Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Działania nieregularne w teorii sztuki wojennej

100%

Odorowicz B.

Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego

|

2007

|

tom 2

347-354

EN

The author attempts to defi ne the notion of “irregular actions”. By providing exam-ples of guerilla actions, the author claims that until XIX century these were not given enough attention in the discussions referring to the form of war actions. Moreover, they were considered to be a dishonourable form of conducting a fi ght. New outlooks on irregular actions appeared after the American Civil War, Boer War and fi nally World War II. However, the real return of irregular actions occurred in the 1990’s. The application of irregular and asymmetric forms of fi ghting compelled contemporary armed forces to a signifi cant redefi nition of actions’ forms.

PL

W artykule podjęto próbę zdefi niowania pojęcia “działania nieregularne”. Przedstawiając przykłady działań partyzanckich Autor stwierdza, że aż do XIX wieku nie poświęcano im większej uwagi w rozważaniach na temat form prowadzenia działań wojennych. Wręcz były uznawana za niehonorową formę prowadzenia walki. Nowe spojrzenie na działania nieregularne przyniosły dopiero wojna secesyjna i burska, a w następniej kolejności II wojna światowa. Jednakże prawdziwy “powrót” działań nieregularnych nastąpił w latach 90. XX wieku. Zastosowanie asymetrycznych i nie-regularnych form walki zmusiło wsoółczesne siły zbrojne do znaczącej redefi nicji form działania.

2

Polskie szyki wojenne w ordre de bataille Eryka Dahlberga

80%

Balcerek M.

Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica

|

2014

|

nr 21

93-108

PL

Album autorstwa Eryka Dahlberga jest niezwykle interesującym źródłem do badań nowożytnej sztuki wojennej. Ma on postać książki liczącej 150 kart; na 140 z nich znajdują się szyki bitewne, pokazowe i ćwiczebne, a na 3 plany obozów. Łącznie w albumie zamieszczono 288 szkiców, podzielonych na 6 rozdziałów tematycznych. Album jest przechowywany w Archiwum Wojskowym (Krigsarkivet) w Sztokholmie. Umieszczone w nim szkice szyków bitewnych były w dużej mierze nieznane historykom wojskowym. Dotyczy to przede wszystkim polskich ordre de bataille. Zapoznanie się z nimi mogłoby w znaczący sposób pogłębić naszą wiedzę o staropolskiej sztuce wojennej w XVII w. Dlatego wydaje się właściwe, aby album Dahlberga został wydany drukiem, co przełożyłoby się na jego większą recepcję w gronie historyków zajmujących się historią wojskowości.

EN

Album by Eric Dahlberg is a very interesting source for the study of the modern art of war. It has the form of book counting 150 cards; 140 of them are the battle, demonstration and instructional arrays, and 3 plans of the camps. In total, the album contains 288 essays, divided into six thematic chapters. The album is stored in the Military Archives (Krigsarkivet) in Stockholm. These sketches are largely unknown to the military historians. This applies above all to the Polish orders of battle. Knowledge on them could significantly deepen understanding of the traditional Polish art of war in the 17th c.; therefore, it seems appropriate to release Dahlberg album in print, which would disseminate knowledge on it among military historians.

3

Miejsce zasad w teorii sztuki wojennej

80%

Polak A.

Zeszyty Naukowe / Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. gen. T. Kościuszki

|

2005

|

tom Nr 3

112--127

PL

W artykule autor podejmuje problem związany z wykorzystaniem zasad sztuki wojennej na przestrzeni dziejów. W treści artykułu wskazuje, że mimo upływu czasu i ciągłych zmian w sztuce wojennej, oraz stosowania nowoczesnych środków walki, zmieniających się uwarunkowań wynikających z umów międzynarodowych, doświadczeń wielowiekowych w tej dziedzinie nie należy odrzucać.

4

Geneza i ewolucja zasad sztuki wojennej. Cz. 2

80%

Polak A.

