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EN
The following study attempts to analyse an aspect of Czechoslovakian-German relations during the so called “Second Republic” (October 1938 — March 1939) that has until now stayed out of researchers’ interests, namely the entries in the so-called station chronicles. This almost unknown source provides us a specific point of view on the atmosphere of the given period because of its combination of institutional and personal characteristics. The most focused part are the weeks in autumn 1938, when Czechoslovakia was forced to withdraw large parts of its area to Germany which led to massive and simultaneously chaotic changes that the railway transport had to react on. Extraordinary efforts were requested in both personal and freight traffic. The aim of the study is to consider these entries as lieu de mémoire and to find answers on following questions: Is it possible to read about the feelings of the people in these entries, or are they written strictly objectively? How are the Germans described, as enemies with no hope for future, or as colleagues suffering under the same circumstances? For the purpose of the study, chronicles both from border and inland regions have been used to detect eventual differences that might be compared as well.
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Content available remote Travelling by Train between Czechoslovakia and Germany after the Munich Agreement
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EN
The following study attempts to analyse an almost unknown aspect of Czechoslovakian-German relations during the so called “Second Republic” (October 1938 – March 1939), namely the railway traffic between the two countries. It is necessary to realize that railway traffic was the most common means of transport for both people and goods at this time and that it was in both countries‘ interests to keep it functioning. This paper focuses on the situations and problems that everyday passengers faced. Their experiences were the main factor on which public opinion of the railways was based. The contributory role of freight transport is also analysed in short because of its importance to the functioning of the economy. An important question, which this study attempts to answer as well, is the nature of relations between Czechoslovakian railway employees and their German counterparts. Did these relations copy those in “high politics” at the time? Or, could the professionals on both sides of the new borders cooperate to keep the traffic flowing? With the use of several examples, descriptions are given of experiences with colleagues on the other side of the border that were often positive and whereby both sides understood that it was necessary to keep the traffic flowing. Unfortunately, these efforts were on occasion disrupted by the decisions of political or military leaders.
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Content available remote Hořký epilog Mnichova 1938
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EN
Nazi Germany consciously and consistently sought to absorb Czechoslovakia. The instrument of breaking the Czechoslovak state became the German national minority headed by the dominating Sudeten-German party, working in the intentions of Hitler. Nazi diplomacy in 1938 set up the problem of the German national minority as an international one and launched a policy of direct coercion thanks to the appeasement of the Western powers. Following Berlin’s direction, it culminated in the adoption of the Munich Agreement of the Four Great Powers, Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France, and the truncation of the Czechoslovak state as the first step towards its destruction. The other was the definitive liquidation of the Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939.
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The Czech concept of betrayal as an element of the Munich mythThis article explores the cultural significance of the “Munich myth”, focusing on the concept of “Western betrayal” and its connotations associated with the idea of destiny and sacrifice. It also examines how the myth influenced the formation of Czech national identity, especially during and shortly after the Second World War. Opening with an analysis of a poem by František Halas written in the midst of the Munich Conference, it also reviews a number of writings which increased the popularity of the ideas of betrayal and sacrifice and, as a result, have made them synonymous with the “Czech fate”: excerpts from the memoirs of Zdeněk Štĕpánek and Edvard Beneš, essays by Karel Kosík and Milan Kundera, and Bedřich Fučík’s literary criticism. The article concludes with a discussion of the key findings of the book Mnichovský komplex (The Munich Complex) by Jan Tesař, a polemic study discrediting and deconstructing the myth of the “Munich betrayal”. Czeska koncepcja zdrady jako element mitu monachijskiegoArtykuł dotyczy fenomenów kulturowych zawartych w micie monachijskim, szczególnie takich, jak koncepcja zdrady i powiązane z nią konotacje (figura ofiary, losu, teatralizacja życia społecznego). Przedstawia także proces formowania się wojennej oraz powojennej czeskiej tożsamości narodowej pod wpływem tego mitu. W artykule poddano analizie wiersze Františka Halasa z okresu wydarzeń monachijskich, a także te fragmenty wspomnień (Zdenĕk Štĕpánek, Edvard Beneš), eseistyki (Karel Kosík, Milan Kundera) i krytyki literackiej (Bedřich Fučík), które przyczyniły się do rozpowszechnienia koncepcji zdrady i ofiary jako czynnika konstytuującego „czeski los”. Artykuł kończy prezentacja najważniejszych tez zawartych w książce pt. Monachijski kompleks autorstwa Jana Tesařa o charakterze polemicznym i dekonstrukcyjnym wobec mitu „zdrady monachijskiej”.
