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EN
This article is the third and the last part of the discussion on Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought styles and collectives. According to his ideas every perception is conditioned by the thought style. There is no neutral perception, it is always determinated by the cultural context and particular thought collectives. It applies also to the perception based on the common sense. This article presents several examples of how human body might be perceived by different thought collectives. The first one shows how “dead” metaphor manipulates the content of the perception, the other one highlights the relationship between the invention of individual, European individualism and the perception of the face. This article series dedicated to Ludwik Fleck was supposed to discuss his ideas, which seem to be very interesting for ethnologists and anthropologists. From the theoretical point of view, Fleck ideas may inspire or supplement the theory of culture. His concepts might be used by various humanities, especially that he relates them to the context of ‘primitive cultures’. The theory of thought styles and collectives might be applied to the research on theory of cognition, cultural aspects of nature, theory of sight, common sense, cultural change, socialization, circulation of knowledge in the society, analysis of meanings, etc. The scope of problems discussed by Ludwik Fleck is very wide and quite interesting for social scientists.
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Content available remote "Zrcadlo přírody" a druhých u Davida Huma:
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EN
The article interprets Hume’s theory of association of ideas, primarily with respect to resemblance as one of the principles of association and to general ideas (or concepts) as a principal consequence of association. On the basis of this interpretation, the author argues that Hume’s conception of resemblance and general terms is not conditioned by the acceptance of the so-called “myth of the given”. As a result of accepting this assumption, however, new questions arise; in particular, why is it that just those general concepts arise that in fact arise and how are they intersubjectively shared. These questions lead to the need to supplement the image of the mind as a “mirror of nature” from the beginning of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, book I, with the image of the mind as a “mirror of others” from book II.
CS
Článek interpretuje Humovu teorii asociace idejí především se zřetelem k podobnosti jako jednomu z principů asociace a k obecným idejím (či pojmům) jako zásadnímu produktu asociace. Na základě této interpretace autor tvrdí, že Humovo pojetí podobnosti a obecných termínů není podmíněno přijetím tzv. „mýtu daného“. V důsledku přijetí tohoto předpokladu však vyvstávají nové otázky, zejména proč asociací vznikají zrovna ty obecné pojmy, které reálně vznikají, a jak dochází k jejich intersubjektivnímu sdílení. Tyto otázky vedou k nutnosti doplnit obrázek mysli jako „zrcadla přírody“ ze začátku první knihy Humova Pojednání o lidské přirozenosti obrázkem mysli jako „zrcadla druhých“ z jeho druhé knihy.
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