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Some Remarks on Wittgenstein's Conception of 'Language Game'

100%

Brykczynski P.

nr 3

189-201

The paper deals with the role of the term 'language game' (Germ. das Sprachspiel) as part of the terminological equipment of the present-day philosophy of language (in what follows only the English term 'language game' will be used for the sake of simplicity).. Various factors will be taken into consideration. The current uses of the term 'game' in and outside philosophy of language (as well as the differences between the English term 'game' and the German term 'das Spiel') will not be neglected. The author's examination of the various Wittgenstein's uses of the term 'language game' covers both the descriptive content of the term, and the underlying intentions of its introduction into philosophical vocabulary - the intentions to accentuate certain features of language and the intentions to accentuate certain of methodological issues. The author says that Wittgenstein uses the term 'language game' in a way that makes it unsuitable for any substantial role in distinguishing philosophical problems and directions of research. Moreover, all talk about language games results not only in accentuating certain important features of language, but also in blurring some others, equally important. However, the first of these two effects is now less significant than it was in the historical context of Wittgenstein's late philosophy (due to changes that took place not without Wittgenstein's influence).

Vachkův pohled na jazykový systém a jazykové normy

75%

Urbanová L.

tom 92

nr 1-2

49-54

In her paper the author recalls her collaboration with the great Czech and world-known Anglicist Josef Vachek, and characterizes his view of the development of the language system. She compares his philosophy of language with that of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who likewise understood language changes as the result of cooperation between internal factors, originating in the language system, and external factors, operating in consonance with ever-changing extralinguistic reality. The paper deals with Vachek’s view of language, which he regards as having two autonomous and complementary language norms: written and spoken. The author presents her position on the shifting borderline between the spoken and the written language in contemporary communication. She compares Vachek’s assessment of the two norms with the British and American approaches as represented especially by M. A. K. Halliday and W. Chafe.

NESOULAD MEZI MORFOSYNTAXÍ A SÉMANTIKOU PODMÍNKOVÝCH SOUVĚTÍ

75%

Tvrdý F.

2024

tom 79

nr 2

150 – 167

The semantic analysis of conditional sentences does not entirely align with their morphosyntactic structure. I substantiate this hypothesis with instances from both Czech and English that extend beyond conventional textbook examples. I also highlight that logicians and philosophers often make terminological errors when they disregard the insights from linguistic disciplines. Despite the early analytic philosophy’s emphasis on terminological precision, the practical application falls significantly short of this ideal. I firmly believe that a proper understanding of the morphosyntax and semantics of conditional sentences is a prerequisite for their classification and analysis. In our pursuit of a comprehensive exploration of conditional clauses, we must also grapple with methodological challenges that delve into the very core of the philosophy of language. The primary issue revolves around the fact that two out of the three a priori methods in philosophy rely heavily on the analysis of conditional sentences: thought experiments and modal metaphysics.

OD POUŽÍVATEĽOV JAZYKA K SÉMANTIKE

75%

Zouhar M.

nr 4

297-311

The paper shows that certain well established arguments widely used in the philosophy of language to discredit some semantic theories are, in fact, defective (from the methodological viewpoint). In particular, the direct reference theory is usually rejected, because (i) it is impossible to substitute co-referential proper names for each other in epistemic contexts and (ii) true identity sentences of the form 'a = b', where a and b are proper names, have to be both necessary and a posterior. Both arguments are based on what a competent user of a given language is willing to admit or refuse to admit. It is shown that the language user invoked in these arguments has to be perfect in a certain sense. Otherwise, the arguments are inconclusive. However, if perfect speakers enter the picture, these arguments become theory laden in a certain way and thus fail to be neutral means which can be used to distinguish correct theories from incorrect ones. In this sense, they cannot be used to discredit neither the direct reference theory, nor any other rival theory.