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Content available remote Poválečné vyšetřování tzv. liptaňské tragédie
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The study focuses on the post-war investigation of the so-called Liptaň tragedy, the murder of six members of Czechoslovak armed forces by pro-Nazi insurgents in September 1938. The research is based on archival records of police and judicial institutions.
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Content available remote Vídeňská arbitráž a Československo v roce 1938:
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EN
The Czechoslovak crisis in May 1938 had a negative impact on Czechoslovak- Hungarian relations and stopped the promising development of contacts leading to settlement of mutual relations. In the middle of 1938 Hungary was very carefully considering all the risks of a war in which it could become involved. The report on convention of a conference in Munich was therefore accepted in Budapest with joy, because the great powers that attended it promised to support settlement of the Hungarian issue. However, the Munich conference failed to resolve the Hungarian issue, even though it created conditions for partial fulfilment of Hungarian demands against Czechoslovakia and voided the Treaty of Versailles as a result, which created hope that the Treaty of Trianon would follow. After the Munich Agreement, Hungary began increasing its demands against its northern neighbour. Official Hungarian demands could only apply to territories with a Hungarian population within the meaning of the Munich Agreement, which was based on the ethnic principle. The arbitration took place on 2 November 1938 in Vienna. Hungary’s annexation of part of the territory of Slovakia and Transcarpathia with a Hungarian population on the basis of the Vienna Arbitration was considered the first great success of the territorial revision policy in Hungarian public opinion.
EN
The Constitutional Court of the Czechoslovak Republic did not get any competence with respect to individual protection of fundamental rights and minority rights. This lack of competence provoked, together with some other facts, its bitter deal of a “bystander on the road towards the decomposition of the common state”. Cases in the field of nationality were considered by both Czechoslovak supreme Courts. They produced however a casuistic and inconsistent case law that missed in some cases the international and constitutional legal framework within which existed the Czechoslovak Republic. An eventual involvement of the Constitutional Court would have provided for a more credible regulation instrument against a real danger of criticism coming from interested neighbouring countries. The interpretation of § 3 [1] of the 1920 Constitution made by the Constitutional Court on the occasion of incorporation of former Austrian territories into the new Czechoslovak State manifested a certain nonchalance in granting a constitutional protection to politically vulnerable Czechoslovak State frontiers. Indeed, in that case, the Constitutional Court did not contest a modification of the state frontiers which was not executed by means of a constitutional law, contrary to § 3 [1]. Precisely for this reason, in 1938, when Czechoslovakia has ceded the Sudeten to Germany, Czechoslovak constitutional law did not play a significant role. From the angle of international law, the Munich Agreement could not be validly invoked vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia as a third state, for the Czechoslovakia’s expression of acceptance of the obligation to cede that territory was not free. The sad story of the Constitutional Court of the Czechoslovak Republic as “bystander” had unfortunately repetitions when the Czechoslovak frontiers moved again, namely, both when Transcarpathian Ukraine was ceded to the USSR in 1945 and when Czechoslovakia disappeared in 1992.
