Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

What is a Human Being: Does It Matter?

100%

Little B.

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nr 1

137-147

EN

In this paper I will argue that man as defined, at least in part, by the concept of hu-man nature within an essentialist understanding remains a philosophically and anthropo-logically defensible way for understanding what it means to be a human being (person). That is, an understanding of human being includes, but is not limited to, the actuality of the non-material or non-extended substance commonly referred to as soul. The argu-ment turns on the notion that persons are essentially persons. It seems intuitive to say that I cannot imagine myself as a “not-a-person” while it is quite easy to imagine myself as “not-a-professor.” To say I am a person seems not identical to saying I am a profesor—the former seems impossible while the latter possible. Although it might be argued that I could not verbalize I am a person without having a body it seems that would not permit one to conclude the two are identical.

2

Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity

86%

Snowdon P.

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tom 69

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nr 1

11-21

PL

In chapter 2 Swinburne rejects physicalism for two reason. The first is that it is committed to entailments that do not exist. It is suggested that this reason is questionable both because there is no persuasive reason to deny there are such entailments, and also no reason to think that physicalism has such entailments. The second reason is that the mental involves privileged access by the subject and physical features do not allow privileged access. It is proposed that the physical does in fact permit privileged access. In chapter 3 Swinburne defends the Simple View of personal identity. The reasoning is very complex and rich, but it is proposed that Swinburne has not really shown that a reductionist account cannot be correct.

3

Nature and necessity in Aristotle’s "Physics"

58%

Olesiak J.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2015

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tom 51

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nr 1

55-73

EN

In Physics II.8 Aristotle claims that the type of necessity found in natural processes is not simple necessity as the ancient physicalists maintained, but hypothetical necessity. The article first considers the textual context within which this issue arises. Then it examines two basic elements of Aristotle’s conceptual apparatus, nature and necessity. It considers his understanding of nature as an inner source of activity and calls attention to the ontological problem of the location of this source within the very entity whose source it is. Next, it examines the various sorts of necessity that Aristotle distinguishes, identifies the sense of necessity that is at work in the ancient physicalist account of natural coming to be, and contrasts it with the hypothetical necessity he proposes. It points out that there remains the unresolved problem of Aristotle’s use in the natural domain of the simple necessity that he elsewhere explicitly reserves to the realm of the unchanging and eternal.

4

Redukcionistický program fyziky a proměna fundamentální ontologie

58%

Havlík V.

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nr 5

695-712

EN

The expanding knowledge of physics - especially in those areas remote from our empirical knowledge - have already, many times before, transformed our intuitive, ontological starting points and our assumptions about the ordering of nature. In the present time, we are prepared to accept that, for example, the simultaneity of an event is dependent on a reference frame, that particles in the microworld can be in multiple places at the same time, or that it is not possible to measure all of these particles’ physical attributes with the same precision at the same time. It is possible to say that we are altogether familiar with relativistic and quantum effects. In physics, however, further facts were also discovered that called for a change in our traditional assumptions. Their results could have a similarly revolutionary impact and could significantly influence not only knowledge in the area of physics, but also some other areas of the special sciences. In this article I try to show in what way the traditional assumptions touching on relationships between the parts and the wholes, which are the basis of traditional, reductionist methodology and fundamental ontology, would be transformed. At the same time, I try to analyze what the consequences of these changes in the explanatory topology will be.

CS

Rozvíjející se fyzikální poznání - především v těch oblastech, které jsou vzdáleny naší empirické zkušenosti - již vícekrát proměnilo naše intuitivní ontologická východiska a předpoklady týkající se uspořádání přírody. V dnešní době jsme již připraveni akceptovat, že například současnost událostí je závislá na vztažné soustavě, že částice mikrosvěta mohou být na více místech najednou, nebo že nelze změřit se stejnou přesností všechny jejich fyzikální vlastnosti. Lze říci, že s relativistickými a kvantovými efekty jsme již celkem obeznámeni. V rámci fyziky byly již ale objeveny i další fakty, které volají po změně našich tradičních předpokladů. Jejich důsledky mohou mít obdobně revoluční dopad a mohou významně ovlivnit nejen fyzikální poznání, ale i některé další oblasti speciálních věd. V této stati se snažím ukázat, jakým způsobem by se v současné době měly proměnit tradiční předpoklady týkající se vztahů mezi částmi a celky, které zakládají tradiční redukcionistickou metodologii a fundamentální ontologii. Zároveň se snažím analyzovat, k jakým důsledkům vedou tyto změny v explanační topologii.