Accidents are Normal and Human Error Does Not Exist: A New Look at the Creation of Occupational Safety

• Autorzy: Dekker S. W. A.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

“Human error” is often cited as cause of occupational mishaps and industrial accidents. Human error, however, can also be seen as an effect (rather than the cause) of trouble deeper inside systems. The latter perspective is called the “new view” in ergonomics today. This paper details some of the antecedents and implications of the old and the new view, indicating that human error is a judgment made in hindsight, whereas actual performance makes sense to workers at the time. Support for the new view is drawn from recent research into accidents as emergent phenomena without clear “root causes;” where deviance has become a generally accepted standard of normal operations; and where organizations reveal “messy interiors” no matter whether they are predisposed to an accident or not.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

human error; accidents; procedures; investigations; safety

PL

bezpieczeństwo pracy; czynnik ludzki; przyczyna wypadku; błąd człowieka

• Wydawca: Taylor & Francis
• Czasopismo: International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics
• Rocznik: 2003
• Tom: Vol. 9, No. 2
• Strony: 211--218
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 14 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Dekker S. W. A.

• Department of Mechanical Engineering, Linköping Istitute of Technology, Linköping, Sweden

Bibliografia

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