Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Ograniczanie wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 2

Liczba wyników na stronie

Wyniki wyszukiwania

Wyszukiwano:
w słowach kluczowych: SENSATIONS

Sortuj według:

Ogranicz wyniki do:

Leona Chwistka rozumienie rzeczywistosci wrazen

100%

Stankiewicz M.

Archeus. Studia z bioetyki i antropologii filozoficznej

2011

tom 12

259-271

Conviction that the world is homogeneous and examinable with one prospect is deceptive. World is a multiplicity of reality – says Leon Chwistek. The article shows the theory of the multiplicity of reality by Leon Chwistek, where the philosopher distin- guishes four fundamental types of reality: sensations, conceptions, things and physical matter. The author analyses one of them in detail – reality of sensations. Chwistek deﬁnes reality of sensations through the formal record based on the group of axioms. The logical record of the reality of sensations system allows only to look formally into this type. The author refers to the sources of philosophical reality of sensations which was a source of inspiration for its creation. She alludes to the John Locke, David Hume, Richard Avena- rius and Ernst Mach’s conceptions. The author describes reality of sensations through categories of the impression and sensory experience. She states that cognition of reality of sensations is closely associated with an individual way of observing the world by every human.

SENSATIONS AND SENSE DATA (Wrazenia i dane zmyslowe)

75%

Judycki S.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

2009

tom 37

nr 3

129-141

The aim of the paper is to present an analysis of the relation between sensations and sense data. A discussion about the historical roots of both concepts (Descartes, Malebranche, Berkeley, Condillac, Reid) is followed by considerations concerning the similarities and differences between sensations and sense data: sense data were interpreted as having objective character, whereas sensations were treated either as being properties of things perceived or as subjective states of mind; sense data are objective and normally they are perceived, although they do not have to be objects of attention, whereas sensations are not perceived in normal circumstances of perception; sense data are neutral as far as dualistic solutions of the mind-body problem are concerned, whereas the subjectivity of sensations forces us to localize them in the non-physical subject. Next, the opposition between sensations and sense data is illustrated by an exposition of Husserl's considerations on sensations (Empfindung) and sense data (Abschattung) as belonging to noetic and noematic structures of consciousness. The end of the paper is devoted to an analysis of arguments for and against the existence of sense data (Ryle, Chisholm, Ayer).