Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Nieobecność problemu rzeczy samej w sobie w filozofii Hegla w obliczu Heglowskiego rozumienia prawdy

100%

Jochlik A. J.

Folia Philosophica

|

2019

|

tom 41

37-55

EN

The article presents a Hegelian view of Kant’s thing in itself in regard to Hegel’s understanding of truth. In it, I designate eight key fragments of The Phenomenology of Spirit, around which the analysis of the issue takes place. As a result, the boundaries have been defined in which Hegel wants to pursue his deliberations. Hegel does not want to think about what is independent of the cognizing subject, claiming that it does not concern us,philosophers because it is the task of religion. The truth for Hegel is what realizes itself among us so that it is fully available to us.

PL

Artykuł przedstawia Heglowskie spojrzenie na rzecz samą w sobie Kanta w odniesieniu do Heglowskiego rozumienia prawdy. W nim wyznaczam osiem kluczowych fragmentów Fenomenologii ducha, wokół których toczy się analiza tego zagadnienia. Dzięki temu zostały określone granice, w ramach których Hegel chce prowadzić swoje rozważanie. Hegel nie chce myśleć o tym, co niezależne od podmiotu poznającego, twierdząc, że to nas, filozofów, nie dotyczy, jest to zadaniem religii. Prawda dla Hegla jest tym, co samo się realizuje wśród nas, tak iż jest nam w pełni dostępna.

2

Dialektyka utopii

94%

Wójcik B.

Estetyka i Krytyka

|

2014

|

nr 4(35)

49-72

XX

In the essay the speculative movement of the term “utopia” is presented on two examples: in works of the two most important dialecticians of modernity, Hegel and Adorno. Hegel’s reflection on utopia is determined by internal tension between his juvenile enthusiasm for the project of aesthetics utopia and mature criticism of all utopian transformations of the actual reality. Adorno, on the other hand, accused his “great predecessor” of betrayal of utopia in the name of its realization. Hence for Adorno utopia is only an negative consciousness of what is not existing, and just it – embodied in the work of art - makes a promise of salvation of the proper name. Confronting these two antagonistic positions I consider them in a wider framework of a fundamental issue: is salvation (of an individual? Of society?) possible in temporality (in the Hegelian absolute knowledge) or will it arrive only form Other side (as in Adorno’s utopia of ineffable nonidentity)?

3

Jedinec v běhu světa : Zamyšlení nad Hegelovým pojetím

94%

Parusniková Z.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2011

|

tom 59

|

nr 3

325-350

EN

The author considers the place of the individual in the course of history which unfolds on the ground of the self-realisation of the absolute. The focus is on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, particularly on the chapter „Rational self-consciousness which is self-realising“ in which Hegel explores the relation between substantiality and subjectivity in the phase of the emergence of modern society. In this phase of history man shows his self-consciousness and free individuality, but at the same time suffers the loss of his substantial grounding. Hegel’s philosophy presents a grand attempt at uniting these two perspectives according to which the full development of peculiarity and uniqueness is in harmony with and a condition of the fulfillment of an impersonal, dynamically-realising, absolute principle. The author argues that Hegel’s metaphysical framework does not provide sufficient space for the recognition of the authenticity of man, emphasised in modern discussion, since subjectivity itself is, to a certain extent, the manifestation of the absolute. But, if we adopt Hegel’s metaphysical standpoint, another interesting prospect opens up: the individual satisfies his essential need of a sense of belonging to a whole, and gradually understands that he is part of a grand process and that he shares in the common work of mankind.

4

Dějiny a problém zla. Hegelova teodicea

94%

Landa I.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2012

|

tom 60

|

nr 5

643-665

EN

The aim of this paper is to develop Hegel’s thesis that the philosophy of history is a theodicy. My interpretation proceeds by several steps: Firstly, I examine Hegel’s formulation of the problem of evil and show that his solution has two interconnected dimensions: theoretical and practical. Accordingly, it operates with two presuppositions: (a) history is accessible to rational inquiry, and (b) this kind of inquiry can reconcile a man with the actual world, including existent evil. My next step is to further develop the first presupposition in the context of the thesis about reason in history, and I analyse Hegel’s peculiar understanding of “reason”. I then distinguish two ways of explaining present and past events: mechanical and teleological, and I clarify why teleological explanations are unavoidable. Within the teleological I differentiate two models: intentional and functional. This distinction is motivated by two circumstances: (1) historical agents act intentionally, and in doing so (2) they also unintentionally actualize their own nature, i.e. freedom. Subsequently, I approach the thesis about the philosophy of history as a theodicy. I contrast Hegel´s own position to moralism and fatalism. The last section gives some reasons against an instrumentalist interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history.

