Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Da foronomia às leis da Física segundo Kant

100%

Délio Borges de Meneses R.

Zeszyty Naukowe Uczelni Warszawskiej im. Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie

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2013

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nr 4(42)

7-22

EN

Kant's interpretation of the mathematics of motion is to be found in “Neurer Lehr Begriff der Bewegung und Ruhe” (1758) in the form of one fundamental principle of kinematics, with a new name to the theory motion, that is phoronomy. None of these propositions is especially original with Kant so far as the sheer mathematics goes, but the selection of just these motion's propositions and Kant's proof for each of them are at the very least strongly influenced by the special features of his critical philosophy.

PL

Interpretację Kanta dotyczącą matematyki ruchu można znaleźć w Neurer Lehr Begriff der Bewegung und Ruhe (1758) w postaci jednego z praw podstawowych kinematyki, z nową nazwą teorii ruchu. Żadne jego sformułowanie nie jest szczególnie oryginalne, a wybór wniosków, twierdzeń i dowodów Kanta z punktu widzenia matematyki, jest silnie uzależniony od cech jego filozofii krytycznej.

2

Autonomia: entre o deontologismo kantiano e a Neuroética

89%

Borges de Meneses R. D.

Społeczeństwo i Edukacja. Międzynarodowe Studia Humanistyczne

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2017

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nr 3(26)

25-33

EN

The principle of Autonomy, according to Koenigsberg’s philosopher, will naturally be chosen only in such a way that the maxims of choice are simultaneously included in the same will as the universal law. That this practical rule is an imperative, that is to say that the Will of the whole rational being is necessarily bound to it as a condition, can not be demonstrated by the simple analysis of the concepts contained in it, since it is a proposition synthetic; it would be necessary to go beyond the knowledge of the objects and enter into a criticism of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason, since this synthetic proposition that orders apoditically must be able to recognize itself entirely a priori. By simple analysis of the concepts of morality, it can be shown very well, that the aforementioned principle of autonomy will be the only principle of morality. In this way, it is discovered that this principle has to be a “categorical imperative” and that it commands neither more nor less than precisely this doctrine.

3

Ohledání Kantova zdravého rozumu

89%

Glombíček P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2009

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tom 57

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nr 6

893-913

EN

The aim of the paper is to forestall certain one-sided interpretations of Kant’s notion of common sense. First, the very occurrence of the term in Kant’s work is widely underestimated, with attention being limited to his negative strictures towards the Scottish school. Second, common sense tends to be instrumentally over-interpreted for particular purposes in aesthetics or political philosophy. The interpretation proposed here, in contrast, begins by pointing out the positive use of the notion already in the first Critique. Furthermore a close reading reveals the epistemological justification of sensus communis in the third Critique, a justification that bases the Kantian notion on the Aristotelian idea of koiné aisthésis what makes the communal aspect of it an effect rather than a foundation. In effect, Kant turns out to be transforming previous uses of the notion of common sense into its current form.

4

Leis da Mecânica de Newton: segundo a leitura kantiana

89%

Borges de Meneses R. D.

Prosopon. Europejskie Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne

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2021

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nr 1(34)

41-53

EN

Kant’s interpretation of the mathematics of motion is to be found in this – Neurer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe (1758) – in the form of one fundamental principle of kinematics. None of this propositions is especially original with Kant sa far as the sheer mathematics goes, , but the selection of just these motion’s propositions and Kant’s proof for each of them proof for each of them are at the very least strongly influenced by the special features of his philosophy.

5

Sentido e Limites da Matemática em Kant

71%

Borges de Meneses R. D.

Prosopon. Europejskie Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne

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2015

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nr 2(11)

19-27

EN

A central problem for Kant’s mathematical philosophy was why the knowledge so obtained can be applied to all experience a priori and with certainty. There is an important aspect of Kant’s answer to that question that I hardly touched on, namely the argument in the Analytic for the claim that mathematics necessarily applies to the objects of empirical intuition.

