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Coleman versus Collins: Dva odlišné přístupy k teorii jednání v americké sociologii

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Subrt J.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

2007

tom 16/29

nr 2

61-76

The article confronts James Coleman's and Randall Collins's approaches towards action theory: reviews both their similarities (based on the importance of micro-sociological perspective for understanding social macro-level) and differences (their attitude towards the assumed rational nature of human action). Coleman supports the homo oeconomicus thesis and understands actors as beings, which make rational decisions and direct their actions on the basis of costs and gains calculations. Collins, on the other hand, emphasizes the extra-rational factors of emotions and routine. By putting up these approaches against each other two ideal type constructions arise, which are particular intellectual modes yet cannot comprehend social reality in its full complexity.

Decision theoretical and evolutionary explanations of social norms

100%

Orthmayr I.

Szociologiai Szemle (Sociological Review)

2004

nr 3

3-22

Darwinian evolutionary theory denied that the history of living beings followed any conscious plan or definite aim. Evolutionary theorists of social development like Friedrich von Hayek also insist that rational calculation has a much more limited role in social life than usually assumed. Institutions and extended orders of social life evolved through the innumerable fumbling efforts of individuals who did not know what they were doing. Thomas Schelling, David Lewis, and Edna Ullmann-Margalit have, however, shown that rational choice theory can offer a valuable tool for analysing even the most eminent field of evolutionary social theory, the emergence of conventions and norms. In game theoretical terms, conventions solve a coordination problem in situtations with multiple equilibria when actors have to find the same equlibrium. Cristina Bicchieri later argued that the knowledge of the game being played and the self-evident principles of rationality were not sufficient to guarantee that an equilibrium would be attained. In the case of the emergence of norms, game theoretical analysis has to be complemented by evolutionary explanation. Brian Skyrms also emphasizes the superiority of dynamical models of evolution over the models of rational calculation in the explanation of large scale social processes. But neither Bicchieri nor Skyrms want to replace rational choice analysis by an evolutionary approach, they rather combine them. Skyrms calls his approach evolutionary game theory.

ANTISTHENOVA „NATURÁLNÍ EKONOMIE“. ENKRATEIA A HÉDONÉ OPTIKOU RACIONÁLNÍ VOLBY

75%

Kramoliš O.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

2017

tom 72

nr 7

537 – 547

Antisthenes (444 – 365 BC.), a predecessor of the Cynic philosophical school, brings an original conception of temperance as a defence against the negative consequences of the excessive pursuit of delight. Antisthenes places an emphasis on experience; he refuses Plato’s attempts to define theories of ideas. He examines the power of the word and pursues moral objectives. His “naturalistic economy of rational choice” prepares the ground for the Cynics’ shift to nature. The theory of “austerity” is discussed in relation to behavioural economy and the theory of rational choice. The main premise is Antisthenes’ nominalist logic and his well-known ability to persuade, which presupposes a dialogue of free people, as well as love, friendship and cooperation.