Zeszyty Naukowe / Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. gen. T. Kościuszki

|

2005

|

tom Nr 2

94--104

PL

W artykule autor podejmuje problem związany z kształtowaniem zasad sztuki wojennej na przestrzeni dziejów. W treści artykułu wskazuje, że mimo upływu czasu i ciągłych zmian w sztuce wojennej, oraz stosowania nowoczesnych środków walki, zmieniających się uwarunkowań wynikających z umów międzynarodowych, doświadczeń wielowiekowych w tej dziedzinie nie należy odrzucać.

5

Operacyjne aspekty bitwy nad Bzurą : pierwsza faza bitwy 9-12 września 1939 roku

80%

Tym J. S.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2011

|

tom nr 4(85)

226-246

EN

The Battle of the Bzura, the operations of the Poznań and Pomorze Armies, became the main Polish forces’ battle in the 1939 Campaign and was the only offensive turn in the operational scale. Gen. Tadeusz Kutrzeba’s forces’ attack was the crowning achievement of the 1939 Campaign offensive effort that no other Polish army in 1939 or any French one in 1940 managed to achieve. The author of the article, an assistant professor at the Branch of Modern Conflicts and War History Analyses at National Defence University, characterized generally the Polish operational art in 1919-1939 and operational command in the 1939 Campaign. Moreover, he analysed the area where the Battle of the Bzura took place. This enabled him to examine its operational aspects in the context of operational art assumptions functioning then and unchangeable principles of the art of war. The analysis of operational premises of the battle, the concept of its waging and the course of its initial phase allowed the author to identify its operational objectives, key points, decisive points, main effort approach, lines of operation as well as the base of operation of the Polish forces’ opponent, i.e. the German 8th Army. The considerations concerning the centre of gravity of this operational unit are also valuable. The author noted that during the course of operations in 9-12 September the Poznań Army undoubtedly achieved tactical success forcing German divisions of the 8th Army to withdraw to the south and inflicting heavy losses on them. However, the operational objective was not reached, as the left-wing divisions of the 8th Army were not defeated. Moreover, ensuring freedom of operation in the direction of the middle Vistula and Warsaw was not achieved. The author also referred to the discussion concerning the Battle of the Bzura that was held in 1945-1958 in military periodicals by its participants – graduates of Higher War College. The author left an open question about a culminating point of the Polish operations in the first phase of the Battle of the Bzura which at the same time paves the way and direction for possible further discussion.

6

Polskie szyki wojenne w Ordre de Bataille Eryka Dahlberga

80%

Balcerek M.

Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica

|

2014

|

nr 21

93-108

EN

Album by Eric Dahlberg is a very interesting source for the study of the modern art of war. It has the form of book counting 150 cards; 140 of them are the battle, demonstration and instructional arrays, and 3 plans of the camps. In total, the album contains 288 essays, divided into six thematic chapters. The album is stored in the Military Archives (Krigsarkivet) in Stockholm. These sketches are largely unknown to the military historians. This applies above all to the Polish orders of battle. Knowledge on them could significantly deepen understanding of the traditional Polish art of war in the 17th c.; therefore, it seems appropriate to release Dahlberg album in print, which would disseminate knowledge on it among military historians.

7

Zarys polskiej myśli obronno-ekonomicznej w latach 1918-1939

80%

Płaczek J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2006

|

tom nr 2(63)

187-205

EN

Polish defensive and economic thought in the time of the Polish Second Republic (1918-1939) was built due to the needs and capabilities of the then state. The defensive - economic thought in the period under research was focused firstly on the science applied for the armed forces to use (the armed forces’ organization and organizational - functional structures and supplying of troops). The following factors influenced the development of this thought: lack of their own experience from World War 1, economic backwardness of the country, the level of national military thought (keeping large number of troops, particularly the infantry and cavalierly and conservatism characteristic for the majority of high military commanders). In the course of time, influenced by military threat, this thought concentrated on the knowledge to serve defensive-economic policy. War economics specialists dealt with the following matters in their publications: location and functioning of the defence industry, supplies and agriculture in wartime, economic mobilization, war financing, role of personnel and raw materials resources in wartime. They followed and took advantage offoreign literature in their scientific investigations. These publications have cognitive, theoretical and pragmatic values. However, many of these thoughts could not be implemented, as they did not match political, strategic interests and weaknesses of the Polish economy at that time. This thought cannot be completely condemned, ignored, disparaged or glorified. Nevertheless, these are our roots that have to be known and researched.