CS
Ústavní soud ČSR neobdržel kompetence v oblastech individuální ochrany základních práv ani práv příslušníků menšin. I v důsledku toho se stal „divákem za plotem u cesty k rozpadu společného státu“. Národnostní otázky se ujaly československé nejvyšší soudy, jež však generovaly kazuistickou a axiologicky nesourodou judikaturu. V ní se občas ztrácel mezinárodněprávní i ústavněprávní rámec, v němž existovala Československá republika. Případné zapojení ústavního soudu by poskytlo republice věrohodnější regulační nástroj proti reálnému nebezpečí kritiky ze strany zainteresovaných sousedních států. Výklad § 3 [1] Ústavy Ústavním soudem ve věci inkorporace bývalých rakouských území vyjádřil určitou lehkomyslnost při poskytování ústavní ochrany politicky zranitelným hranicím československého státu. Ústavní soud v daném případě akceptoval změnu státní hranice, která nebyla provedena ústavním zákonem. I proto později v souvislosti s odstoupením sudetoněmeckého území nehrálo ústavní právo ČSR významnou úlohu. Z hlediska mezinárodního práva se nelze Mnichovské dohody vůči Československu coby „třetímu státu“ platně dovolat, neboť jeho přijetí závazku z této dohody nebylo svobodné. Tristní příběh Ústavního soudu ČSR coby „diváka“ se bohužel opakoval i při dalších historických územních změnách, a to jak v souvislosti se Zakarpatskou Ukrajinou v roce 1945, tak při rozpadu ČSFR v roce 1992.
EN
The Czechoslovak (Munich) Crisis of 1938 was concluded by an international conference that took place in Munich on 29-30 September 1938. The decision of the participating powers, i.e. France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, was made without any respect for Czechoslovakia and its representatives. The aim of this paper is to examine the role of the defence sector, i.e. the representatives of the ministry of defence and the Czechoslovak armed forces during the Czechoslovak (Munich) Crisis in the period from mid-March to the beginning of October 1938. There is also a question as to, whether there are similarities between the position then and the present-day position of the army in the decision-making process.
EN
Under Vladimir Putin’s regime Russia seeks to whitewash Soviet history and promote an anti-Western narrative in order to legitimize its territorial claims and political demands in Eastern Europe. Drawing on electronic sources such as social media posts, articles from the Russian media, newspaper comments and media statements, the author demonstrates that one of its tools is the exaggerated condemnation of the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and the emphasis on the historical guilt of the Western powers in the Nazi expansion, made to avoid discussion of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, signed less than a year later.
CS
Rusko se pod vládou Vladimira Putina snaží překreslovat sovětskou historii a propagovat protizápadní narativ, aby legitimizovalo své územní nároky a politické požadavky ve východní Evropě. Na základě elektronických zdrojů, jako jsou příspěvky na sociálních sítích, články z ruských médií, komentáře v novinách a mediální prohlášení, autor ukazuje, že jedním z nástrojů tohoto narativu je účelové zdůrazňování Mnichovské dohody v září 1938 a historické viny západních velmocí na nacistické expanzi, které má odvádět pozornost od diskuse o paktu Molotov–Ribbentrop, uzavřeném o necelý rok později.
EN
After the creation of Czechoslovakia it is possible to track the decrease in interest in Russia, for, with, the exception of the chairman of the National Democratic Party, Karel Kramář and his supporters, it disappeared from Czech thought as a traditional fixed point. However, nationally-motivated interest in Russia returned to Czech thinking in the 1930s in connection with Adolf Hitler’s accession to the chancellery and the growing pressure from Nazi Germany. The traditional image of Russia as a “massive oak tree” and guarantor of security for the Czechoslovak state that had become popular again was based upon numerous more or less misleading sources. This study attempts to demonstrate that what was at stake here were not only results of the activity of Czechoslovak diplomacy in the 1930s, the activities of leftist intellectuals and their appurtenant organizations or the action of communist or even directly Soviet propaganda, but also Czech Russophilia.
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