Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

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Edmunda Husserla idea nauki i projekt fenomenologii jako nauki

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Czarnooka M.

Filozofia i nauka. Studia filozoficzne i interdyscyplinarne

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2020

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tom 8/2

57-79

PL

W tym tekście analizuję ideał nauki wypracowany przez Edmunda Husserla w późniejszym okresie jego twórczości, głównie w Medytacjach kartezjańskich i w Kryzysie nauk europejskich. Analiza ta jest drugą częścią rozważań przedstawionych w: M. Czarnocka, Edmunda Husserla idea nauki i projekt fenomenologii jako nauki ścisłej, Filozofia i nauka. Studia filozoficzne i interdyscyplinarne, 7 (2), 2019, s. 247-264. Husserl twierdzi, że przeobrażenie filozofii w naukę ścisłą, główne zamierzenie jego intelektualnej aktywności, wiąże się z reformą wszystkich nauk pozytywnych. Nauki pozytywne są według niego ściśle związane – przez wspólne fundowanie i wspólny ideał – z filozofią. W pracy porównuję też Husserlowski projekt filozofii jako nauki fundamentalnej z trendami obecnie panującymi w filozofii i wielością jej szkól, pól problemowych i metod.

2

Hermeneutyczna charakterystyka pojęcia „Lebenswelt” w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla

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Furman M. , Akademia Pomorska w Słupsku

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tom 18

EN

The subject of this are the considerations concerning the “late” period of Edmund Husserl’s output and the notion of Lebenswelt. Husserl believes that any scientific knowledge, unlike analyses of common experience, requires new formal specification. Ipso facto cognitive absoluteness and its objectivity in a form of the “thing-in-itself” is moved to the background. A man cannot reach definitive cognition in this manner. Therefore cognition of life is the matter of principle.

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Ślady fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla w twórczości Simone Weil

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Fiutak K.

Logos i Ethos

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2020

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tom 53

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nr 1

55-76

EN

The aim of the article is to show and analyze a fairly distinct convergence that occurs between the philosophical thought of Simone Weil and the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl. Weil, inspired by the phenomenological thought, wrote several important texts. The article is to bring closer their content and indicate the originality of the interpretation of the phenomenological thought contained therein.Weil believes that the correct attitude of the cognizing subject consists of three elements: waiting, desire and attention.This attitude is very similar to that which we find in Husserl’s process of phenomenological reduction, the so-called epoché. Weil in her philosophy also uses the phrase la pensée détachée [detached thinking]. This phrase means a thought detached from reality. The form he should take in order to reach the essence of things. According to Weil, we meet with an almost identical attitude in phenomenology, where the subject suspends his judgment about reality, to “watch,” “hear” the essence of a given phenomenon.

PL

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie i analiza pewnej dość wyraźnej zbieżności, jaka zachodzi pomiędzy myślą filozoficzną Simone Weil a metodą fenomenologiczną Edmunda Husserla. Weil zainspirowana myślą fenomenologiczną napisała kilka istotnych – choć mało znanych i częściowo niedostępnych w języku polskim – tekstów poświęconych tej tematyce. Artykuł ma przybliżyć ich treść i wskazać na oryginalność zawartej tam interpretacji myśli fenomenologicznej.Weil uważa, że właściwa postawa podmiotu poznającego składa się z trzech elementów: oczekiwania, pragnienia i uwagi. Postawa ta jest bardzo podobna do tej, którą przyjmuje Husserl w procesie redukcji fenomenologicznej, tzw. epoché. Myślicielka w swej filozofii również posługuje się zwrotem la pensée détachée [oderwane myślenie]. Zwrot ten oznacza myśl oderwaną od rzeczywistości. Formę, jaką powinna ona przyjąć, chcąc dotrzeć do istoty rzeczy. Według Weil, z niemalże identyczną postawą spotykamy się w fenomenologii, gdzie podmiot zawiesza swój sąd o rzeczywistości, aby „oglądać”, „usłyszeć” istotę danego fenomenu.

4

Edmunda Husserla idea nauki i projekt fenomenologii jako nauki ścisłej

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Czarnocka M.

