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1
Content available Subiektywne – intersubiektywne – obiektywne w ujęciu Gottloba Fregego
100%
Niebrój K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2012
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nr nr 17
49-68
EN
The main concern of my work is the issue of the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity on the ground of Frege’s works. It is assumed in this article that in Frege’s concept of objectivity is a special kind of absolute. In order to justify that claim, I use Frege’s ontological ideas, e.g. distinction between object and concept, three kingdoms, Truth, False, distinction between thought and thinking.
2
Content available remote Fregean Description Theory in Proof-Theoretical Setting
100%
Indrzejczak A.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
|
2019
|
tom 28
|
nr 1
137-155
EN
We present a proof-theoretical analysis of the theory of definite descriptions which emerges from Frege’s approach and was formally developed by Kalish and Montague. This theory of definite descriptions is based on the assumption that all descriptions are treated as genuine terms. In particular, a special object is chosen as a designatum for all descriptions which fail to designate a unique object. Kalish and Montague provided a semantical treatment of such theory as well as complete axiomatic and natural deduction formalization. In the paper we provide a sequent calculus formalization of this logic and prove cut elimination theorem in the constructive manner.
3
Content available Fregowska kategoria Bedeutung
89%
Bogucki K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2018
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tom 43
83-102
EN
The paper concerns Frege’s notion of Bedeutung. My main thesis is that Frege notion of meaning should be understand as a truth-value potential of an expression rather than reference/denotation. This interpretation allow us to treat homogenously Bedeutung of names, sentences and predicates. It should be obvious in the case of predicates, because Bedeutung of predicates aren’t some objects, but some functions (something ‘unsaturated’). Therefore, the name-relation (relation name-referent) cannot be implied in the very meaning of the word ‘Bedeutung’.
PL
W artykule omawiam Fregowską kategorię Bedeutung. Główną tezą artykułu jest to, że za Fregowskie znaczenie (Bedeutung) należy uznać potencjał wartości logicznej wyrażenia, a nie referencję czy też denotację. Za pomocą tej interpretacji możemy w sposób jednorodny ująć znaczenie nazw, zdań oraz predykatów. Powinna być ona oczywista w przypadku predykatów, ponieważ znaczeniem (Bedeutung) predykatów nie jest żaden przedmiot, lecz funkcja (coś ‘nienasyconego’). Z tego względu, relacja nazwowa (relacja nazwa-nośnik) nie powinna być wpisana w samo znaczenie słowa ‘Bedeutung’.
4
Content available Wittgenstein o rozjaśnianiu myśli. Wstęp do lektury „Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego"
89%
Bogucki K.
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
|
2018
|
tom 41
|
nr 2
147-165
EN
In this article I examine some remarks from Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus about the point and the method of his work. First part of the article concerns relationships between Frege‘s conception of elucidation and Wittgenstein‘s conception of philosophy. Second part of the article is about Wittgenstein‘s attitude to science and the role of science in philosophy. Third part of my article concerns the ethical purpose of Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
5
Content available Wittgenstein o rozjaśnianiu myśli. Wstęp do lektury „Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego”
88%
Bogucki K.
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
|
2018
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tom 43
|
nr 4
52-70
PL
In this article I examine some remarks from Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus about the point and the method of his work. First part of the article concern relationships between Frege‘s conception of elucidation and Wittgenstein‘s conception of philosophy. Second part of the article is about Wittgenstein‘s attitude to science and the role of science in philosophy. Third part of my article concern the ethical purpose of Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
6
How “Meaning” became “Narrow Content”
88%
Grabarczyk P.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2016
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tom 46
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nr 1
155-171
EN
The paper traces how disappointment with the notion of linguistic meaning has led to a shift towards the new, technical term of “narrow content”. In the first part of the paper I analyze the ways “narrow content” is understood in the literature. I show two important distinctions which have to be applied to the term in order to avoid confusion – the difference between context and functional theories of narrow content, and the difference between mental and linguistic narrow content. I argue that the most controversial combination of both distinctions is the idea of functional linguistic narrow content. In the second part of the paper I show that, contrary to the initial impression, this controversial, cut back notion of narrow content sheds some much needed light on several key semantic phenomena which we might otherwise be unable to explain – and because of this can be seen as a rightful descendant of the notion of meaning.