6

O povinnosti člověka vůči sobě samému: Patočka, Kant a Charta 77

71%

Jakub J.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2009

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tom 57

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nr 4

491-506

EN

Jan Patočka, in a text about Charta 77 written for a special occasion, appeals to Kant’s idea of the duties which a human being has to himself. In the first part of this study, an attempt is made to relate this text to other places where Patočka reflects on the philosophical motivation of political action. In the second part, it is then shown which elements of Kant’s doctrine of virtue and doctrine of right that Patočka is actually appealing to. Patočka’s reading of Kant is, on the one hand, a fascinating attempt to link the doctrine of right with the doctrine of virtue; on the other hand, however, it is a rather selective interpretation which obscures Kant’s sense of the specific character of the legislation of right (rather than ethics) which arises where there is a co-existence of people and which would encompass of the famous principle of legality on which Charta 77 was based. In conclusion, the author poses the question of why exactly Patočka does not exploit this principle of legality and the verdict is reached that it is because of Patočka’s – rather than Kant’s – characteristic conception of freedom as transcending the given.

7

Artistic Research: Delusions, Confusions and Differentiations

71%

Früchtl J.

Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture

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2019

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tom 3

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nr 2(8)

124–134

EN

Concerning artistic research, the state of affairs is still one of delusions and confusions. The reason for this is the pluralization and dedifferentiation of rationality pushed forward by the postmodern period. The way out of it is the way of differentiations. Thus, it seems helpful, first, to remember what we already have in philosophical aesthetics, namely four basic models of art and knowledge. The question, then, is whether artistic research fits into (one of) these models. To my mind, it does – though in a new way. Secondly, it is helpful to have a short sober sociological look at the situation. Finally, we have to ask the question about the kind of research that is at stake in artistic research. Here, the meaning of non-propositional knowledge and Kant’s idea of an as-if-knowledge is useful. All in all, artistic research still fails in giving a sufficient explanation of itself.

8

Descartes, Kant, and Swinburne on Human Soul

71%

Judycki S.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2021

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tom 69

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nr 1

45-56

PL

This paper addresses two issues in Richard Swinburne’s book Are We Bodies or Souls? I interpret Swinburne’s modal argument as an example of a priori synthetic knowledge. Swinburne’s thesis that every person possesses “thisness” is compared with Kant’s distinction between the empirical character and the intelligible character.

9

Global Duties in the Face of Uncertainty

71%

Loriaux S.

Diametros

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2017

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nr 53

75-95

EN

This paper aims to highlight the role played by uncertainties in global justice theories. It will start by identifying four kinds of uncertainties that could potentially have an impact on the nature, content and very existence of global duties: first, uncertainties regarding the causes of global injustices; second, uncertainties regarding the consequences of global justice initiatives; third, uncertainties pertaining to the 'imperfect' character of certain global duties; and fourth, uncertainties regarding the conduct of others. It will discuss each of these uncertainties in turn, with particular attention to their normative implications, their distinctively 'global' source, and the possibility of their being addressed. It will conclude with some reflections on how the normative issues raised by uncertainties related to spatial distance compare to those raised by uncertainties related to temporal distance.

10

Wieczysty pokój końca historii. Koncepcje geopolityczne

71%

Liszkowska E.

Historia i Polityka

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2012

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nr 8(15)

32-42

EN

The aim of this paper is to present the concept of The end of History by F. Fukuyama and compare it with the philosophical concepts of I. Kant. The text is describing the main elements of liberal democracy promoted by Fukuyama comparing them to philosophical proposals of Kant. Both authors paid attention to the importance of human rights in international relations. Both also expressed their hope for the existence of global peace. The factor that diff ers them is the attitude towards the democracy.