8

Geneza i ewolucja sztuki wojennej. Cz. 1

80%

Polak A.

Zeszyty Naukowe / Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. gen. T. Kościuszki

|

2005

|

tom Nr 1

114--126

PL

W artykule autor podejmuje ważki problem związany z kształtowaniem zasad sztuki wojennej na przestrzeni dziejów. W treści artykułu wskazuje, że mimo upływu czasu i ciągłych zmian w sztuce wojennej, oraz stosowania nowoczesnych środków walki, zmieniających się uwarunkowań wynikających z umów międzynarodowych, doświadczeń wielowiekowych nie należy odrzucać.

9

Sztandar z Ur – aspekt taktyczny

80%

Lasota J.

Obronność – Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania i Dowodzenia Akademii Sztuki Wojennej

|

2016

|

nr 1(17)

12

EN

The development of the art of war has been continuously carried out since its origins dating back the mists of the ancient past. We do not have written sources concerning military history and its components in the context of the oldest civilizations. Basing on the preserved artifacts, we can merely assume how wars and battles were waged in distant historical epochs. However, some exhibits have managed to survive and they could bring us closer to the mentioned above issues. One of these artifacts is the Standard of Ur exhibited in the British Museum. This item representing Sumerian art comes from the early predynasty period (2900-2334 BC) and was found in one of the royal tombs in the ancient city of Ur. The author of the article has suggested several tactical possibilities how the battle presented on the artifact could have been fought taking into considerations clues and hints that the ancient artist placed on the masterpiece.

10

Zmienność niezmiennych zasad sztuki wojennej

80%

Przybylak M.

Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy

|

2021

|

tom XXII (LXXIII)

|

nr 2 (276)

271-277

PL

Michał Przybylak dokonał recenzji publikacji: Jacek Lasota, Zasady sztuki wojennej (Warszawa: Bookmarked, 2020), ss. 492.

11

Możliwe kierunki zmian w reagowaniu kryzysowym. Cz. 2

80%

Bujak A.

Zeszyty Naukowe / Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. gen. T. Kościuszki

|

2005

|

tom Nr 3

89--101

PL

Autor w prezentowanym artykule dokonuje pogłębionej analizy nowych zadań stojących przed polskimi siłami zbrojnymi u progu XXI w. Uwzględniając przy tej okazji rozwój środków walki, z których wiele wykorzystywano w trakcie wojny w Zatoce Perskiej. Zwraca uwagę na przeniesienie środka ciężkości działań wojskowych pod wpływem odprężenia polityczno-militarnego na świecie. Dotychczasowa rola czynnika militarnego zamienia się w coraz większym stopniu w czynnik utrzymywania pokoju, zniechęcania i odstraszania, a tym samym zapobiegania agresji.

12

Czas jako determinant planowania i prowadzenia operacji

70%

Joniak J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2012

|

tom nr 2(87)

337-353

EN

Contemporary operations’ planning and conducting is very difficult and requires commanders’ great flexibility and most of all adaptability skills. The key issue is to determine in an appropriate way factors determining achieving the goals of operation. Time is one of them. Time as an operational factor may have different dimensions in relation to different kinds and branches of armed forces. Moreover, it may have a different significance for assets in different operational environments. It must be a component of each kind of operation as the determinant of its rationality. However, it could be assumed that the party, which will win the time battle, has more chances of success to achieve its planned goals. The recent years’ revaluation of military theoreticians’ perception of the time and information problems shows explicitly that achieving success in operations is the resultant of these two dimensions. Acquiring key information, even if significantly in advance in relation to the enemy, does not give grounds to achieve victory in battle. Only information in connection with the time of response becomes the key to attain the assumed goal. It is the basis to gain advantage.