7
Content available remote Fregovo pojetí aplikace aritmetiky
88%
Sousedík P. , Svoboda D.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2015
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tom 63
|
nr 3, Special No: Sedmkrát z logiky a metodologie vědy
101-124
EN
The authors believe that the problem of applicability can be approached in two ways. One approach derives from the fact that the empirical world has been the source of many mathematical concepts, and claims that arithmetic captures reality in the same way as common empirical disciplines. Its miraculous applicability can then be explained by the greater universality of the concepts used. Such an approach is designated a poste¬riori. The other approach to the problem of applicability, designated a priori, assumes that arithmetic is not grounded empirically, in fact it is already there before all expe¬rience. Upon analysis, both approaches authors’ view, these merits and shortcomings were already noticed by Frege. Though his conception is to be classified as an a priori approach, he – unlike his predecessors – also learned much from proponents of a posteriori conceptions.
8
Content available Presupozycje w perspektywie logicznej
75%
Kulińska Z.
Linguistica Copernicana
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2016
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nr 13
239-250
EN
The main aim of this article is to show the problem of presupposition from the side of the logical analysis of language. Deliberations on the topic derive from the nineteenth century and are connected to Gottlob Frege. In his work titled "On sense and reference", he asks how the expressions with a referring function should be translated into logical language. He also emphasizes "assumptions for the existence of referent (designation)", whose characteristic feature is that their authenticity is a crucial condition to provide a sentence with a logical meaning. Therefore, Frege highlighted the crucial feature of presupposition that is constancy under negation. However, Frege's concept lacks unity when it comes to the level of the language on which the assumptions should be made. An opposing view on presupposition is presented by Russell and his idea of definite descriptions, which solves the problem of sentences with non-existent subject terms, of which Frege's language philosophy does not provide a precise explanation. Russel claims that denoting phrases can be expressed in the form on conjunction of the value of the sentence and thus sentences predicating on something that does not exist happen to be false. However, Russel's view differs from the one presented by a twentieth-century philosopher, Peter Strawson. The latter maintains that the problems mentioned derive from the fact that scholars do not notice the difference between sentences and sentences used to have an assertive meaning and, consequently, that the sentences cannot be true or false since this is a characteristic feature of statements. He also emphasizes a connection between them, in which one statement is a primary condition to give a logical value to another statement. Strawson called the phenomenon a presupposition and claimed that it can be recognized as a specific kind of pragmatic deduction/presupposition. The article focuses on showing the three views on presupposition on the grounds of the philosophies of language presented by scholars mentioned above.
9
Content available remote Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions
75%
Gomułka J. , Wawrzyniak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2013
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nr 24
61 - 86
EN
The main question of our article is: What is the logical form of statements containing expressions such as “… is true” and “it is true that …”? We claim that these expressions are generally not used in order to assign a certain property to sentences. We indicate that a predicative interpretation of these expressions was rejected by Frege and adherents to the prosentential conception of truth. We treat these expressions as operators. The main advantage of our operational reading is the fact that it adequately represents how the words, “true” and “truth,” function in everyday speech. Our approach confirms the intuition that so-called T-equivalences are not contingent truths, and explains why they seem to be—in some sense—necessary sentences. Moreover, our operational readingof truth expressions dissolves problems arising from the belief that there is some specific property—truth. The fact that we reject that truth is a certain property does not mean that we deny that the concept of truth plays a very important role in our language, and hence in our life. We indicate that the concept of truth is inseparable from the concept of sentence and vice versa—it is impossible to explicate one of these concepts without appeal to the other.
10
Content available „Cała matematyka to właściwie geometria”. Poglądy Gottloba Fregego na podstawy matematyki po upadku logicyzmu
75%
Bogucki K.