CS

Záměrem této studie je interpretovat Hegelovu tezi, že filosofie dějin je teodiceou. Interpretace postupuje v několika krocích: (1) Na příkladu Hegelovy formulace problému zla ukazuji, že jsou v ní přítomny dvě roviny: teoretická a praktická. Hegel se na jedné straně domnívá, že dějiny jsou přístupné rozumovému poznání, a na druhé straně je přesvědčen, že toto poznání může v důsledku vést ke smíření myšlení a skutečnosti, resp. člověka a světa (včetně existujícího zla). (2) Uvedené domněnky objasňuji v kontextu teze týkající se přítomnosti rozumu v dějinách, přičemž seznamuji s Hegelovou koncepcí rozumu. (3) Následně rozlišuji dva výkladové modely minulých a přítomných událostí: mechanistický a teleologický. Toto rozlišení je mj. motivováno dvěma skutečnostmi: za prvé tím, že dějinní aktéři jednají intencionálně, a za druhé tím, že v tomto svém jednání nevědomě uskutečňují svou povahu, kterou je svoboda. (4) Tezi, že filosofie dějin je teodiceou, se v dalším pokouším odstínit od moralismu a fatalismu. (5) Na závěr uvádím důvody v neprospěch instrumentalistické interpretace Hegelovy filosofie dějin.

5

Action, objective, intersubjectivity: towards a theory of social action

94%

Forlin F.

Ethics in Progress

|

2013

|

tom 4

|

nr 2

55-62

EN

The reflection on intersubjectivity is a central question in the contemporary philosophical debate. In this field, current practical philosophy faces one of the most difficult challenges. Apparently, the research for a foundation of the intersubjective level seems to lead inevitably towards the abandonment of the logical-foundation theory on which the philosophy had been based up until Hegel. In this report, however, I would like to attempt something different. That is, I would like to explore the possibility of inserting the subject of intersubjectivity right into the heart of Hegelian thinking, with an aim to outline the foundation of a social action theory capable of exhibiting reasons stronger than those deriving from simple dialogic validation. It is possible, as Ho sle believed, that Hegel himself did not take this aspect of the profound dynamics of his thought too seriously, and that he had not prepared the notional categories to be able to think about it in depth. Nevertheless, the theoretical foundations of intersubjectivity, brought back to its Hegelian roots, is the fundamental cornerstone upon which to build the logical-rational foundations of social action

6

Problem wolności i myślenia w Heglowskiej Fenomenologii ducha

94%

Jochlik A.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

|

2021

|

tom 49

|

nr 1-4

67-93

EN

The goal of the article is to show that in Chapter Four of Phenomenology of Spirit the aim is not to show the servant as the one who becomes independent of nature, but to show his escapism and its consequences. The main point of reference is the “master-slave” dialectic, with a heavy emphasis on Kojève’s interpretation. Apart from this one, the other important points of reference are the very beginning of Chapter Four, as well as Hegel’s understanding of skepticism. The article is organized in such a way that every part focuses on the analysis of at least one crucial quotation, each one constituting a Hegelian attempt to define freedom. It will show that Chapter Four provides us with only the beginning of long considerations on the question of freedom.

7

Estetyka przyrody: nowe pojmowanie natury

94%

Frydryczak B.

Estetyka i Krytyka

|

2009

|

nr 15-16

41-55

EN

The impulse to aestheticize nature, firmly rooted in the modern drive to conquer it, laid the foundations for a panoramic theoretical perspective.Any new aesthetics, in turn, must take into account the change of circumstances in which nature currently develops, its changing socio-historical conception, as well as the process of cultural transmission, whereby an idealized image of nature is passed on from generation to generation. It is to be assumed that alongside the aestheticized understanding of nature as a landscape, there exists a ‘micrological’ view, which hails in a new type of aesthetic sensitivity. This new sensitivity takes the ideal of harmonious coexistence as the basis of a renewed relationship between man and nature, and the expanded aesthetics of nature is its proper custodian.

