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1

THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET MASS-SCALE SPECTACLES (FROM 1917 TO THE 1930S) (Ewolucja widowisk masowych w Zwiazku Radzieckim (od roku 1917 do lat 30))

100%

Osinska K.

Konteksty - Polska Sztuka Ludowa

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2008

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tom 62

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nr 2(281)

154-175

EN

The point of departure are the differentiated and contradictory sources of the phenomenon of Soviet mass-scale spectacles On the one hand, the latter referred to the concept of the 'masses' which, according to its class interpretation, represent predominantly the proletariat, and in certain versions - exclusively the proletariat from highly industrialised factories and large cities. On the other hand, mass-scale spectacles emerged from pre-revolutionary idealistic conceptions of the renascence of culture via the rejection of individualism and a return to primary sources focused on the commune. These notions, inspired by views expounded by Nietzsche, were propagated and developed in Russia by Viacheslav Ivanov, the idea of 'bogostroitelstvo', which combined Marxism and religion (Lunacharsky, Alexandr Bogdanov, et al.) and the idea of 'sobornost', stemming from the Russian Orthodox movement and represented by, i. a. Nikolai Berdyaev. The first post-revolutionary years featured two discernible and mutually hostile tendencies in culture: the project of objectifying the proletariat, expressed in the idea of the 'mass-scale theatre', and, on the other hand, the 'theatre for the masses', according to which the masses were treated as an object and passive recipients, and art - as a tool of ideological indoctrination. The first project was developed chiefly upon the basis of the Proletcult. In a suitable sub-chapter the authoress recalls the polemic between Lenin and Proletcult ideologues, with special emphasis on the inner contradictions both within the Proletcult ideology and the stand represented by the Bolshevik party. A depiction of the Proletcult ideology in the domain of the theatre encompasses also its less known aspects, such as the rejection of the copyright 'fetish' (which rendered possible an unrestricted adaptation of the classics) and a new conception of the theatrical company: radical Proletcult theoreticians proposed a total abolition of the function of the director and his replacement by a collective. In the new theatre, as envisioned by Proletcult, the actor was to become the foremost expression of mass-scale and collective principles. The successive sub-chapters discuss assorted forms of the mass-scale theatre: amateur theatricals, the theatre in the armed forces, mass-scale performances (including the most famous Capture of the Winter Palace), communist rituals, political carnivals, as well as marches, parades and demonstrations from the 1930s. Examples of the spectacles and their descriptions come from Soviet texts (1918 - mid-1930s). The authoress brings the reader closer to the political context of the mass-scale spectacles, paying particular attention to the disputes waged by the Bolshevik party and avantgarde artists, and concerning the form of political propaganda and new culture in general. The article's leitmotif concerns the evolution of mass-scale spectacles, from carnivals and theatrical shows based on the idea of activating the masses, to demonstrations and parades, which imposed a certain rigour upon the masses and expressed the might of the Soviet state.

2

Od revoluce a občanské války ke statutu velmoci. Hlavní trendy vývoje Ruska a Sovětského svazu v první polovině 20. století (teze k diskusi)

80%

Reiman M. , Litera B.

Slovanský přehled: historická revue pro dějiny střední, východní a jihovýchodní Evropy (Slavonic Review: Review for Central, Eastern and Southeastern European history)

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2009

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tom 95

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nr 4

501-513

EN

The study analyses main evolutionary tendencies in Russia in the first half of the 20th century, their significance in modernisation of the country and Russia's transformation into a great power. It pays particular attention to political and social-economical expansion and puts it in a broad context of Soviet Union's advancement and international situation.

3

Polska sowietologia do 1939 roku

80%

Pipes R.

