Cooperative and Non-cooperative, Integrative and Distributive Market Games with Antagonistic and Altruistic, Malicious and Kind Ways of Playing

• Autorzy: Laskowski S.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The article illustrates distinctions between important concepts of game theory, which support understanding the relation between subjects on competitive and regulated telecommunications services market. Especially it shows that often used distinction between retail and wholesale market that treat them respectively as competitive and cooperative can be misleading or even wrong.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

antagonism and altruism; competition; cooperative games; integrative and distributive processes; non-cooperative games

• Wydawca: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
• Czasopismo: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
• Rocznik: 2008
• Tom: nr 4
• Strony: 87--96
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 15 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Laskowski S.

• National Institute of Telecommunications, Szachowa st 1, 04-894 Warsaw, Poland,

Bibliografia

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• [7] G. E. Kersten and G. R. Mallory, “Rational inefficient compromises in negotiation”, Interim Rep. IR-98-024, IIASA, Laxenburg, 1998.
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• [9] J. C. Harsanyi, “Games with incomplete information – Nobel lecture”, 1994 [Online]. Available: http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/ economics/laureates/1994/harsanyi-lecture.pdf
• [10] R. B. Myerson, “Leartning game theory from John Harsanyi. Notes for a memorial service at Berkeley”, Kellogg School of Management, Aug. 2000 [Online]. Available: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/myerson/ research/hars.pdf
• [11] R. B. Myerson, “Harsanyi’s games with incomplete information”, Manage. Sci., no. 50, pp. 1818–1824, 2004 [Online]. Available: http://home.uchicago.edu/∼rmyerson/research/harsinfo.pdf
• [12] A. P. Wierzbicki and M. Makowski, “Multi-objective optimization in negotiation support”, Tech. Rep., IIASA, Laxenburg, 1992.