On some procedures supporting multicriteria cooperative decisions

• Autorzy: Kruś L.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The paper deals with cooperation problems in the case of several parties having different sets of criteria measuring their payoffs. It presents interactive procedures supporting multicriteria analysis and aiding consensus seeking through a mediation process. Using ideas of the cooperative game theory, a mathematical model describing cooperation situations and deriving possible payoffs of parties can be constructed. The model is a base for the analysis made. Solution concepts developed in the cooperative game theory are applied in the mediation process. The procedures can be used in a computer-based system supporting analysis carried on by the parties.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

multicriteria analysis; cooperative games; computer-based systems; utility theory; mediation

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej
• Czasopismo: Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences
• Rocznik: 2008
• Tom: Vol. 33, No. 3
• Strony: 257--270
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 40 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Kruś L.

• Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Newelska 6, 01-447 Warsaw, Poland

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