11

Kant, Rawls a kritika kosmopolitismu

71%

Rasmussen D.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2010

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tom 58

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nr 2

229-244

EN

The author defends a cosmopolitan standpoint and attempts to justify the existence of the principles of global justice in the contemporary globalised world. His discussion involves three steps. Firstly, he discusses the influential conception of T. Nagel which holds that in the contemporary world there are only humanitarian moral duties, not principles of global justice, for such principles would require the existence of political institutions to enforce justice. Next, attention is given to I. Kant and an attempt is made to show that from the moral viewpoint the principles of global justice may exist even without the de facto existence of institutions of global government. Finally, the author analyses in some detail J. Rawls’ The Law of Peoples, which he interprets from a cosmopolitan viewpoint. On the basis of this interpretation Rawls’ conception of the principles of global justice is analysed and at the same time his critique of cosmopolitanism is called into question

12

Interpretacja myśli Immanuela Kanta w ramach II Davoser Hochschulkursen. Ernst Cassirer – Martin Heidegger

71%

Musioł A.

Estetyka i Krytyka

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2012

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nr 4(26)

151-160

XX

The philosophical meeting in Swiss Davos, happening on the turn March and April the year 1929, became a contribution to renewed analysing of foundations Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Kant in its own opus magnum places arguments which into different – at first sight, irreducible to himself - the manner lay out Cassirer and Heidegger. Favoured problems determine the content of my article, wherein – using the addition Zu Odebrechts und Cassirers Kritik des Kantbuches placed into Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, the spacious Peter E. Gordon's work Continental Divide. Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos and determining the creature of my pronouncement the translation of Andrzej J. Noras Expositions and the disputation in Davos - I make the comparative analysis the tenet of marburgian neo-Kantianist with theorems the author Sein und Zeit.

13

Emócie a kantovská morálka

71%

Cíbik M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2016

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tom 64

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nr 2

189-209

EN

This article aims to clarify the approach of contemporary Kantian moral theories to the emotions. The emotions are often presented as the biggest problem for this type of ethical reflection. One of the standard interpretations of Kant claims that, on his view, emotions are excluded from morally-worthwhile conduct. Our conduct should flow from pure duty, in the absence of affective inclination. In the first part of the article we show that this interpretation of Kant is not the only one possible and that, in his view, emotions may accompany morally-worthwhile conduct. The theories of contemporary Kantians (Korsgaard, Hermanová) confirm this. The role of emotions in Kantian theories is, however, limited. The emotions cannot play an active role in the determination of the moral worth of human conduct. A “expanded” Kantian morality which asserts such a role for emotions (such as is attempted by Ernst Tugendhat) cannot be given argumentational support and is bound to fail. In the concluding part of the article we show that this failure is in no way philosophically problematic and that emotions should not enter into the normative evaluation of human conduct.

14

Obecný smysl u Arendtové a Kantův zdravý rozum

71%

Glombíček P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2011

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tom 59

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nr 3

351-376

EN

The article is concerned with the epistemological background of Hannah Arendt’s philosophy. It focuses on the notion of common sense that plays a central role in Arendt’s work. The origin of Arendt’s notion of common sense lies in her interpretation of Kant, and the author tries to state the inadequacies of Arendt’s interpretation of Kant with respect to the notion of common sense. The focus is not on the application to political philosophy but rather on Kant’s theory of judgement, and it is shown that whereas Kant’s aim was a unified theory of rationality, Arendt, mostly unintentionally, narrows the scope of the theory to conscious consideration of others in decision making. Textual evidence aside, the thesis of the article is supported by a reductive argument that distinguishes the purported theory of the meaning of judgements from Arendt’s approach, in order to show the latter’s conformist implication.

15

Wokół Kantowskiej genealogii moralności, czyli o grzechu pierworodnym jako akcie konstytutywnym ludzkiej kultury

71%

Krakowiak J.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

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2017

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nr 63

95-131

EN

This is a non-contradictory with the concept of turning from virtual values towards the spiritual ones [as per Andrzej Grzegorczyk] and perhaps a bold interpretation of the mainstream myth of the Book of Genesis. In an immediate dimension, it is a reminder of the Conjectural Beginning of Human History, where, based on the concept of conviviality, Kant describes man’s striding and inexorable departure from the condition of an animal nature. The increase in the freedom of the rational being-in-the-world comes at the expense of the development of particular human persons subjected to the antinomy of guilt and the work of self-perfection. We speak of the progress as if it was permitted by God – would Grzegorczyk say, but now made on one’s own and requiring responsibility: the drama of existence. The myth of original sin is therefore at the same time a genealogy of morality, not just of punishment. This means opening of the gates of the world of freedom but of spiritual struggle, too. The latter is divine – God also relaxed after the act of creation and did not see it as a punishment as He made a self-sacrifice in His creations. Hence, in Laborem exercens, there is the idea of a man being God’s collaborator in the process of creating the world.