8

Master—Slave

94%

Dobieszewski J.

Dialogue and Universalism

|

2016

|

nr 2

141-147

EN

The article concerns the problem of master and slave in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Then I compare this problem with the issues discussed in the Hegel, Haiti and Universal History, an interesting book by Susan Buck-Morss, published in 2009.

9

Od Natury do Historii: Efekt Lutra u Hegla

94%

Bielik-Robson A.

Konteksty - Polska Sztuka Ludowa

|

2018

|

tom 72

|

nr 3(322)

97-104

PL

Tytuł mojego eseju odnosi się do przejścia, które zdefiniowało epokę nowoczesną – „od natury do historii“ – i które stało się możliwe dzięki teologii reformowanej. Ta bowiem podważyła zasady świętego prawa naturalnego, sformułowane przez tomistyczną metafizykę, i zainwestowała w pracę nad naturą, poddając ją wielkiej dziejowej transformacji. Z kolei podtytuł mojego eseju – „efekt Lutra u Hegla“ – ma wykładnię szerszą i węższą. Ta pierwsza, szersza, odnosi się do ogólnego efektu reformacji w heglowskiej filozofii, która, jak sam autor zapewnia, nie powstałaby, gdyby nie duchowy ferment renesansowego „germańskiego chrześcijaństwa“. Ta druga, węższa, odnosi się do konkretnego efektu myśli luterańskiej w postaci najważniejszego pojęcia Hegla, jakim jest kategoria pracy. Hegel, sam zawsze uważający się za ortodoksyjnego luteranina, stworzył myśl, która znacznie odbiega od dogmatów wyznania augsburskiego – w jednym aspekcie jednak pozostał absolutnie wierny koncepcji Marcina Lutra, czyli właśnie w jego idei pracy jako jednocześnie zawodu i powołania: Beruf jako Berufung.

EN

The title of this essay refers to the “from Nature to history” transition, which defined the modern epoch and was rendered possible by the theology of the Reformation. It is the latter that undermined the principles of the holy natural law formulated by Thomist metaphysics and invested in work on Nature by subjecting it to a great historical transformation. In turn, the sub-title of the essay – “The Luther Effect in the Case of Hegel” – has been granted both a wider and a narrower interpretation. The former refers to the general effect of the Reformation within Hegelian philosophy which, as the author assured us, would have not come into being had it not been for the spiritual fomentation of ”Germanic Christianity”. The latter refers to the concrete effect of Lutheran thought in the form of the most important Hegelian conceit, namely, the category of labour. Hegel, who always regarded himself as an Orthodox Lutheran, is the author of reflections that to a considerable extent differ from the dogmas of the Augsburg confession; nonetheless, in a single aspect he remained loyal to the conception launched by Martin Luther, i.e. the idea of labour as simultaneously a profession and a calling: Beruf as Berufung.

10

Shakespeare – Swinarski – Hegel

94%

Hernik-Spalińska J.

Pamiętnik Teatralny

|

2014

|

tom 63

|

nr 3(251)

