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1
Content available remote Relativismus a kontingentní budoucnosti
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EN
Imagine that Goethe declared on September 17th, 1792, at the village of Valmes, these words: “here tomorrow there will be a battle (… which will mean the beginning of a new era)”. One might think that this sentence is not, at the given moment, true. But on the following day, September 20th, the Duke of Brunswick will say to him: “You were right!”, as if from the perspective of the contemporary situation Goethe pronounced words that were true the day before. These two intuitions at first sight exclude one another. MacFarlane asserts that it is possible to make them compatible if we accept the new concept of relative truth: relatively, in the context of the verdict, Goethe’s words retrospectively show their truth. This analysis of contingent future would thus justify a new form of relativism (semantic relativism). The article summarises the framework of temporal logic in which the question of indeterminism is posed, and it examines MacFarlane’s standpoint with the aim of establishing the conclusion that, in this situation, there is no justification for the relativistic “ideology”.
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Content available remote Alasdair Agonistes: MacIntyre and a New Discontent with Modernity
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EN
This paper is an examination of certain assumptions that, I hold, lie in the background of MacIntyre’s conception of the formation of the intellectual schema as found, most prominently, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. A thorough examination of MacIntyre’s concept of the rational schema, I will show, reveals that the parsing he proposes to carry out on intellectual history is confronted with a problem that finds its analogue in the field of biological taxonomy. In order to carry out this project of determining where the seams lie in intellectual history one must first recognize that the parsing itself is a scheme-dependent undertaking. As such it is not unlike the necessarily somewhat arbitrary identification of species and genera in the biological realm. In other words, it should be recognized that intellectual history, like the morphology of the plant and animal kingdoms, is continuous, not discreet. An almost wholly unexamined assumption that stalks through Whose Justice? and Three Rival Versions is that there are something like intellectual natural kinds in the history of ideas. Indeed, the notion that there are “traditions” at all (in the sense in which MacIntyre uses the term) may be a highly conventional artefact of an Enlightenment-era view of intellectual progress. This leads me to conclude that MacIntyre has failed to observe that the view of traditions and schemes neatly succeeding one another, on which much of his critique is dependent, is itself a product of the perspective he calls “encyclopedia.” This, in turn, will make manifest why it is that almost all of MacIntyre’s examples of rational scheme-switching are from the natural sciences rather than the normative, a fact I will show is connected to a paradigm of linear progression that one tends to find in the exact sciences, but not in praxis.
EN
Nowadays is growing importance of interdisciplinary research and in the field of cultural diversity, multiculturalism and intercultural cooperation. It is important also to take into account the global processes of changes associated with the dissemination of digital information and communication technologies. One of the theories which are essential in this area of research is the concept by E. Sapir and B.L. Whorf. The purpose of the article is to introduce into a current condition of scientific dispute concerning the views of these authors on the relationship between language and cognition. Paper is based on a critical analysis of the literature. In conclusion, the main findings and recommendations for further research were identified.
Human Affairs
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2009
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tom 19
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nr 3
239-250
EN
The paper deals with E. H. Gombrich's lifelong polemics against metaphysics in art history and the humanities. They began in 1937 and continued up until his final (posthumous) book The Preference for the Primitives. Analyzing the "fallacies" and "pitfalls" resulting from metaphysical collectivism, essentialism, expressionism, holism and relativism such as a "belief in hypostatized collective personalities" and "style as a super-artist" or "physiognomic fallacy", Gombrich also unmasked their ideological implications. He first targeted nationalism and racialism, then the perils of totalitarianism and finally all forms of relativism. Gombrich's plea for the universality of the "canon of excellence" can be regarded not only as a defence of humanism but also as a form of apology for the values of Western liberal democratic society.
