors that may affect its value; applied systems analysis and mathematical modelling method for new methodological approaches' development to assessing of hazards' likelihood and their consequences' severity were used. The basis for improving the systematic approach to planning and rationalizing labour protection measures is based on the standard IEC 61882:2001. The statistics are taken from the "Messages" information system, which operates in the State Service of Ukraine on Labour and is designed to collect and process data on occupational injuries Findings: An analysis of the current legislative and regulatory acts showed promising directions for their improvement. A mathematical model for scoring industrial risk is proposed, which takes into account the relationship between industrial risk and preventive measures and the time of their implementation. The calculation system developed on the basis of the proposed model provided a reduction in the time for processing data and calculating the values of industrial risks by 20...25%. Research limitations/implications: Statistical data on industrial injuries at enterprises of the oil and gas industry of Ukraine for 2018-2019 were used. Practical implications: Implementation of the proposed systematic approach to the organization of occupational safety and health management at enterprises has shown its simplicity and effectiveness, which can induce employers to finance reasonable and timely preventive measures. Originality/value: The method has been improved by decreasing the discreteness step in the assessment of industrial risk components, which has increased its accuracy; by developing a mathematical model for calculating the probability of a hazard, taking into account the frequency with which workers are exposed to danger, which eliminates the need to involve experts for an expert assessment at this stage.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono znaczenie analizy zagrożeń związanych z czynnikiem ludzkim w systemie transportu kolejowego. Opisano miejsce i rolę czynnika ludzkiego w dyrektywie w sprawie bezpieczeństwa kolei. Przeanalizowano zdarzenia kolejowe w latach 2010-2017 pod kątem zdarzeń wywołanych bezpośrednim działaniem pracowników na stanowiskach związanych z bezpieczeństwem i prowadzeniem ruchu kolejowego. Wskazano metody, które zarządcy infrastruktury i przewoźnicy kolejowi mogą wykorzystać dla prawidłowego zdefiniowania miejsca i roli poszczególnych stanowisk pracy w organizacji i ich wpływu na bezpieczeństwo ruchu kolejowego oraz zaproponowano procedurę identyfikacji zagrożeń w obszarze czynnika ludzkiego oraz zdefiniowano interfejsy związane ze stanowiskiem pracy dyżurnego ruchu.
EN
The article presents the significance of the analysis of threats related to the human factor in the rail transport system. The place and role of the human factor in the Directive on railway safety is described. Railway incidents in 2010-2017 were analyzed in terms of events caused by the direct action of employees in positions related to the safety and conduct of railway traffic. Methods that infrastructure managers and rail operators can use to correctly define the place and role of individual work posts in the organization and their impact on rail traffic safety are indicated. In addition, the article proposes a procedure for identifying threats in the area of the human factor, the interfaces associated with the work position of the traffic dispatcher are defined.
EN
The article presents the hazard identification process as a sequence of events that leads to accident and/or material loss at the workplace. The chain of events can be described as an orderly set of circumstances conducive to the emergence of a threat. The article presents an analysis of the application of elements of the events theory to the identification of hazards in an industrial plant on the example of a gas explosion. The circumstances supporting the emergence of a gas explosion hazard were identified by determining the direct and indirect causes of the event and the main conditions leading to the event (loss). Also indicated is the cause of gas explosion hazard, which is the initiating factor in the chain of events.
EN
To improve safety the application of effective risk management has become a requirement in the mining industry. The effectiveness of mining risk management essentially depends on the risk assessment process, as the output of the risk assessment process helps the mine management to decide upon the control measures to be employed to mitigate the risks identified in the mine. The application of risk assessment in mines has become important not only for ensuring a safe working environment but, also, it is now a legal requirement. The capability of a risk assessment process depends on the hazard identification phase, as unidentified hazards may lead to unknown and unmanageable risks. Therefore, it is essential to identify all the potential hazards to manage the risks in mines. The object of this study is to identify the safety hazards present in Indian underground coal mines and to build a preliminary database of the identified hazards. Accident data collected from the Directorate General of Mines Safety in India and a public sector coal mining company was studied to identify safety hazards that may probably lead to accidents. The database could help the mine management to improve decision making after analysing and evaluating the safety risks of identified hazards.