86-104

EN

Since his early years, Swinarski had been under the influence of Hegel’s philosophy, whose application he could see in Bertolt Brecht’s theatre. In one of his interviews he said: “Thus, through the contradiction between the ideal and reality, there comes to be a man who stands apart from this reality and is dissatisfied with it. This contradiction is what thought is born out of”. He admitted to ‘reading Romanticism “through Marx”, among others’. But Swinarski in the basic tenets of his thinking, concerning the issues of dialectic, objectification and the modern state, followed rather the Hegel that was often misconstrued and fell into oblivion because of the way his philosophy was interpreted by Marxism. The difference between the Marxian and Hegelian points of view becomes clear in Swinarski’s idea for staging Hamlet as it deals with Hegel’s social philosophy and his views on the state. Hegel warned that, due to prolonged peace, citizens engage in their private affairs so much that they forget what binds them to the state and he urged members of civil society to be ‘political animals’ as well. According to this Hegelian conception, Hamlet, educated in more developed European countries where had been taught to fear the violence of the state and the objectification it brought, and to endorse rationalism and shallow idealism, lost his primitive instinct to resolve conflict regardless of personal revulsion but with the interests of the whole in mind. The state requires that the individual subordinate himself and his body to its ends. In contrast, Marxism sees such objectification as a source of suffering, because Marx interpreted Hegel through the Feuerbachian reversed perspective ‘according to which the sphere of politics and law should be treated as an “alienated” manifestation, a mere appearance of the important social sphere, the one that is “truly human”’. Thus, in words of M. J. Siemek, young Marx and his later followers break away with ‘the Aristotelian idea of man as a zoon politikon: the intersubjective world of public life and actions ceases to exist as it becomes principally irrational. The social reality of human interactions turns into a confusing sphere of dark and dangerous forces, unintelligible and, for this reason, unyielding to any form of public control and regulation’. Hamlet was usually interpreted in such a Marxist fashion, as a hero objectified against his will, subjected to self-willed violence (of Claudius’ on the one hand, and Fortinbras’ on the other), estranged in the irrational world of politics. The same reification principle governed the totalitarian Communist regime that sought to separate the individual from politics that was viewed as impure and alienating. M. J. Siemek points out that ‘Communism radically severed the ontological link between polity and sociation. It deracinated politics from the basic structure of social life. As a result, the structures of authority and power became independent and self-legitimating to the point where political praxis lost any meaningful reference to both social reality and social theory’. Swinarski interpreted Shakespeare in a Hegelian, and not Marxian, way. Hamlet could have stopped the expansion of the new embodiment of evil only if he had properly understood his objectification by the state. The raison d’État required him not to fight his objectification but his modern education made him unable to accept it, castrating him politically and making him view politics as something impure and alien. Thus, in the name of distaste, which is the only thing he holds dear for the want of any other values, and ‘with an ironic sense of individual freedom, he starts out on his suicidal progress toward negation, which always ends with an encounter with nothingness’.

11

Heidegger a Hegel

94%

Bednář M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2015

|

tom 63

|

nr 1

47-56

EN

The author investigates the parallel conceptions of the overall philosophical goal of M. Heidegger and G. W. F. Hegel. He is of the opinion that the main parallel in the philosophical work of these two thinkers is evident when we compare Heidegger’s conception of the first and second beginning of the history of being with Hegel’s historical scheme of the two phases of the return of the absolute idea to itself. Hegel’s moment of one’s own fully-conscious self-understanding determining the mediation of oneself, and thus overcoming one’s own externality is revealed to be the foreshadowing counterpart of Heidegger’s conception of the overcoming of the first beginning. This overcoming, which Heidegger calls a second beginning, is the overcoming of a movement that substitutes being with the highest being. Heidegger takes the first beginning of the history of being as its necessary initial movement, and only thus can being become aware of itself as the mediating movement of the historical possibility of the second beginning. Hegel’s and Heidegger’s thought are thus revealed to follow analogical and parallel paths in expressing the ultimate conceptions of philosophical thought of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

12

„Vymykající se modernizace“

94%

Nagl-Docekal H.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2009

|

tom 57

|

nr 1

69-86

EN

The modern age is characterised by a loss of social solidarity and the growing isolation of the individual, who strives only for personal gain. The result of this is the politically-unmanaged dynamic of the world economy and world society. The author raises the question of how philosophy can contribute to a new strengthening of normative consciousness. To this end she concentrates on Habermas’, or rather Hegel’s, programme of a re-iterated critical reading of religio-philosophical reflections, and of the translation of the contents of faith “from the religious idiom into one that is generally accessible”. She extensively elaborates, as she herself puts it, on the brief explicit appeals made to Hegel by Habermas, working especially with Hegel’s works Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (I, II) and Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. Hegel’s interpretation of Christianity, in the author’s view, provides a tool for analysing the genesis of the current crisis of normativity – including the problematic of human dignity, international justice and a just treatment of the sexes – as well as providing possible solutions to these questions.

13

czy Heglowska diagnoza sztuki jest aktualna?

94%

Chmielowski F.

Estetyka i Krytyka

|

2011

|

nr 1(20)

29-46

EN

The text presents the Hegelian idea of the end of art as well as her meaning for theoretical comprehension and the practical understanding of artistic facts. Author subjects hermeneutical analysis system and empirical premises Hegelian thesis, confronting it with current state of art as well as artistic consciousness and her interpretation in the philosophical aesthetics.

14

Proč Láokoón nekřičí? K diskontinuitám v poznání

84%

Kolman V.

