PL EN


Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników
Tytuł artykułu

How to do it with sticky notes: a method for exploring expert knowledge to prepare guidelines for practice in railway vehicle maintenance

Treść / Zawartość
Identyfikatory
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
The process of describing human activities in procedures has been used since the beginning of the 20th century. However, it is increasingly evident that procedures understood as sets of orders and prohibitions can be counter-productive because they do not allow the proper use of employees’ knowledge and experience. Therefore, it is postulated that guidelines for practice should be co-developed by employees from the ‘sharp end’ of the organization, but there are no simple methods that can achieve this aim. In the present work, we propose a procedure based on sticky notes, inspired by how information technology teams function. We present a description of the original sticky notes method (SNM) and demonstrate its application in the railway sector. As a result of the workshops conducted with the participation of experts, we gained knowledge about practices that were not included in the documentation, but that could significantly improve the process under research. The primary purpose of the SNM is to ensure the involvement of employees in the process of creating guidelines for practice. This method is particularly useful for describing linear processes in which activities can be arranged chronologically.
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Strony
153--164
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 52 poz.
Twórcy
  • Poznan University of Technology Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie 5, 60-965 Poznań, Poland
autor
  • Poznan University of Technology Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie 5, 60-965 Poznań, Poland
  • Poznan University of Technology Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie 5, 60-965 Poznań, Poland
autor
  • Arriva RP Sp. z o.o. Dąbrowskiego 8/24, 87-100 Toruń, Poland
Bibliografia
  • 1. Perrow, C. Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 1984.
  • 2. Le Coze, J.C. Vive la diversité! High Reliability Organisation (HRO) and Resilience Engineering (RE). Safety Science. Elsevier Ltd. 2016.
  • 3. Haavik, T.K. & Antonsen, S. & Rosness, R. & Hale, A. HRO and RE: A pragmatic perspective. Safety Science. The Authors. 2016.
  • 4. Harvey, E.J. & Waterson, P. & Dainty, A.R.J. Applying HRO and resilience engineering to construction: Barriers and opportunities. Safety Science. Elsevier Ltd. 2016.
  • 5. Weick, K.E. & Sutcliffe, K.M. & Obstfeld, D. Organizing for High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness. Research in Organizational Behavior. 1999. Vol. 21. No. 1. P. 81-123.
  • 6. Heinrich, H.W. Industrial accident prevention: A scientific approach. 1st ed. McGraw-Hill, New York. 1931.
  • 7. Gnoni, M.G. & Saleh, J.H. Near-miss management systems and observability-in-depth: Handling safety incidents and accident precursors in light of safety principles. Safety Science. Elsevier Ltd. 2017. Vol. 91. P. 154-67.
  • 8. Hollnagel, E. Safety-I and safety-II : the past and future of safety management. CRC Press. 2014.
  • 9. Woods, D.D. Four concepts for resilience and the implications for the future of resilience engineering. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Elsevier. 2015. Vol. 141. P. 5-9.
  • 10. Lundberg, J. & Johansson, B.J. Systemic resilience model. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Elsevier. 2015. Vol. 141. P. 22-32. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2015.03.013.
  • 11. Adjetey-Bahun, K. & Birregah, B. & Châtelet, E. & Planchet, J.-L. A model to quantify the resilience of mass railway transportation systems. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Elsevier. 2016. Vol. 153. P. 1-14.
  • 12. Hollnagel, E. Safety-II in Practice. Routledge. 2018.
  • 13. Hale, A.R. & Swuste, P. Safety rules: Procedural freedom or action constraint? Safety Science, 1998. Vol. 29. No. 3. P.163-177.
  • 14. Rosness, R. The Proceduralization of Traffic Safety and Safety Management in the Norwegian Rail Administration: A Comparative Case Study. In: Bieder C. & Bourrier M. (eds.). Trapping Safety into Rules: How Desirable or Avoidable Is Proceduralization? CRC Press. 2013. P. 173-189.
  • 15. Dekker, S. The safety anarchist: relying on human expertise and innovation, reducing bureaucracy and compliance. Routledge, New York. 2018.
  • 16. Høyland, S. & Aase, K. & Hollund, J.G. & Haugen, A.S. What Is It about Checklists? Exploring Safe Work Practices in Surgical Teams. In: Bieder C. & Bourrier M. (eds.). Trapping Safety into Rules: How Desirable or Avoidable Is Proceduralization?, CRC Press. 2013. P. 121-138.
  • 17. Cantos, P. & Pastor, J.M. & Serrano, L. Evaluating European railway deregulation using different approaches. Transport Policy. 2012. Vol. 24. P. 67-72.
  • 18. Hale, A.R. & Heming, B.H.J. & Carthey, J. & Kirwan, B. Modelling of safety management systems. Safety Science. 1997. Vol. 26. No. 1-2. P. 121-140.
  • 19. European Commission. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/779 of 16 May 2019 laying down detailed provisions on a system of certification of entities in charge of maintenance of vehicles pursuant to Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 2019.
  • 20. Power, M. The Audit Society. Rituals of Verification. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 1997.
  • 21. Knudsen, F. Paperwork at the service of safety? Workers’ reluctance against written procedures exemplified by the concept of “seamanship.” Safety Science. Elsevier Ltd. 2009. Vol. 47. No. 2. P. 295-303.