PL
Zawód operatora koparko-ładowarki polega na wykonywaniu robót ziemnych oraz prac pomocniczych, transportowych i porządkowych. Środowiskiem pracy operatora koparko-ładowarki są tereny budów, żwirownie, piaskownie, kamieniołomy, kopalnie. Operator koparko-ładowarki pracuje zarówno wewnątrz, jaki i na zewnątrz kabiny i narażony jest on na występowanie wielu czynników środowiskowych mogących powodować wypadki przy pracy oraz choroby zawodowe. W artykule przedstawiono w sposób syntetyczny charakterystykę zawodu operatora koparko-ładowarki zwracając uwagę na takie aspekty jak: zakres wykonywanych czynności (zadań), środowisko pracy oraz kwalifikacje i uprawnienia niezbędne do wykonywania tego zawodu. Następnie dokonano przeglądu zagrożeń zawodowych występujących na stanowisku pracy operatora koparko-ładowarki. Uzupełnienie powyższych rozważań stanowią wyniki oceny ryzyka zawodowego przeprowadzonej za pomocą metody Risc Score. W efekcie autorzy publikacji prezentują przykładowe działania korygujące umożliwiające zminimalizowanie poziom ryzyka zawodowego.
EN
The job of a backhoe operator is to perform earthworks as well as auxiliary, transport and order work. The working environment of the backhoe loader operator are construction sites, gravel pits, sand pits, quarries, and mines. The backhoe operator works both inside and outside the cab and is exposed to the presence of many environmental factors that can cause accidents at work and occupational diseases. The paper presents in a synthetic way the characteristics of the profession of a backhoe loader operator paying attention to such aspects as: the scope of performed activities (tasks), working environment and qualifications and qualifications necessary to perform this profession. Then, a review of occupational hazards occurring at the workplace of a backhoe loader operator was made. Supplementing the above considerations are the results of the occupational risk assessment carried out using the Risc Score method. As a result, the authors of the publication present examples of corrective actions to minimize the level of occupational risk.
13
Content available Dobre praktyki przy ocenie ryzyka zawodowego
PL
Ocena ryzyka zawodowego, o czym stanowią akty prawne jest jednym z obowiązków pracodawcy. Istotnymi zagadnieniami w przebiegu oceny ryzyka są: charakterystyka stanowiska pracy, identyfikacja zagrożeń, dalej szacowanie ryzyka odnoszącego się do każdego zidentyfikowanego zagrożenia, następnie wartościowanie ryzyka i określenie działań ograniczających lub eliminujących ryzyko. W konsekwencji powyższych treści obecnie poszukuje się dobrych praktyk w zakresie oceny ryzyka zawodowego, w szczególności w opracowywaniu elementów składających się na tzw. algorytm oceny ryzyka. W artykule przedstawiono dobre praktyki na podstawie przeprowadzonych analiz i obserwacji odnoszących się do systemu zarządzania bezpieczeństwem i higieną pracy. W szczególności zwrócono uwagę na aspekt planowania samej oceny ryzyka, jakości zespołu ds. oceny ryzyka zawodowego i jego umiejętności oraz na poszczególne elementy wchodzące w przebieg oceny ryzyka.
EN
According to the legal acts, making a risk assessment should be the responsibility of the employer. The important issues in the course of the risk assessment are as follows: the characteristics of the job, the identification of hazards, further risk assessment relating to each identified hazard, the valuation of the risks and defining the measures to reduce or eliminate the risk. As a result of the above mentioned, currently, there is a need to find good practices in the field of risk assessment, in particular in the development of elements of the so-called risk assessment algorithm. The article presents good practices on the basis of the analyzes and observations relating to the Safety Management System and Occupational Health. In particular, the attention was paid to the risk management process, the quality and the skills of the team assessing the risk as well as to the individual elements included in the risk assessment process.