Studia nad Faszyzmem i Zbrodniami Hitlerowskimi

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2011

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tom 33

33-45

EN

The paper presents the origins and development of the Polish analyses concerning the tsar’s and Soviet Russia. According to the author, the roots of the Polish interpretations of the Soviet system are inherent in the 19th-century accounts of the tsar’s Russia political system, which were initiated by the German scientist, August von Haxthausen (1792–1866). The Haxthausen’s conviction that Russians had a special disposition to communism was subsequently adopted by the Polish thinkers and writers: Henryk Kamieński, Zygmunt Krasiński, and Franciszek Duchiński. The Polish philosopher Wojciech Dzieduszycki observed in 1908 that an attempt to introduce the socialism could only bring the creation of a bureaucratic system. The majority of the Polish witnesses and observers of the rise of the communist regime in Russia after 1917 (Jan Kucharzewski, Roman Dmowski, Marian Zdziechowski and Jan Parandowski, among others) were of the opinion that the communist system was a continuation of the tsarist one. Władysław Leopold Jaworski firmly emphasized, however, that the socialism in the Marx’s version was alien to the Russian culture. In the author’s opinion many Polish commentators of the Soviet Russia (e.g. Marian Zdziechowski, Jan Parandowski and Feliks Koneczny) stressed the leading role of Jews in the Soviet system. The Scientific-Research Institute of the Eastern Europe (Instytut Naukowo-Badawczy Europy Wschodniej) — established in 1930 at the University in Wilno — played a distinct role in the Polish sovietology. Two scholars: Wiktor Sukiennicki and Stanisław Swianiewicz, were the leading figures of the Institute. The publications originated in that Institute were deliberately impartial and contributed to the scientific knowledge on the Soviet system.

4

PEACE CONFERENCE OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE AND THE SOVIET RUSSIA IN KIEV IN 1918 (Konferencja pokojowa Panstwa Ukrainskiego i Rosji Radzieckiej w Kijowie w 1918 r.)

70%

Kolasinski M.

Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej

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2010

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tom 45

59-90

EN

The article presents the course of peace conference between the Ukrainian State (UD) and the Soviet Russia (RSFRR) held in Kiev from May till October 1918. Its convening was anticipated by the German-Russian peace treaty of 3 March 1918. In contrast to negotiations in Lithuanian Brzesc, this time the Bolshevik diplomacy proved to be more efficient than the Ukrainian one. It managed to suppress German military pressure, delay ad acta the signing of the peace treaty, and, owing to the activity of delegation members, achieve a rise in revolutionary spirits in Ukraine. The Ukrainian party did not manage to delimitate the state border or provide protection for its citizens on the territory of the Soviet Russia. The only success of the conference was the signing of preliminary treaty on 12 June 1918. Afterwards, its activity was terminated. Moscow and Kiev held differing views on all fundamental matters: boundary line; the principles of legal succession after the Russian Empire, and, in consequence, the distribution of its equities and assets; civil affiliation of its inhabitants; and finally, the principles of mutual economic relations. UD did not possess effective tools to exert pressure on RSFRR, and its German ally was not willing to enter a conflict with Bolsheviks over somebody else-s interests. The defeat of Central States eliminated the last factor that impelled Moscow to negotiate with Kiev. Similarly to the previous year, Moscow decided to regulate mutual relations on military grounds.

5

Sovětská zahraniční politika a Osmanská říše na přelomu let 1917 a 1918

60%

Novák P.

Český časopis historický (The Czech Historical Review)

