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STATE AND LAW OF NATURE. SAMUEL CLARK'S CRITICISM OF THOMAS HOBBES

100%

Raube S.

Archeus. Studia z bioetyki i antropologii filozoficznej

2008

nr 9

49-69

Several years after Hobbes' death his spirit was incessantly present in British philosophy. It aroused such a bitter controversy, that every philosopher or theologian who considered himself a Christian theist felt an irresistible obligation to dispute with Hobbes and to discredit his philosophy. The article presents the criticism of the thought of 'Leviathan's' author made by Samuel Clark, one of England's leading apologetic thinkers of the turn of the 17th and 18th century. Clark's criticism starts from a position of traditionally understood law of nature as God's creation. The main target of the attack is Hobbes' state of nature, interpreted by Clark as inconsistent with the deepest layer of human condition. Also, a vital element of Clark's objection is Hobbes' conception of God

PHYSICAL CONSTANTS AS IDENTIFIERS OF MODERN UNIVERSAL LAWS OF NATURE

100%

Dahan O.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2020

tom 27

nr 3

325 – 345

I argue that in modern algebraic-formulated science the ‘physical constant’ can be understood, for practical purposes, as an ‘identifier’ of a universal law of nature. This identifying role is possible because the concept of ‘physical constant’ fulfils the same need for universality, stability, and fundamentality (as universal laws) for increasing the epistemic value of a scientific theory. This can be demonstrated in two different ways. The first involves a thought experiment envisioning science without physical constants, which appears to be a science of local and particular laws. The second is the observation that physical constants mostly emerge as components in an algebraic formulation of universal laws, but not in the algebraic formulation of particular laws. This observation about the link between physical constants and universal laws of nature, if correct, makes two contributions. First, it clarifies, at least partially, the ambiguity in the use (and the absence) of the concept ‘law’ in contemporary science. Second, it can help in distinguishing between a universal law and a particular law, while avoiding one of the abiding philosophical problems regarding laws of nature — the problem of the ceteris-paribus criterion for a generalization.

FREEDOM, POWER AND CAUSATION

75%

Pink T.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2019

tom 26

nr 1

141 – 168

Freedom or control of how we act is often and very naturally under-stood as a kind of power—a power to determine for ourselves how we act. Is freedom conceived as such a power possible, and what kind of power must it be? The paper argues that power takes many forms, of which ordinary causation is only one; and that if freedom is indeed a kind of power, it cannot be ordinary causation. Scepticism about the reality of freedom as a power can take two forms. One, found in Hume, now often referred to as the Mind argument, assumes incompatibilism, and concludes from incompatibilism that freedom cannot exist, as indistinguishable from chance. But another scepticism, founds in Hobbes, does not assume incompatibilism, but assumes rather that the only possible form of power in nature is ordinary causation, concluding that freedom cannot for this reason exist as a form of power. This scepticism is more profound—it is in fact presupposed by Hume’s scepticism—and far more interesting, just because freedom cannot plausibly be modelled as ordinary causation.