Filozofia i nauka. Studia filozoficzne i interdyscyplinarne

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2019

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tom 7/2

247-264

PL

Śledzę wieloletnie zmagania Edmunda Husserla nad wypracowaniem idei nauki. Idea ta miała dla Husserla kardynalne metafilozoficzne znaczenie: służyła do uformowania właściwej filozofii (fenomenologii), tj. takiej, która ma być ścisłą nauką – nową i wyższą jej postacią. Husserlowska idea nauki nie jest dowolnym projektem indywidualnych badaczy, środowisk uczonych, grup, lecz samą istotą nauki — niezmienną, uniwersalną, niepodlegającą przekształceniom wraz ze zmianami społeczno- kulturowymi, ahistoryczną, niezrelatywizowaną do naukowej praxis.

EN

I investigate Husserl’s long-term research on revealing/constructing a proper idea of science. For Husserl this idea was of tremendous importance: it had to be the basis of forming a (the) proper philosophy (phenomenology), that is, a philosophy which was to be an exact science, a new and higher form of science. According to Husserl, the idea of science is not a free project of individual researchers, scientific communities, but the very essence of science—changeless, universal, nontransformable, non-culturally and socially loaded, ahistorical, and non-relativized to scientific praxis. It was attempt to determine a new status of philosophy which led Husserl’s to the consideration of a universal idea of science.

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Edmund Husserl’s idea of science and the project of phenomenology as a science

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Czarnocka M.

Filozofia i Nauka

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2020

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tom 8

6

Fenomenologia a duchowy wymiar życia

89%

Wesołowska A.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

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2016

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tom 28/1

175-190

EN

The aim of the article is to demonstrate that Husserl’s phenomenology as a science involves problems connected with essence of spiritual life. The spiritual dimension is an important context in the reading of Husserl’s work. This problem affects the specificity of Husserl’s thought and manner of philosophizing. According to Husserl, the fundamental task of philosophy concerns the sphere of spirit and its evolution. In correspondence with the question of the essence of spirit, Husserl’s phenomenology is presented in the perspective of two threads. First, the author consider the problem of spiritual life taken as a life in truth; secondly, a reflection over essence of spirit is understood as a purpose of philosophizing.

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Phenomenology and Its History: A Case Study on Heidegger’s Early Relation to Husserl—and a Plea for the Historical Method in Phenomenology

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Varga P. A.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2015

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nr 3

88-104

EN

In order to better understand the notion of history proper to phenomenology, I un-dertake a brief case study. Namely, I investigate Martin Heidegger’s relation to Edmund Husserl in the years preceding Husserl’s appointment to Freiburg, with a special focus on an occasional writing by Heidegger from 1912. The application of historical method not only dismantles the teleological constructions which mark Heidegger’s own account of his early discovery of Husserl’s phenomenology, but also present a young thinker eager to absorb cutting edge, though not necessarily consistent, developments from contemporaneous philosophy. Heidegger’s early approach could also be conceived as a window onto an elusive brief period of phenomenology before its transformation into a Movement, thereby illustrating the positive contributions of the historical approach to the history phenomenology.

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Primát vizuální zkušenosti při výkladu prostorové povahy zvuků v Husserlových přednáškách "Ding und Raum"

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Nitsche M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2022

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tom 70

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nr 1

5-21

EN

The study critically analyzes Husserl’s interpretations of spatiality in his lectures from 1907, titled “Ding und Raum”. It seeks reasons why these lectures concentrate almost exclusively on visual perception and do not consider the constituting of space by means of auditory perception. He finds these reasons both in the ambivalent interpretation of location (i.e., the insufficiently considered relationship between localization and position) and in the not fully reflected upon conviction that sight is more important for a person in relation to the surrounding environment than is hearing. The study points out the possibility of applying Husserl’s formulated “method of layers” in the course of phenomenological research to sonic environments (assuming the rejection of the primacy of visuality in the interpretation of human experience).

CS

Studie kriticky analyzuje Husserlovy výklady prostorovosti v přednáškách Ding und Raum (1907). Hledá důvody, proč se tyto přednášky soustředí téměř výhradně na vnímání zrakem a není zohledněna konstituce prostoru pomocí sluchového vnímání. Tyto důvody spatřuje jednak v ambivalentním výkladu umístění (tj. nedostatečně promyšleném vztahu mezi lokalizací a polohou) a jednak v ne zcela reflektovaném přesvědčení, že zrak je pro člověka ve vztahu k okolnímu prostředí důležitější než sluch. Studie upozorňuje na možnost aplikace Husserlem formulované „metody vrstev“ při fenomenologickém výzkumu zvukových prostředí (za předpokladu odmítnutí primátu vizuality při výkladu lidské zkušenosti).

