Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

METAPHYSICAL AND MORAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DISCUSSION ABOUT INTERRUPTION (Metafyzicke a moralni predpoklady debaty o interupci)

100%

Belohrad R.

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nr 2

214-237

EN

The work analyzes two competing arguments in the issue of abortion and shows that each requires a different theory of personal identity. Further, the author analyzes those theories and he shows what moral premises they are compatible with and what implications there are for the abortion debate.

2

EMOTION, EXPERIENTIAL MEMORY AND SELFHOOD

100%

Yang S.

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tom 20

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nr 1

18 – 36

EN

Recently, emotion has attracted much attention in many areas of philosophy. In the philosophy of mind, some argue that emotions are individuated and identified with reference to feelings, beliefs, desires, or perceptions. Furthermore, they are often claimed to be changeable, unstable, and ambivalent. However, despite their instability, emotions are sometimes long-standing. They have, in addition, perspective. These characteristics of the emotions help us in solving one of philosophy’s most enduring problems, that is, the problem of personal identity. In order to illustrate this claim the author elaborates on the conception of ‘experiential memory’ suggested by Wollheim. To understand memory as experiential, we need to understand the affective element attached to some memories. The author argues that memory affects not only our past thought but also our past emotions, and those emotions deriving from the past stay on to affect our whole being and our future. Hence, the experiential memory is not just confined to the recalling of events or experiences that the subject has experienced, but concerns the narrative structure of a person’s life as a whole.

3

ĽUDSKÉ EMBRYÁ AKO INDIVÍDUÁ A OSOBY

100%

Volek P.

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tom 65

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nr 6

538-551

EN

In his paper, the author argues that human embryos are individuals and persons. He accepts the critique of the non-individuation argument of human zygote and refutes the possibility of understanding blastomeres as individuals. Finally, realism in the understanding of personal identity is accepted on the basis of an argument justifying substantial form as a principle of personal identity.

4

REFLECTED VIEW ON THE PERSONAL AFTERLIFE

100%

Krchňák D.

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nr 2

196 - 214

EN

The author tries to argue that, from the methodological position of reflected equilibrium, it seems to be reasonable to build a theory of personal identity that enables a person to continue her existence after the biological death of her body. This conclusion is supported by the argument that our practice reflects that our identity-pre-supposing concerns reach beyond biological continuity. We have also good reasons to maintain such concerns and practices. As the best candidate to implement such concerns in a theoretical account of practical identity, he will identify the person-life view, where personal identity depends to a great extent on social conditions. The author also shows how this theory can implement the classical belief in the afterlife, and how it could conceptualize the difference of the afterlife from a physical and a theistic point of view.

5

MINULÉ ŽIVOTY JOHNA LOCKA: MORÁLNA ZODPOVEDNOSŤ A PAMÄŤOVÉ KRITÉRIUM OSOBNEJ IDENTITY

88%

Rozemberg A.

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nr 6

458 – 468

EN

One of the John Locke´s most controversial claims is that we should not be held responsible for the deeds of which we genuinely have no recollection as performed. We are only responsible for the acts of which we are conscious. The reason behind is the assertion that the personal identity equals the identity of consciousness. This concept of person is the background of Locke´s claim that the immaterial substance (IS) is irrelevant for personal identity. I argue, that if we had only a very unclear idea of IS and could not give any clear explanation of the relationship between IS and a person, the excluding of IS from the identity discourse would be highly dubious. Further, I argue that the memory criterion of the personal identity is problematic for many reasons, and that the missing continuity of memories between lives is compatible with the idea of justice and practical concerns.

6

Wokół fenomenologii podmiotu Adama Węgrzeckiego

88%

Pyka M.

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tom 46

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nr 2

21-35

EN

Professor Adam Węgrzecki’s philosophical research, as well as his other works, concentrate mainly on philosophical anthropology and the problem of man. It was with these issues in mind that he continued his research into the phenomenology of values and developed a Polish version of the philosophy of encounter. In this paper I discuss his study of the phenomenology of the subject (the self). Whereas Husserl and Ingarden introduce the idea of the self in the context of epistemology, Adam Węgrzecki analyses it from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. I attempt to place his results in a wider horizon which includes both phenomenology and analytic philosophy. I argue that his results contain a narrow idea of the self (as the source of activity) as well as a wider idea of the self, and both of these are necessary. These results can be placed in the center of recent debates on the problems of the self and of personal identity, and they constitute an important contribution to these debates. In particular, they can be used against those who want to ignore or even deconstruct the idea of the self.

7

FENOMÉN SVEDOMIA A PERSONÁLNA IDENTITA ČLOVEKA

88%

Korený P.

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nr 3

275-285

EN

The inaugural explores the phenomenon of conscience as including the reference to the first person and his/her identity: the conscience is intrinsically mine. The word mine refers here not only to the fact, that the voice of conscience comes from inside of me, but also to my being addressed by it and connected through it with my genuine Self as a distinctive individual. In the first instance the voice of conscience is directly related to our actions, but if we let it to develop in its full strength, it can make us to reflect on who we essentially are. It is the concept of personal identity enforced 'in one's own production' which enables us to explain this linkage. In conclusion the author shows the difference between the genuine conscience of an individual, created in living contacts with a community of morals, and a wrong individuality of conscience, which is just a subjective feeling or a believing heart of a lonely individual rooted entirely in herself/himself.

8

THE CRITIQUE OF COMMUNICATIVE REASON. COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND PERSONAL IDENTITY (A kommunikativ esz kritikaja. Kommunikativ cselekves es szemelyes identitas)

75%

Sik D.

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2009

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tom 19

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nr 3

43-63

EN

The following essay is aimed at confining the scope of The Theory of Communicative Action apropos of the problem of personal identity. For Habermas the notion of personal identity may be derived directly from the conclusions of his social theory: it is the specific part of the lifeworld (the meanings connected to the self) reproduced via communicative action. As communicative action is the mechanism of social integration as well, it is impossible to describe theoretically a personal identity that is distinct from the social in the Habermasian approach. This problem is solved in the paper with the help of Foucault's ideas on social power and subjectivation. Foucault introduces a constitutive dimension of power: he originates the modem subject from the individualization of power relations. By examining the subject in its opposition to social power, he offers an opportunity to describe a personal identity that is distinct from the social. In the author's opinion, by approaching to the concept of communicative action from a Foucaultian perspective, certain elements of power in the series of speech acts (that is certain dogmatic language uses) may be introduced as the expressions of the opposition against the logic of action coordination referring to the contours of personal identity. These dogmatic language uses may be specified based on the Kohlbergian-Habermasian ideas on moral development. In these cases the dogmatic language use does not require emancipation as it refers to personal identity, in this sense it reveals the limits of the scope of communicative rationality. In the final part of the paper the recognition-theoretical presuppositions of personal identity are introduced.