  • 22. Almklov, P.G. & Rosness, R. & Størkersen, K. When safety science meets the practitioners: Does safety science contribute to marginalization of practical knowledge? Safety Science. Elsevier Ltd. 2014. Vol. 67. P. 25-36.
  • 23. Dekker, S.W.A. & Nyce, J.M. There is safety in power, or power in safety. Safety Science, Elsevier Ltd. 2014. Vol. 67. P. 44-49.
  • 24. Fucks, I. & Dien, Y. ‘No Rule, No Use’? The Effects of Over-Proceduralization. In: Bieder C. & Bourrier M. (eds.). Trapping Safety into Rules: How Desirable or Avoidable Is Proceduralization? CRC Press. 2013. P. 27-39.
  • 25. Jeffcott, S. & Pidgeon, N. & Weyman, A. & Walls, J. Risk, trust, and safety culture in U.K. train operating companies. Risk Analysis. 2006. Vol. 26. No. 5. P. 1105-1121.
  • 26. Wrigstad, J. & Bergström, J. & Gustafson, P. One event, three investigations: The reproduction of a safety norm. Safety Science. The Authors. 2017. Vol. 96. P. 75-83.
  • 27. Hale, A. & Borys, D. Working to rule or working safely? Part 2: The management of safety rules and procedures. Safety Science. 2013. Vol. 55. P. 222-231.
  • 28. Rae, A. & Provan, D. Safety work versus the safety of work. Safety Science. Elsevier. 2019. Vol. 111. P. 119-127.
  • 29. Rae, A.J. & Provan, D.J. & Weber, D.E. & Dekker, S.W.A. Safety clutter: the accumulation and persistence of ‘safety’ work that does not contribute to operational safety. Policy and Practice in Health and Safety, Taylor & Francis. 2018. Vol. 16. No. 2. P. 1-18.
  • 30. Pettersen, K. Acknowledging the role of abductive thinking: A way out of proceduralization for safety management and oversight? In: Bieder C. & Bourrier M. (eds.). Trapping Safety into Rules: How Desirable or Avoidable Is Proceduralization? CRC Press. 2013. P. 107-117.
  • 31. Dekker, S. Ten questions about human error: A new view of human factors and system safety. Lawrence Erlbaum. 2005.
  • 32. Hale, A. & Borys, D. Working to rule, or working safely? Part 1: A state of the art review. Safety Science. 2013. Vol. 55. P. 207-221.
  • 33. Daneva, M. & Pastor, O. Requirements engineering: Foundation for software quality. In: 22nd international working conference, REFSQ. Gothenburg, Sweden, march 14-17 2016. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 2016. Vol. 9619. P. 205-222.
  • 34. Patton, J. User Story Mapping: Discover the Whole Story, Build the Right Product. O’Reilly Media. 2014.
  • 35. International Electrotechnical Commission. IEC 61882:2016 Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies) - Application guide. 2016.
  • 36. Grote, G. Promoting safety by increasing uncertainty - Implications for risk management. Safety Science. Elsevier Ltd. 2015. Vol. 71. P. 71-79.
  • 37. Hubbard, D.W. The failure of Risk Management. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2009.
  • 38. Stanton, N.A. Hierarchical task analysis: Developments, applications, and extensions. Applied Ergonomics, Elsevier. 2006. Vol. 37. No. 1. P. 55-79.
  • 39. Marhavilas, P.K.K. & Koulouriotis, D. & Gemeni, V. Risk analysis and assessment methodologies in the work sites: On a review, classification and comparative study of the scientific literature of the period 2000-2009. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Elsevier Ltd. 2011. Vol. 24. No. 5. P. 477-523.
  • 40. Naweed, A. & Balakrishnan, G. & Dorrian, J. Going solo: Hierarchical task analysis of the second driver in “two-up” (multi-person) freight rail operations. Applied Ergonomics, Elsevier. July 2018. Vol. 70. P. 202-231.
  • 41. Stanton, N.A. & Baber, C. Modelling Command and Control: Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork. CRC Press. 2008.
  • 42. Barnatt, N. & Jack, A. Safety analysis in a modern railway setting. Safety Science. Elsevier. December 2018. Vol. 110. P. 177-182.
  • 43. Kanse, L. & Parkes, K. & Hodkiewicz, M. & Hu, X. & Griffin, M. Are you sure you want me to follow this? A study of procedure management, user perceptions and compliance behaviour. Safety Science. January 2018. Vol. 101. P. 19-32.
  • 44. Gill, A. & Smoczyński, P. Layered model for convenient designing of safety system upgrades in railways. Safety Science. December 2018. Vol. 110B. P. 168-176.
  • 45. International Civil Aviation Organization. Safety Management Manual. 2013.
  • 46. Rasmussen, J. Information processing and human-machine interaction. An approach to cognitive engineering. Elsevier Science Inc. 1986.
  • 47. Aven, T. Risk Analysis. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2015.
  • 48. Lundgren, R.E. & McMakin, A.H. Risk communication: A handbook for communicating environmental, safety, and health risks. 4th ed. John Wiley & Sons. 2009.
  • 49. European Commission. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013 of 30 April 2013 on the common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment and repealing Regulation (EC) No 352/2009. 2013.
  • 50. Augustyn, E. & Kadziński, A. & Smoczyński, P. Model of the Tactical Aircraft Operating System as an aggregated analysis domain for hazard risk management processes. Scientific Journal of Silesian University of Technology. Series Transport. 2018. Vol. 101. P. 15-26.
  • 51. Augustyn, E. & Kadziński, A. & Gill, A. Safety systems components in air task domain of Tactical Aircraft Operating System. Transportation Research Procedia. Elsevier BV. 2019. Vol. 40. P. 1238-1243.
  • 52. Siegel, A.W. & Schraagen, J.M.C. Beyond procedures: Team reflection in a rail control centre to enhance resilience. Safety Science. The Authors. 2017. Vol. 91. P. 181-191.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-99a09e8f-0fd1-4122-a217-0eb91f75d9bc
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.