EN
In this article authors researched maintenance system of the multirole F-16 aircraft. For the study purposes, the F-16 maintenance system model has been created. From this model, the main analysis domain was derived, comprising „Minor aircraft objects discrepancies removal” process. Considering such an analysis domain, on the basis of the schematic diagram of the hazard identification process, authors presented the following procedures: tools preparation for the hazard sources identification, hazard sources identification, hazard sources grouping and hazards formulation. The main goal of this article was to provide hazard identification process results as hazard specifications, which include: a group of hazard sources, hazards formulation and the most probable/predictable consequences, severities and losses/harms of the hazard activation.
PL
W pracy obszarem rozważań jest system obsługi samolotu wielozadaniowego F-16. Zbudowano model systemu obsługi samolotu wielozadaniowego F-16. W ramach tego modelu wyróżniono domenę analiz obejmującą proces „Usuwanie drobnych niezdatności obiektów samolotu”. Dla przyjętej domeny analiz, na tle schematu ideowego procesu identyfikacji zagrożeń, zaprezentowano procedury: przygotowywania narzędzi do rozpoznawania źródeł zagrożeń, rozpoznawania źródeł zagrożeń, grupowania źródeł zagrożeń i formułowania zagrożeń. Podano końcowe efekty procesu identyfikacji zagrożeń w postaci charakterystyk zagrożeń, na które składają się: grupa źródeł zagrożenia, sformułowanie zagrożenia, przewidywane straty / szkody będące wynikiem aktywizacji zagrożenia.
PL
Przedsięwzięcia wiertnicze uważane są za powtarzalne. Cechuje je wewnętrzna logika oraz skatalogowane i dobrze udokumentowane metody działania. Tym niemniej pojedyncze projekty można traktować jako zdarzenia unikatowe w tym sensie, że ich założenia mogą być determinowane przez lokalizację, otoczenie geologiczne, geometrię otworu czy też przeznaczenie instalacji. Budowa podziemnej infrastruktury, zarówno metodami konwencjonalnymi, jak i bezwykopowymi, obarczona jest zawsze mniejszym lub większym poziomem niepewności. Nawet w przypadku działań uznawanych za bezpieczne, gdzie ryzyko jest niskie, jego poziom nigdy nie spada do zera. Istnieje potrzeba uporządkowania pojęć, narzędzi i technik radzenia sobie z ryzykiem w branży wierceń kierunkowych HDD oraz w technikach pokrewnych. Zdaniem autora wiedza z zakresu analizy ryzyka jest niezbędna, a firmy powinny poświęcać temu zagadnieniu coraz więcej uwagi. Zarządzanie tym obszarem jest obecnie integralną częścią praktycznie wszystkich znanych metodyk zarządzania projektami.
EN
Though drilling enterprises are thought to be reproducible, every one of them can be examined as a unique event, because their location, geological surroundings, hole geometry and the purpose are different. Completing an underground infrastructure, regardless of chosen technology, presents some risks. Even if we undertake actions that are regarded safe, the risk never drops off to zero – therefore risk management is an integral part of almost any known project management practice.
EN
The multirole F-16 is the most advanced aircraft in the Polish Air Forces. It has been equipped with the very modern, sophisticated and advanced turbofan engine F100-PW-229. Due to the fact, that there is only one engine, its reliability, durability efficiency and performance are the crucial factors for the safety reasons. In the article authors researched maintenance system of the F100 turbofan engines, which are built on the multirole F-16 aircraft. For the study purposes F100 maintenance system model has been created. From this model, the main analysis domain was derived, comprising “Major engine objects discrepancies removal” process. Considering such an analysis domain, on the basis of the schematic diagram of the hazard identification process, authors presented the following procedures: tools preparation for the hazard sources identification, hazard sources identification, hazard sources grouping and hazards formulation. The main goal of this article was to provide hazard identification process results as hazard specifications, which include: a group of hazard sources, hazards formulation and the most probable/predictable consequences, severities and losses/harms of the hazard activation.