13

Sztuka wojenna – sztuką intelektu prowadzenia operacji wojskowych, wykorzystania zasobów informatycznych oraz jakości potencjału logistycznego wojsk

70%

Mańkowski R. , Nyszk Ł.

Obronność – Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania i Dowodzenia Akademii Sztuki Wojennej

|

2017

|

nr 2(22)

15

XX

The aim of this paper is to answer the following questions: what military art is, what it is concerned with, what it is for, how it developed through history, and what its essence and impact on the quality of logistics potential is. While discussing the above, the authors refer to the following issues: • philosophy of military art in historical approach; • theory of Clausewitz versus military art; • vision of nuclear war versus military art; • military art versus information potential of the military; • military art in the logistics system of the military; • quality and quantity of the military and its capability; • quality of logistics in performing military tasks of the military. The essence, specificity, and scope of military art concerning its impact on the knowledge connected with the military and their operational tasks are considered by the authors of this paper in the historical aspect as well as the current reality of the armed forces. The need to improve the quality of performing logistics tasks and the creation and improvement of the logistics system of the military are discussed across the spectrum of military art concerning the current high quality requirements. It is expected within the scope of services rendered by the operational military systems. This paper analyses the essence and necessity of qualitative breakthrough in the current logistic reality on the basis of theoretical interpretations of combat war phenomenon involving its two opposing subsystems (potentials) containing material (energetic) and nonmaterial (informational) aspects. It is assumed that both of these varying aspects of any potential are expected to function properly according to their designation. Therefore, they must be influenced by the proper qualitative logistic potential based on the settled principles of the military art to provide feedback, continuity, and completion of tasks. Finally, having described the great role of logistics in providing the high level of combat operations and expected results, the authors conclude the paper with reflections concerning the place and role of logistics, as well as its qualitative requirements in practical activity, and the contribution of the military art in this approach.

14

Od Ksenofonta do Liddel-Harta, czyli krótki przegląd wybranych teoretyków sztuki wojennej

60%

Polak A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2012

|

tom nr 2(87)

305-321

EN

The art of war has a long and rich history. Thousands of treaties have been written by hundreds of theoreticians during dozens years since it emerged. The article deals with only a few. They include the representative of the antiquity (Xenophon, Thucydides and Caesar), the Middle Ages (Machiavelli) and modern history (Luddendorf, Fuller and Liddell-Hart).

15

Zasady sztuki wojennej w biznesie

60%

Sułek M.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2002

|

tom nr 2(47)

245-259

EN

The theory of the art of war exerts a great influence on the organisation and management studies that in the 90s increased significantly. It is a twofold influence. Firstly it is a cursory influence of military language, secondly its is a methodological and factual influence with serious consequences for conducting organisation and management studies. The article discusses the methodological basis for applying the principles of “civilian” management and the art of war principles by distinguishing two different co-ordination mechanisms. The author puts forward a thesis that in normal conditions of market competition the use of, by analogy, the principles of armed forces commanding is not satisfactorily justified in economic activity. The commonly used notion of “competitive battle” diverts the attention from the most essential fact that competition is not a form of battle, but a form of co-operation. However, applying the principles of the art of war is possible and recommended in specific situations, i.e. crisis management.

16

Polska sztuka wojenna w wojnie obronnej 1939 roku

60%

Hermann H.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

1999

|

tom nr 2(35)A Numer specialny

79-93

17

Historia wojen morskich i geografia wojennomorska-przedmioty wykładane w rosyjskich i radzieckich morskich uczelniach wojskowych od drugiej połowy XIX w. do czasów obecnych

60%

Będźmirowski J. , Szudrowicz A.

Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej

|

2001

|

tom R. 42 nr 4 (148)

5-13

PL

Przedmioty historia wojen morskich. historia morskiej sztuki wojennej, geografia wojenno-morska są obecnie jednym Z głównych bloków przedmiotów 10lmnych w programach kształcenia wyższych morskich uczelni wojskowych. morii kształcenia kadr oficerskich rosyjskiej marynarki wojennej dzieje tych - przedmiotów przedstawiały się bardzo różnie. Ich znaczenie wzrosło zwłaszcza po klęsce floty rosyjskiej pod Cuszimą. Degradacja ich znaczenia miała miejsce larach 70. i 80. XX w. Obecnie czynione są starania aby omawiane przedmioty zajęły należne im miejsce w projektach programów kształcenia oficerów marynarki wojennej Federacji Rosyjskiej.

EN

Subjects such as history of wars at sea, history of naval art, naval geography at the moment constitute the main group of subjects included in curricula of higher schools. In the history of training officers for the Russian Navy the subjects have been treated in various ways. They gained in importance especially after the defeat the Russian fleet at the battle of Czuszima. They were neglected in the -- and 1980s. At present attempts are being made to give them appropriate ~ration in the curricula designed for training naval officers in the Russian

18

Istota i cel współczesnego natarcia. Cz. 2, Natarcie związku taktycznego

60%

Kaczmarek W.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

1999

|

tom nr 1(34)

21-32

EN

The article presents conditions when a brigade and/or division can conduct an assault. The significant contents of the author’s considerations are focused on defining relations and dependencies between the place of a brigade/division in operational group and a defence form conducted by the enemy. Basing on the task definition, which is perceived in the con-text of the purpose of the action, differences between defence breaking and defence defeating have been outlined. In the final part of the article the author’s viewpoints concerning actions of so called separated operational unit have been presented.

19

Myślenie a sztuka wojenna

60%

Czupryński A.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

2006

|

tom nr 1(62)

110-125

EN

The article is a synthesis of a research project entitled "Development Determinants of the Art of War. The author highlights conditions of operational thinking in human development and its influence on the development of the art of war. Operational thinking is an ability required on every command level in the process of armed fighting organisation and conducting, in the decision making process situations of high uncertainty. Developing operational thinking is not a mechanical remembering but generating creative and productive thinking. Thus operational thinking is an intellectual ability of problem perception and creative solving. In the art of war it gains a special importance because situations to be solved are determined with incomplete data which demands defining the problem, stating conditions of solving and selecting one of many solutions taking the aim into consideration. The effectiveness of operational thinking is developed in the process of institutionalised education and during problem solving social activity. In the art of war, operational thinking is determined by the expected aim and not by the current situation conditions. Its idea is to perceive dependencies that create changes in a particular problem situation and their influence on the expected result of the activity. Operational thinking in the art of war is determined by a creative approach towards problem solving in the aspect of the expected aim.

20

Obrona miasta Bełza w 1919 roku jako forma obrony aktywnej

60%

Ślipiec J.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

|

1999

|

tom nr 4(37)

237-249

EN

In November 1918, a Polish-Ukrainian conflict broke out on the Polish Southeast Borderland including areas of Easter Galicia and Volhynia. The Battle of Lvov, which took place on 1st to 22nd November, finished with victory and was the first stage of the conflict. Seizing Lvov did not mean the end of Polish-Ukrainian fights that lasted until July 1919. On January 28, 1919, Col. Berbecki’s group reached the outskirts of Bełz and seized the town. During the fights, the enemy’s forces, which outnumbered ours, were defeated, 365 prisoners of war were taken, some officers including, 25 machine guns and other guns and ammunition were gained. The most important characteristic of Bełz defence was its active and offensive character. Taking into consideration the art of war during the defence of Bełz, it has to be stated that undertaken by Col. Berbecki form of active defence was the most effective solution enabling reaching success. Experiences gained at the defence of Bełz were included into Polish art of war. And thus Gen. Stanisław Haller ordered to introduce the subject “Tactics of Persistent Defence in Housing Estates” into the curriculum of General Staff School. There were used experiences and conclusions from Bełz defence, worked out by Col. Berbecki at the request of the Chief of Staff.