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
|
2019
|
tom 44
|
nr 1
1-20
EN
Gottlob Frege abandoned his logicist program after Bertrand Russell had discovered that some assumptions of Frege’s system lead to contradiction (so called Russell’s paradox). Nevertheless, he proposed a new attempt for the foundations of mathematics in two last years of his life. According to this new program, the whole of mathematics is based on the geometrical source of knowledge. By the geometrical source of cognition Frege meant intuition which is the source of an infinite number of objects in arithmetic. In this article, I describe this final attempt of Frege to provide the foundations of mathematics. Furthermore, I compare Frege’s views of intuition from The Foundations of Arithmetic (and his later views) with the Kantian conception of pure intuition as the source of geometrical axioms. In the conclusion of the essay, I examine some implications for the debate between Hans Sluga and Michael Dummett concerning the realistic and idealistic interpretations of Frege’s philosophy.
11
Content available Truth-Bearers in Frege and the Tractatus
75%
Bronzo S.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2019
|
tom 47
31-53
EN
This paper argues that the Tractatus breaks deeply with Frege’s account of truth-bearers as mind-independent entities, and is closer to the act-theoretic approach recently defended, for example, by Scott Soames and Peter Hanks. For the Tractatus, the primary truth-bearers are facts-in-use, which essentially involve acts, as well as facts functioning as instruments of representation. The Tractarian account, it is further argued, can vindicate three platitudes that constitute the main motivation of Frege’s approach.
12
Content available remote Paradoks kłamcy
63%
Wawrzyniak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2011
|
nr 15
161-179
EN
The aim of the article is to determine what role the liar sentence plays in our language. On the one hand, it seems to be well formed formula, and on the other, it does not seem to have any clear sense. At the beginning of the article I point what form an adequate solution of the liar paradox should take. In my opinion it could not consist in giving rules which do not allow to build such a sentence. The paradox remains unsolved until there is such a language in which it could be expressed. In the first part of the text I try to explain why Tarski’s solution is not satisfactory. If the semantical definition of truth is correct, the liar sentence could not lead to a contradiction because formulas which are not well formed could not be premises of any inference. From that follows that the so called liar paradox does not arise and that leads to the conclusion: ‘the reconstruction’ of the liar propounded by Tarski could not be correct. In the second part I present an approach to the liar which appeals to Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language. The conclusion of my consideration is that the liar sentence is nonsense, which means it is not given any sense – either its logical form is determined but we do not fix any definite meaning to some parts of it, or an attempt to determine its logical form in the standard way leads to regress ad infinitum.
13
Content available The context principle and the idea of explaining meaning as from the outside
63%
Wawrzyniak J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2019
|
tom 47
55-78
EN
The aim of my article is to show that accepting the context principle (CP) almost inevitably leads to a rejection of the project of giving a completely general explanation of linguistic meaning. I will argue that it is difficult to reconcile CP with any version of the project of giving such an explanation of meaning that does not appeal to semantic terms. I will begin with a short characterization of CP. I will outline the reading of CP which I myself embrace. Then I will briefly characterize the difference between the idea of explaining the meanings of linguistic expressions from outside of any language, and that of doing so from inside of a language. Then I will move on to the main point of my article, arguing that it is difficult to render the consequences of CP compatible with the idea of an explanation of meaning external to all linguistic content.
14
A Fregean conception of singular existence
63%
Sayward C.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
|
2015
|
tom 24
|
nr 1
3–18
EN
A perplexity about singular existence statements (for example, ‘Socrates exists’) is that for their negations to be true their subject terms do not name anything. For example, in ‘Pegasus does not exist’ ‘does not exist’ is not said in respect to the referent of ‘Pegasus’ since there is none. But, then, in respect to what is that said? The paper answers the question by proposing a metalinguistic interpretation of singular existence statements, according to which singular existence statements are about names. It is argued that this interpretation fits in well with Frege’s views on existence, presupposition, and his idea that names have senses.
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