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My comments are focused on the debate between Izydora Dąmbska and Ludwik Fleck. In the course of their debate, which took place in the 1930's, they discussed some basic issues of epistemology, focusing on the problems of the sources of scientific knowledge, objectivity of knowledge, and truth. The aim of the paper is to place their debate in a the historical context and to demonstrate the novelty of Fleck's arguments, especially in comparison with Thomas S. Kuhn's later contribution. I also examine the dominant interpretations of Fleck's theory of knowledge, as well as the reasons for which his philosophical ideas, especially Entstehung und Entwiklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (1935) have fallen into the philosophical oblivion. I argue that Fleck's views, although innovative, were less radical than it is commonly thought.
Teologia w Polsce
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2019
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tom 13
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nr 2
187-199
EN
Ecumenical activity is a very important aspect of life in the Catholic Church. The author of the article looked at this ecumenical activity in the perspective of Joseph Ratzinger’s – Benedict XVI’s teaching. According to pope emeritus nowadays relativism is the most dangerous for ecumenism in the Catholic Church after Vaticanum II. A special document promulgated by pope Benedict XVI entitled Anglicanorum coetibus was a magnificent example of ecumenical activity in the Catholic and conciliar spirit. The article shows ecumenism also in the perspective of conciliar Decree on ecumenism and liturgical vision of unity of the Church.
EN
Postmodernity, also known as postmodern or late modern of clarity, it seems the key word in the description of modern culture and civilization. Stricter characterized for the consumer aspiration, the pursuit of materialistic values, hedonism, questioning the truth and the consequent relativism mean that preaching has it become an extremely difficult and demanding. The submitted paper the author raises the question whether this unfavorable context, the voice from the pulpit of the church has any chance of reaching the listener. Returns the first attention to the need for greater inclusion in the preaching of the situation in which the modern student living word of God, then outlines the genesis, the main assumptions of postmodernism and their consequences for the life of faith. In summary, attempts to formulate certain indications-tion concerning both the content and style of preaching in the simplifica-changed context.
Human Affairs
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2009
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tom 19
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nr 3
259-265
EN
In the spirit of Sir Ernst Gombrich, this essay uses an anecdote-a chat between Gombrich and a barber from Tuscany-to illustrate a deeper point, namely, how cultural memory, tradition, and a canon give rise to an implied language of culture and cultural value. Gombrich staunchly defended tradition against relativism. By relativism, he meant something like "radical subjectivism." To his mind, subjectivism (in the cultural and social sense of the term) is not only impossible, since meaning is conferred through culture and society, but it is also dangerous (in the cultural and ethical sense of the term), since it denies the existence of shared values. Against consensus on the one hand and radical subjectivism on the other, Gombrich advocated a middle way: criticism and self-criticism to ensure latitude; the search for "truth" to ensure a limited plurality of interpretations.
EN
Recent writing associated with the so-called “ontological turn” provokes many theoretical questions. Anthropologists associated with the ontological turn deny the representationalist framework, where cultures are treated as clusters of beliefs that operate like different perspectives on a single world. These authors speak about many “worlds” instead of many cultures, and therefore it seems to imply a kind of relativism. We argue that, unlike earlier forms of relativism, the ontological turn in anthropology is not only immune to the arguments of Donald Davidson’s “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, but it affirms and develops the antirepresentationalist position of Davidson’s subsequent essays.
EN
The present paper attempts to throw some light on the conundrum of Socrates’ political views in the Apology and Crito. The problem resides in that the Socrates of the Apology evidently undermines the authority of Athenian democracy, whereas the Socrates of the Crito argues that his escape from prison would be tantamount to disrespecting the state, which would in turn threaten the prosperity of the entire πόλις. The article suggests that in the two dialogues, the young Plato examines the possibility of steering a middle course between embracing relativism, on the one hand, and encouraging civil disobedience, on the other. Thus, the philosopher focuses primarily on investigating the two options, without either totally subordinating the citizen to the state, or unreflexively accepting any crude pragmatism.
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Content available Współczesna moralność bez etyki?