16

Post-Kantian Perfectionism. A Study in the Political Thought of German Idealism, from Leibniz to Marx

71%

Moggach D.

Academicus. International Scientific Journal

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2022

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tom 13

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nr 26

128-153

EN

This paper summarizes the major themes of my current monograph project and my recent co-edited volume on post-Kantian perfectionism. The central thesis is that Kant’s critique of rational heteronomy in the Groundwork effectively ruled out certain types of perfectionist ethics and their corresponding political applications, notably the programmes of Christian Wolff and his school, which were dominant in the German territories in the mid- to late eighteenth century. Kant’s critiques did not, however, preclude the emergence of a new type of perfectionism, no longer based on the state-sponsored promotion of eudaimonia or material, intellectual, and spiritual thriving, but on the advancement of freedom and the conditions for its exercise. Predicated on the idea of right, post-Kantian perfectionism focuses on maintaining and enhancing the juridical, political, and economic conditions for rightful interaction among self-defining individuals. Humboldt, Schiller, Fichte, Hegel, and the Hegelian School exemplify this new approach in different ways. Marx’s problematic relation to this tradition is outlined.

17

Problém přechodu od teoretické sféry k praktické v „Kritice soudnosti“

71%

Vacura M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2015

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tom 63

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nr 1

3-16

EN

Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Judgement often focus on the problematic of beauty and taste which a large part of the first part of his book is devoted to, or on questions of teleology connected with living nature analysed in the context of the second part. This article attempts to show that Kant in the third Critique tries to include the question of the relation of the theoretical and practical sphere in his treatment of this problematic. The crystallisation of Kant’s thought in this respect began to take place from the First Critique onwards. In clarifying this question we put to use the central concept of the Third Critique – purposefulness. The development of this concept in Kant’s thinking is traced. In the concluding part of the study we attempt to show that in employing the newly-formulated conception of purposefulness, Kant tackles the question of how the two spheres are connected by means of a thesis concerning the unity of the super-sensory substrate of nature and freedom.

18

Państwo prawa na gruncie filozofii politycznej Immanuela Kanta – dwie interpretacje

63%

Wieczorkowski M.

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

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2019

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tom 1(19)

108-124

PL

Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu omówienie kantowskiej koncepcji stanu prawnego jako podstawy współcześnie rozumianej zasady państwa prawa. W związku z tym tekst ten próbuje udzielić odpowiedzi dwa pytania: 1) jaki charakter można przypisać kantowskiej koncepcji stanu prawnego, biorąc pod uwagi wynikające z niej obowiązki; 2) czy analiza kantowskiego stanu jurydycznego może mieć jakiekolwiek przełożenie na współczesne rozumienie państwa prawa, a jeśli tak, to jakie. W celu realizacji tego zadania omówione zostają moralne presupozycje kantowskiego stanu prawnego, zgodnie z przyjętym powszechnie przekonaniem, że filozofia polityczna Kanta jest ściśle sprzężona z jego refleksją moralną i etyczną. Następnie analizie poddane zostaję dwie interpretacje kantowskiego stanu jurydycznego – interpretacja liberalna oraz interpretacja autorytarna. Kluczową różnicą pomiędzy tymi interpretacjami jest sposób ustalania zakresu okoliczności, w których obowiązek posłuszeństwa władzy państwowej winien być realizowany. Następnie kantowski stan jurydyczny zostaje zestawiony z dwoma sposobami rozumienia zasady państwa prawa – materialnym i formalnym – w celu oceny, czy zasadę państwa prawa powinniśmy rozważać w kategoriach ciągłości czy raczej zerwania względem koncepcji kantowskiej.