17
Content available remote Ocena ryzyka w systemach transportowych
PL
W pracy omówiono problemy identyfikacji zagrożeń w systemach transportowych, w których nie tylko obszar działania jest duży, ale też związki przyczynowo-skutkowe pomiędzy przyczynami uszkodzeń, a stratami są odległe w czasie i przestrzeni. Ma to miejsce w systemach transportowych osób i towarów, systemach dystrybucji wody, gazu, ropy naftowej, czy w sieciach elektro-energetycznych. Zaproponowano systemowe podejście bazujące na kategoryzacji systemu na elementy aktywne (przyczynowe) i pasywne (skutkowe). Omówiono pojęcie podatności na zagrożenie (vulnerability), zdolności zdrowienia (resilience) oraz możliwość sterowania ryzykiem poprzez wprowadzanie środków bezpieczeństwa w łańcuchach zdarzeń niepożądanych.
EN
Paper describes problems of hazard identification in extensive technical systems, i.e. where activity domain is large as well as cause-consequences relations between failure causes and consequences are remote or distant. It is observed in transportation systems, systems of water, gas and oil distributions and energoelectrical nets. It is proposed systemic approach based on catergorization of system on active (causing) and passive (suffering) elements. It is described concept of vulnerability and resilience in that context and it is shown possibility of risk management due to introducing safety measures in the undesired event chain.
18
Content available remote Risk assessment in transportation systems
EN
The paper presents problems of hazard identification in transportation systems, where not only field of action is large but also cause-consequences relations between failure causes and losses are distant in time and space. It is observed in transportation systems of goods and passengers, systems of water, gas, oil distribution and electro-energetic nets. Proposed systemic approach based on system elements classification on active (casual) and passive ones (affected). There are described concepts of vulnerability (damageability), resilience (ability of recovering and risk controlling by introducing safety measures to undesired event chain.
PL
W pracy omówiono problemy identyfikacji zagrożeń w systemach transportowych, w których nie tylko obszar działania jest duży, ale też związki przyczynowo - skutkowe pomiędzy przyczynami uszkodzeń, a stratami są odległe w czasie i przestrzeni. Ma to miejsce w systemach transportowych osób i towarów, systemach dystrybucji wody, gazu, ropy naftowej, czy w sieciach elektro-energetycznych. Zaproponowano systemowe podejście bazujące na kategoryzacji systemu na elementy aktywne (przyczynowe) i pasywne (skutkowe). Omówiono pojęcie podatności na zagrożenie (vulnerability), zdolności zdrowienia (resilience) oraz możliwość sterowania ryzykiem poprzez wprowadzanie środków bezpieczeństwa w łańcuchach zdarzeń niepożądanych.
EN
Oil and gas well drilling activities are associated with numerous hazards which have the potential to cause injury or harm for people, property and the environment. These hazards are also a threat for the reputation of drilling companies. To prevent accidents and undesired events in drilling operations it is essential to identify, evaluate, assess and control the attendant risks. In this work, a structured methodology is proposed for risk assessment of drilling activities. A case study is performed to identify, analyze and assess the risks arising from human factors in one of the onshore drilling sites in southern Iran. A total of 17 major hazards were identified and analyzed using the proposed methodology. The results showed that the residual risks of 100% of these hazards were in the acceptable or transitional zone, and their levels were expected to be lowered further by proper controls. This structured methodology may also be used in other drilling sites and companies for assessing the risks.
EN
The paper presents the attempts at determining the reasons for the hazardous incidents which threaten the safety of people working on scaffolds, as well as in their vicinity. The article is divided into two parts, the former referring to the information on the accident rate involving scaffoldings as well as the research on the likelihood of the occurrence of perilous situations, the inspection of their technical state and the breaches of the OSH Regulations included. The latter part is devoted to the thorough analysis on the particular stages of the scaffold operation life, the special attention being paid to the practices, errors and failures while designing scaffolding. Moreover, it concerns the selection of the scaffold elements, the assembly and disassembly of scaffolding as well as their usage which can result in an accident or a building collapse. The range of activities that contribute to the decrease in or even the avoidance of risky situations involving scaffolds is hereby presented in conclusions.
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