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Beyond Multiculturalism: Recognition Through the Relational Reason

100%

Donati P.

Polish Sociological Review

2009

tom 166

nr 2

147-178

Multiculturalism is a term spreading in the West during the 1960s to indicate respect, tolerance and defence of cultural minorities. The idea of multiculturalism has become a collective imaginary (“all different, all equals”). It has generated a political ideology supporting an inclusive citizenship towards “different” cultures. After being adopted as official policy in many Countries, multiculturalism has generated more negative than positive effects (fragmenting the society, separating the minorities and fostering cultural relativism). As a political doctrine, it seems harder and harder to be put into practice. At its place, today we talk of interculturality. But this expression too seems quite vague and uncertain. This essay discusses on the possible alternatives to multiculturalism, asking itself whether the way of interculturality can be a solution or not. The Author’s thesis is that the theory of interculturality has the advantage to stress the inter, namely what lies in between different cultures. But it does not possess yet the conceptual and effective means to understand and handle the problems of the public sphere, when the different cultures express cultural values radically conflictual between them. The troubles of interculturality result from two lacks: an insufficient reflexivity inside the single cultures, and the lack of a relational interface between the different cultures (between the carrier subjects). Modern western Reason created a societal structure (lib-lab) promoting neither the first nor the second one. In fact, it neutralizes them, because it faces the dilemmas of values inside the cultural diversities through criteria of ethical indifference. Such criteria set reflexivity to zero, preventing individuals to understand the deepest reasons of the vital experience of the others. Reason is emptied of its meaning and of its understanding capability. To go over the failures of multiculturalism and the fragilities of interculturality, a lay approach to the coexistence of cultures is required, being able to give strength back to Reason, through new semantics of the inter-human diversity. The Author suggests the development of the “relational reason,” beyond the forms already known of rationality. To make Reason relational might be the best way to imagine a new social order of society, being able to humanize the globalizing processes and the growing migrations. The after-modern society would be more or less human, depending on how it will be able to widen the human Reason, structuring it inside a new “relational unit” with the religious faith.

Zamyšlení nad knihou Ondřeje Sikory "Kantova praktická metafyzika"

72%

Sobotka M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2019

tom 67

nr 4

605-623

The article focuses on Ondřej Sikora’s book, Kant’s Practical Metaphysics (Kantova praktická metafyzika. Praha, Karolinum 2017). Emphasis is placed on the metaphysical anchoring of Kant’s ethics, which is expressed in the thesis of Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten), to the effect that a person is called to a higher meaning of his or her existence than the meaning that existence alone supplies him or her. >From this perspective, Kant’s thesis of the two causalities, natural causality and causality from freedom, becomes intelligible. The author places further emphasis on Sikora’s interpretation of the difference between Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft), which hinges on its movement from the hypothetical analyses of the “idea … of a possible pure Will” (“Idee … eines möglichem reinen Willens”) to the categorical assertions of the Critique of Practical Reason. The movement from Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals to the Critique of Practical Reason is facilitated by the introduction of the “fact of Reason” as a piece of knowledge that in itself also contains an ethical claim.

Tato studie je vyjádřením ke knize Ondřeje Sikory Kantova praktická metafyzika (2017). Za její první klad recenzent považuje důraz na metafyzické zakotvení Kantovy etiky, které se projevuje v tezi Základů metafyziky mravů , podle níž je člověk povolán k vyššímu významu své existence, než jaký mu skýtá existence sama. Z tohoto pohledu je pochopitelná teze o dvojí kauzalitě u Kanta, kauzalitě přírodní a kauzalitě ze svobody. Recenzent dále klade důraz na Sikorovu interpretaci rozdílu mezi Základy metafyziky mravů a Kritikou praktického rozumu, který záleží v postupu od hypotetických rozborů „ideje … možné čisté vůle“ („Idee … eines möglichem reinen Willens“) ke kategorickým tvrzením Kritiky praktického rozumu. Postup od Základů metafyziky mravů ke Kritice praktického rozumu je umožněn zavedením „faktu rozumu“ jako poznatku, který v sobě zároveň obsahuje etický nárok.

Die vorliegende Studie ist dem 2017 erschienenen Buch Ondřej Sikoras Kants praktische Metaphysik (Kantova praktická metafyzika. Praha, Karolinum 2017) gewidmet. Schwerpunkt ist die metaphysische Verankerung von Kants Ethik, die in der These Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten deutlich wird, dergemäß der Mensch zu einer höheren Bedeutung seiner Existenz berufen ist, als sie ihm selbst gibt. Aus dieser Perspektive wird die These der doppelten Kausalität bei Kant verständlich, nämlich der natürlichen Kausalität und der Kausalität durch Freiheit. Der Autor betont des weiteren Sikoras Interpretation des Unterschieds zwischen Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten und Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, der im Fortschreiten von der hypothetischen Analyse „Idee … eines möglichen reinen Willens“ zu den kategorischen Behauptungen der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft besteht. Der Schritt von Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten hin zur Kritik der praktischen Vernunft wird durch die Einführung des „Faktums der Vernunft“ als Erkenntnis möglich, die auch einen ethischen Anspruch umfasst.