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EN
According to the essential arguments of post-modernism (relativism and subjectivism in particular), which was popular in last decades, there is no point in dealing with moral philosophy. Post-modernists admit, however, that moral is worth discussing yet with a different approach then before. This new approach is totally opposed to the morality of the bygone decades and lacks a wide spectrum of values such as the objective truth, norms or principles and other generally accepted values. The new morality is supposed to compete effectively with the past morals because it is better. In order to prove that post-modernists characterize morality of the past as a set of norms and legal principles which rule the social life. This kind of ethics was bound to heteronymous obligation which determined human life and thus ruined human freedom and autonomy. Every deed which was at variance with the standards was regarded as an offence. In such circumstances people avoid making decisions and rejected responsibility. They felt comforted to obey regulations imposed by authorities. Post-modernists are unable to prove the superiority of their new approach since they have no rational or theoretical arguments. In this approach there is no unchanging human nature or fixed norms or values. Ethics is basically a question of sensitivity and imagination; it is depended on the instinct and impulse – therefore on something subjective, elusive and fastidious. There is no absolute certainty that human decisions and deeds are reasonable and good. If we pursue ethics in this particular way it will become senseless and will result in subjectivism, irrationalism, nihilism, relativism, etc. On the grounds of such ethics it would be possible to both praise and condemn the same deed.
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EN
Our contemporary life is said to be in conformity with what we do. People tend to be honest and trustworthy unlike those in the past - in the Victorian times, for example, when there were elements of hypocrisy and conventional behaviour among citizens. Many people nowadays live their lives according to their own subjective beliefs; and they speak openly about their both good and bad deeds – even if some of them were kept secret to the public. And the public is equally open to tolerate or even accept them. An analysis of many cases in which people follow their own moral beliefs shows that this category of people are not always honest – only then, when their system of moral values is in accord with the objective system of moral values. Individual moral beliefs can be a result of false or relative moral theories, or even constructed to fit one’s moral attitude. Behaviour in which one respects the established principles, though may seem genuine, does not need to be considered honest. Following this kind of thinking, a man does not have any motivation or need to control himself – human-beings can dispense with self-development. The Victorian hypocrite had at least a due respect for moral values and knew that he had done wrong. His honesty followed what was good in his life but his deeds were all in all doomed to failure. Failure on the way of applying the right moral principles in life is not dishonesty. Every attempt to follow them inspires humans to undertake some spiritual efforts and gives opportunity to one’s own personal development.
13
Content available Czy relatywista może być parezjastą?
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PL
Tytułowe pytanie jest w równym stopniu problematyczne, jak i zasadne, dlatego też moim celem będzie próba ujęcia tego zagadnienia z dwóch teoretycznie odmiennych pozycji – realisty i konstruktywisty epistemologicznego. W końcowej części tekstu spróbuję jednak nakreślić możliwości godzenia postawy parezjasty z akceptacją dla stanowiska relatywistycznego.
EN
The article aspires to provide the reader with the answer to the relevant question whether a relativist can be a parrhesiast. This is a complicated question, because parrhesia implies ethical commitment, which from the relative point of view is difficult to justify. I present two different philosophical perspectives (epistemological realism and radical relativism) as two possible approaches to the main problem.
EN
In the debate between contextualism and relativism about predicates of taste, the challenge from disagreement (the objection that contextualism cannot account for disagreement in ordinary exchanges involving such predicates) has played a central role. This paper investigates one way of answering the challenge consisting on appeal to certain, less focused on, uses of predicates of taste. It argues that the said thread is unsatisfactory, in that it downplays certain exchanges that constitute the core disagreement data. Additionally, several arguments to the effect that the exchanges in question don’t amount to disagreement are considered and rejected.
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In this text, referring to the allegation that the Philosophical Workshops preach “empty freedom of relativism”, I deal with the theory which forms the foundation of the Matthew Lipman’s program. I do so in the context that attributes situationism to it. First, I consider what is situationism (analyzing three of its versions), and whether the creators of the philosophical workshops represent situationism. Then, I wonder if they promote the “useful life at the moment” and explain what tools they propose to achieve the convergence of moral behavior of different entities, as well as what is, according to them, the basis of objective/intersubjective justification of individual entity actions that deviate from social expectations. At the end, I point at the Socratic roots of this concept.