Svět literatury – Časopis pro novodobé literatury (World of Literature – Journal for Modern Literatures)

|

2017

|

tom 56

9-21

EN

The paper deals with the central problem of Lessing’s Laocoön „Why does not marble Laocoön in his famous depiction scream?“ against division of our experience into scientific knowledge and art. First, Lessing’s original solution based on the constitutive differences between poetry and plastic arts is generalized leading to the difference between causal and intentional explanation. Second, the resulting discontinuity between science and art is presented as an instance of a more basic discontinuity between knowledge and its object to be overcome by a reflective account of knowledge as derived from the philosophy of Hegel.

15

Heglowska krytyka stanu prawniczego

84%

Hau M.

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

|

2021

|

nr 3(28)

69-81

EN

The aim of the article is a question about the actuality of the Hegelian concept of law, presented in the Principles of the philosophy of law. For Hegel, the law is the most important element in the structure of a capitalist society, because it funds the mutual recognition of individuals, which gives social relationships a foundation not in the dialectic of rule and servitude, but in the submission of all authorities to general legal norms. The analysis of selected contemporary practices that allow for the choice of jurisdiction calls into question the Hegelian concept, since these practices show that the general principle is broken – abstract norms of law no longer have to apply to everyone. The second part of the article is devoted to the analysis of criticism of legal profession to which Hegel accused the responsibility for alienating the law from society and thus blurring the relationship between law and freedom. The question will be asked whether Hegel’s criticism can be applied to contemporary problems in the relationship between law and society. Whether the law continues to be, as Hegel wanted it to be, a rational means of meeting the needs of individuals, or whether, on the contrary, it is increasingly becoming a source of exploitation.

PL

Tematem artykułu jest pytanie o aktualność Heglowskiej koncepcji prawa, wyrażonej przede wszystkim w „Zasadach filozofii prawa”. Dla Hegla prawo jest najważniejszym elementem w strukturze kapitalistycznego społeczeństwa, ponieważ funduje wzajemne uznanie jednostek, przez co stosunki społeczne zyskują oparcie nie w dialektyce panowania i służebności, ale poddaniu się przez wszystkich władzy ogólnych norm prawnych. Analiza wybranych współczesnych praktyk, pozwalających na wybór jurysdykcji, poddaje w wątpliwość Heglowską koncepcję, ponieważ praktyki te pokazują, że przełamana zostaje zasada ogólna –abstrakcyjne normy prawa nie muszą już obowiązywać wszystkich. Druga część artykułu jest poświęcona analizie krytyki stanu prawniczego, której Hegel zarzucał odpowiedzialność za wyobcowanie prawa od społeczeństwa, a tym samym rozmycie związku między prawem a wolnością. Postawione zostanie pytanie, czy krytykę Hegla można odnieść do współczesnych problemów relacji prawo –społeczeństwo. Czy prawo dalej stanowi, jak chciał tego Hegel, racjonalny środek do realizacji potrzeb jednostek, czy może przeciwnie, coraz częściej staje się źródłem wyzysku.

16

Tożsamość narodowa wobec idei absolutnej w systemie Hegla

83%

Jochlik A.

Logos i Ethos

|

2014

|

nr 2(37)

99–123

PL

Artykuł koncentruje się wokół zagadnienia Heglowskiej tożsamości narodowej, które jest zawarte głównie w Zasadach filozofii prawa oraz w Wykładach z historii filozofii. Ukazane jest ono poprzez postęp świadomości człowieka dotyczącej jego wolności, jednakże w bardziej ograniczonym zakresie, niż ma to miejsce w Fenomenologii ducha. Celem tego artykułu jest ukazanie prawdziwego znaczenia tego zagadnienia, które jest skoncentrowane w pojęciu absolutnej idei, w Nauce logiki.

17

Abstraction Made Flesh – Immediacy of the Body and Religious Experience. Derrida, Hegel and Georges de La Tour

83%

Olesik M.

Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture

|

2021

|

tom 5

|

nr 3

50-63

EN

The text juxtaposes two different understandings of religion, the first: Hegelian, where it functions as an imaginary representation of the concept, and the second: Derridean, which confronts and radicalizes the idea of the death of God. At the center of their juxtaposition is the process of abstraction and the religious figure of the “desert” which both authors use to illustrate it. Central to Derrida’s thinking of religion, understood as a figure of relentless negativity in search of difference, a “desert” can also be found in Hegel’s exploration of “unhappy consciousness,” where it is used in reference to the crusaders and serves as a metonymy of the futile imaginary association of Christ’s divinity with his actual, individual body. The text sets out to complicate what Hegel understands as the abstract nature of Christ’s body and body in general with reference to Derridean gesture of religious purification and through the analysis of Saint Thomas, a work by a baroque painter, Georges de La Tour which is analyzed as an embodiment of the complex relations between religious abstraction and image.