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2012

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tom 110

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nr 2

254-287

EN

The issue of relationships between the newly founded Soviet Russia and the declining Ottoman Empire during the final stage of World War I is one the blank spaces on the margins of an otherwise well-discussed topic. Negligible interest in this topic is primarily caused by the fact that this was a relatively short and relatively unimportant episode set against the background of much more significant events. In the period from November 1917 to March 1918 the policy of Soviet Russia towards the Ottoman Empire represented part of a more general problem – namely Soviet policy towards the Four Central Powers. At the beginning of the period under research Soviet Russia was at war with the Ottoman Empire. The Soviet Government therefore considered the conclusion of peace to be its principal problem of policy towards the Ottoman Empire. It was to give Russia space to disseminate revolutionary ideas amongst the Ottoman population. In case these ideas fell onto fertile ground, a revolutionary uprising in the Ottoman Empire (envisaged naturally as one of a generally democratic and anti-imperialist nature, albeit not a proletarian revolution) could contribute to the weakening of the European powers and thus to the final victory of a proletarian revolution in the developed countries of Europe and America. High expectations and hopes placed on proclamations and peace offers, intentionally targeted to promote revolutionary potential in the countries of the Central Powers (and not merely within them), did not, however, come to fruition in the case of the Ottoman Empire, nor in the case of their allies. Revolutions did not materialise in the above mentioned countries in the period under research. Therefore, during truce talks, which took place shortly after Soviet offers of peace, the Soviet side attempted to ensure favourable conditions for the spread of its propaganda, especially among the troops of the Central Powers. The questions of a peace settlement between Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire became a matter of peripheral importance during the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, which followed. Nevertheless, Soviet foreign policy had to deal with three main problems in her relationship to the Ottoman Empire: 1) the fate of Eastern Anatolia and especially the question of the Armenians there, 2)the recognition of the independence of Persia and the withdrawal of both Ottoman and Soviet troops from there and 3) the question of Ottoman territorial demands in South Caucasus. However, Soviet foreign policy in all these three areas conflicted with the entirely opposing Ottoman views on a future settlement of the above mentioned problems. It was the irony of fate that both countries evoked the idea of national self-determination in order to promote their own demands, yet each of them envisaged its realization in completely different terms. With a view to the overall results of peace talks the Soviet Government failed, at the end, to have her own demands incorporated in the peace treaty. Similar to her situation with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Soviet Russia incurred territorial losses in the case of the Ottoman Empire, also. Thus, the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk came to embody, to a greater degree, the failure of Soviet foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire.

6

Latviešu kreisās mākslas uzliesmojumi 20. gs. 20.–30. gados Latvijā un Padomju Krievijā

51%

Kāle S.

Makslas Vesture un Teorija

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2021

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tom 25

39-54

EN

In the interwar period, the consistently developed output of leftist artists proved unacceptable and dangerous to both Soviet Russia’s and Latvia’s political elites and civic circles. This is largely evident from the previous research on this subject that has encountered numerous obstacles. Among these was either partial or complete annihilation of artists and their art during the Great Terror in Russia, the dogmatic perspective of Socialist Realism focused on meticulously realist form, direct Communist ideological connotations affecting leftist art as well as the traumatic historical experiences of Latvia and Latvians under the Soviet occupation and waves of repressions. The article is a pioneering look at the most radical leftist Latvian artists’ activities in Soviet Russia and Latvia, searching for their common denominators. In 1922 and 1923, the artist Kārlis Johansons (1890–1929) who was known in Russian avant-garde circles wanted to organise two exhibitions in Latvia with himself as well as Gustavs Klucis (1895–1938) and Aleksandrs Drēviņš (1889–1938) as participants but met with a lack of interest. Klucis and Johansons later took part in the leftist Latvian group Kref that was active from 18 November 1923 to spring 1924, uniting fine artists and writers. In Latvia, the tandem of writer Linards Laicens (1883–1938) and artist Ernests Kālis (1904–1939) took over the popularisation of leftist art in the second half of the 1920s. They were active for some time before the onset of the Great Depression paying attention to constructivist form alongside socially critical ideas. The brightest example of their cooperation was the revolutionary literary magazine of Latvian workers Kreisā Fronte published in Riga from March 1928 to December 1930 when it was closed. Leftist Latvian authors had episodic contacts via the cultural and educational society Prometejs (1924–1937). At first, the society was active in publishing Latvian books and periodicals at its publishing house Prometejs but in the early 1930s it also oversaw the Latvian section of the International Bureau of Revolutionary Artists (IBRA). Kālis as well as Samuils Haskins (1909–1974), emigrated to Soviet Russia in the mid-1930s but, instead of Soviet benefits, both encountered the directives of Socialist Realism and were arrested in 1937 and 1938 as Latvian spies. Although, unlike Drēviņš and Klucis, they escaped death during the Great Terror, they experienced confinement or exclusion from culture as “wrong” leftists, threatening or too alien to the established artistic life or political system.