EN
Moral Relativism can be considered an attractive alternative to realism because relativists can make good sense of cultural and societal disagreements by seeing them as faultless. However, we can show that this advantage is made possible by systematically disagreeing with moral phenomenology. Relativists make a substantial distinction between intercultural and intracultural discourses which turns out to be incoherent. This can be shown by making use of Crispin Wright’s notion of Cognitive Command.
EN
This paper offers an outline of practical and theoretical relations between truth and rhetoric. A point of departure for considerations to follow are philosophical theories of the sophists, Plato, and Aristotle as well as modern commentators of political rhetoric. I argue that the predominantly rhetorical nature of contemporary culture is inextricably bound up with the controversial issue of political deception, its definition and function. I refer to the theories of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida pertaining to the following issues: a relation between acting and lying, mass deception, and self–deception in totalitarian states. I further propose that classical ethics developing from Plato, Aristotle and Kant fails as a basis for the analysis of political and social processes in democratic societies. Key to grasping these processes is rhetoric – as an art of persuasion – which has nothing to do with the traditional true–false dichotomy.
EN
Aim. The aim of the research is to explore the functionality of the Open Education Model of religious education for the “form[ation of] an internal moral compass,” as Steven Hitlin and Jane Allyn Piliavin (2004) describe the modern understanding of values. In other words, the author will attempt to explore first what the model has to offer in terms of equipping students with the necessary skills so that they will successfully navigate through the conflict of values, and second the potential application and limitations of the model. Methods. The exploration is based on a 2014 production by Pure Flix Entertainment, the first movie in the God’s not Dead series. The author will consider two educational cases presented in the movie using a close reading method. Results. The study seems to prove that that the God’s not Dead movie accurately portrays the conflict of values experienced by young adults in present-day America. It also appears to consistently promote the Open Education Model as a type of religious education that provides considerable assistance to the learners in retaining their beliefs in the world of mixed values, especially in the time of crisis. The model appears to lend sound conceptual framework missing in other models, but its full application is time and effort consuming and fails to provide more comprehensive approach to religious diversity. Conclusion. The Open Education Method of religious instruction in the environment dominated by a multicultural approach, seems to offer valuable concepts that may facilitate educational process proposed by other models and thus deserves more thorough consideration in academic research.
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Content available remote Silny program Szkoły Edynburskiej z perspektywy epistemologicznej
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PL
Analizuję z filozoficznej perspektyw koncepcję nauki postulowaną przez szkołę edynburską. Pokazuję, że koncepcja ta ma istotny wymiar filozoficzny, a niektóre ważne jej aspekty są w bliskiej korespondencji do odpowiednich aspektów racjonalistycznych filozoficznych teorii nauki.
EN
The conception of science postulated by the Edinburg School is analysed from the philosophical perspective. It is shown that the conception has significant philosophical dimensions, and that its important aspects are in close correspondence to relevant aspects of the rationalistic philosophical theories of science.
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Content available Metalinguistic Value Disagreement
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Studia Semiotyczne
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2017
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tom 31
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nr 2
139–159
EN
In a series of publications Burgess, Plunkett and Sundell have developed a metalinguistic negotiation view that they call ‘Conceptual Ethics.’ I argue that their position adequately captures our intuition that some cases of value disputes are metalinguistic, but that they reverse the direction of justification when they state that speakers ‘negotiate’ the best use of a term or concept on the basis of its prior social role. Borrowing ideas from Putnam (1975b), I instead suggest distinguishing two meanings of general terms and value predicates. Core meaning represents the lowest common denominator between speakers and is primarily based on our needs to coordinate behavior. In contrast to this, the noumenal meaning of a general term or value predicate is intended to capture an aspect of reality and represents what a term really means. Like many other disputes about theoretical terms, terms for abstract objects, and predicates, metalinguistic value disputes are about noumenal meaning on the basis of a shared core meaning. This direction towards reality is what sets the account apart from mere metalinguistic negotiation.
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