18

Patočka and Hegel´'s Philosophy of the History of Philosophy

83%

Leško V.

Folia Philosophica

|

2016

|

tom 37

EN

Hegel’s history of philosophy has irreplaceable place within the whole of his philosophizing and this fact grounds its philosophical importance. It has become the organ of the self-knowing mind in time as an integral component of philosophy of objective mind. Patočka was very precise with defining four main dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy: 1. The development of philosophy is organic. Different philosophies are different stages of the same organism development. 2. The role of individuality is subordinate; it does not belong to philosophical contents. 3. Time is but a mere external milieu, a mirror of inner development in the organism of mind. Philosophy and other aspects of mind in different periods are certain manifestations of the very same stage in the development of spiritual substance. Each historical period can be expressed rationally. Time thus doesn´t have positive, content meaning. 4. Advance of philosophical systems corresponds with the logical development of thought. The crucial core of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy as Patočka identified it couldn´t be even put forward in a better way. According to Patočka, Hegel is right that history of philosophy lives a life of systematic philosophy; it reflects our systematic nature, our tendency to system. History of philosophy and philosophy itself for Patočka, as well as for Hegel, create unity – a kind of organic totality.

19

Metafilozofia, czyli o filozofii po filozofii (choć nadal z jej wnętrza) – na przykładzie refleksji historycznofilozoficznej Hegla i Heideggera

83%

Gawlik C.

Człowiek i Społeczeństwo

|

2022

|

tom 53

153-170

EN

The main purpose of the paper is to characterize the metaphilosophical paradigm of today’s philosophy.The author argues that contemporary philosophical thought is thoroughly – and in a complexsense – metaphilosophical in nature. Namely, it takes the form of philosophy’s reflection on itselfpracticed after its end, but still from within philosophy. Understood in this way, metaphilosophyunifies the formal-spatial and temporal meanings of the prefix “meta-” as well as the two correspondingspecific paradigms of metaphilosophy: philosophy of philosophy and post-philosophy. In orderto substantiate this hypothesis, (1) the Hegelian historical-philosophical position, which marks thefinal moment of classical philosophy, is first presented, and on its basis the situation of contemporarythought, which is determined by the problem of the future of philosophy, is outlined. (2) Then the“early” and “late” philosophy of Martin Heidegger, which belongs to the metaphilosophical epochof post-classical philosophy, is discussed. (3) This ultimately allows the author not only to drawconclusions about the condition of philosophy today, but also to outline an original context fora potentially fruitful confrontation between these two authors, which is the second aim of the paper.

20

Żałoba i rewolucja. Refleksje heglowskie

83%

Wójcik B.

Śląskie Studia Polonistyczne

|

2015

|

nr 2(7)

131-154

EN

The article takes up a problem of a complex relationship between Hegel and the French Revolution, of which the philosopher was both a great enthusiast and a brilliant critic. The point of departure for the analysis is a critical reading of the traditional interpretations of Hegel’s relation to the Revolution (J. Ritter and J. Habermas), which enables the author to develop a “speculative interpretation of the Revolution” on the basis of Phenomenology of Spirit. The key to the understanding of the dynamics of the Enlightenment, which found its culmination in the Revolution, is the inner dialectic of knowledge and faith which constitutes this epoch. The ideas of the Enlightenment become undermined by the opposition between the German (reformation) process of working through the relation between faith and knowledge and the French (revolutionary) repression of its mutual relationship. This paradox recognized by Hegel (in R. Comay’s interpretation) leads the philosopher to formulate a dialectic position: revolution with reformation would be the work of mourning (the process of working through) on this lost object (the world of faith), whereas revolution without reformation would remain only futile melancholy of terror, compensating for the lack of reformation. The paradoxical lesson for the present times (inspired by S. Žižek’s reading) which arises from Hegel’s interpretation is the following: cultural revolution (revolution in thinking itself, in utopian dreams) is the condition of possibility of the success of social revolution.