EN

The purpose of this article is to discuss Kant’s concept of juridical state as the foundation of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, the article tries to answer two questions: (1) what character can be attributed to Kant’s concept of juridical state taking into account the obligations arising from it; (2) can the analysis of the Kantian juridical state have any impact on the contemporary understanding of the rule of law and if so, what can this impact be. In order to accomplish this task, moral presuppositions of Kant’s juridical state are discussed, according to the commonly accepted view that Kant’s political philosophy is closely linked with his moral and ethical reflection. Then, two interpretations of Kant’s juridical state – the liberal one and the authoritarian one – are analysed. The crucial difference between these interpretations lies in establishing the circumstances in which the duty of obedience to state power should be carried out. Then, Kantian juridical state is compared with two ways of understanding the rule of law – the material one and the formal one – in order to evaluate whether the rule of law should be considered as continuity of or rupture with the Kantian concept.

19

Kant o spełnialności obowiązków w świetle zależności inferencyjnej między powinnością i możliwością

63%

Kozyra W.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

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2018

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nr 66

27-38

PL

W artykule omawiam kwestię odniesienia przedmiotowego zasady, przez niektórych nazywanej „prawem Kanta” (Kant’s Law), która głosi, że jeżeli dana osoba powinna uczynić X, to może ona uczynić X. Twierdzę, że reguła ta nie znajduje zastosowania u człowieka jako zjawiska, lecz odnosi się wyłącznie do człowieka jako noumenu. Pokazuję, że o ile będziemy traktować podmiot Kantowski jako jednolity punkt odniesienia dla tej zasady, o tyle uwikłamy się w sprzeczność w interpretacji tekstu Kanta, ponieważ wtedy będzie on twierdzić zarówno, że człowiek powinien spełniać swoje obowiązki, dane że może to robić, jak i że imperatyw kategoryczny przedkłada prawo niezależnie od tego, czy człowiek jest w stanie mu sprostać, czy nie.

EN

In this paper I discuss the problem of a referent of a principle, deemed by some as “Kant’s Law”, which states that if one ought to do X, then one can do X. I argue that in Kant’s philosophy this principle does not apply to man as a phenomenon, but only to man as a noumenon. I show that if we stick to the idea of a “man” as a unified center of reference for this principle, then we will end up with a contradiction, since Kant ostenesibly says both: that people can act in a certain way, provided that they ought to, and that moral law legislates regardless of what man can or cannot do.

20

Po mochlos – prolegomena do możliwych jeszcze rozważań o kondycji uniwersytetu

63%

Chojnacki M. , Żardecka M.

Człowiek i Społeczeństwo

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2020

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tom 49

EN

The text tackles the problem of the condition of university, in a world blindly believing that the only possible worth measure is economic in nature and, in the name of this belief, setting in motion a ruthless bureaucratic machinery that throttles all kinds of creativity and nips in the bud all nonstandard actions and creations. The world apparently is “out of joint”, and things are taking an unexpected turn. University is one of the victims, but also one of active accomplices of this despicable situation. How to speak about the university to those who are exclusively in business of calculating balance of profits and losses? How to speak about it after deconstruction, when all great ideas have been already repeatedly and manifoldly dismounted and discredited? How to speak about it, when the university’s men and women have discredited themselves repeatedly as well, oscillating between libido sciendi and libido dominandi? Trying to solve this puzzle, we are following in the footsteps of Derrida, who in his texts about university makes appeal to Kant, and inspired by his invention, we set in motion two opposite traditions, represented by Lyotard, Bourdieu, Bauman and Readings on the one hand, and by Humboldt, Schleiermacher and Jaspers on the other. With Derrida, we make noises about the return of the ideas of truth, of the light of reason, of the autonomy of university. It is, however, a return of the specters of the past, in alignment with Derrida’s hauntology. Humanists are people of academia who see these specters, but at the same time are already specters themselves – even if they still show up here and there, they are almost insignificant. They are onlyallowed to contemplate their negligibility and to confess their habitual helplessness. University always had to defend itself, and it does defend itself today.