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The Missing Pieces of Derrida’s Voice and Phenomenon

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Harman G.

Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture

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2022

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tom 6

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nr 2

4-25

EN

Jacques Derrida’s critique of Edmund Husserl in Voice and Phenomenon targets several ways in which Husserl’s theory of signs is said to remain dependent on a model of presence, and therefore to be a form of onto-theology. In a sense this simply extends Martin Heidegger’s own critique of Husserl as failing to account for what remains obscure behind any presentation to the mind. Yet Derrida’s critique is ultimately more radical than Heidegger’s, though the radicality is in this case unjustified. Namely, Derrida goes beyond Heidegger’s critique of presence to mount an additional critique of “self-presence,” which is more often known as “identity.” Derrida’s insufficiently motivated critique of identity leads to additional problems for his philosophy.

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Od fenomenologů dále, k řeči blíže Nad novou knihou Tomáše Koblížka

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Krásová E.

Svět literatury – Časopis pro novodobé literatury (World of Literature – Journal for Modern Literatures)

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2022

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tom 32

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nr 65

119-128

EN

The text is a review study of Tomáš Koblížek’s book. After an introductory summary of the book, we discuss three main issues: 1) the simplistic conception of Edmund Husserl’s “phenomenology of speech”, 2) the insufficient analysis of basic concepts, especially language as “expression”, 3) the adoption and emphasis of the disjunctive conception of two ways of seeing speech — original and scientific — in the wake of H. Pos. We argue that it is the third issue in particular that undermines the final section of the book, which introduces the conceptual dimension of speech. In Koblížek’s conception, the theorization of ethics becomes possible only by returning to an “originary” consciousness of language and is incompatible with a scientific stance. We suggest that, in our view, the contradiction is not so strong and a merger of the two is — even in the spirit of the “Saussurean postulates” — possible.

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Vnímanie hraníc v čase

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Šterbáková D.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2016

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tom 64

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nr 1

23-43

EN

When we see an object, we see it as bounded and separated from other objects in space. When we hear a sound, we are capable of discerning its beginning, its continuing flow, and its end in time. Despite this, the bounds of sound are not firm, but flow with the sound in time and cannot be fixed. We can perceive other sounds and events synchronously. Do we then perceive the bounds of acustic events on the basis of time, as is commonly supposed? How could the bounds in time not be real, but only notional (conventional), and on the basis of what do we distinguish sounds and silence? This article investigates (i) how we are able to perceive (distinguish) bounds, that is change in the context of a continous perception of sounds; and (ii) whether time enables us to distinguish the perceived event as a delineated whole, or rather as part of the continuous flow of sounds. The first question is developed from Leibniz’s thoughts about the emergence of consciousness, in so far as they issue from the aural model of perception. The second question is put into the context of Husserl’s analysis of the percept of melody and asks whether Husserl’s understanding of aural events (melody) as a whole is compatible with the fact that melodies occur in time gradually.

12

On the Foundational Compatibility of Phenomenology and Thomism

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Wagner D. C.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2021

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tom 10

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nr 3

579-607

EN

Jacques Maritain criticized Husserl’s phenomenological method—the ἔποχή—as being incompatible with the realism of St. Thomas Aquinas. Maritain equated phenomenology with idealism, holding that it universally negates the existence of known objects as things in the world. Not surprisingly, then, a tendency has arisen in the thought of Thomists commenting on Karol Wojtyła’s phenomenological-Thomism to distance Wojtyła’s method from that of Husserl. However, since Wojtyła himself saw fit to appropriate the phenomenological method, Thomists will do well to reevaluate Husserl’s ἔποχή. This study shows that Husserl’s phenomenology is formulated as an Aristotelian science, consciously presupposing the existence of its subject matter and not universally negating the existence of known objects as things in the world. The ἔποχή, thus, is compatible with the realism of the Angelic Doctor, and the phenomenological-Thomism of Karol Wojtyła stands on firm realist ground.

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Musical Works as Ideal Objects: Phenomenology of Music and its Implications for Philosophical Anthropology

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Geniušas S.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2018

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nr 4

231-244

EN

In light of recent studies in the phenomenology of music, the essay engages anew in the classical phenomenological controversy over the ideal status of musical works. I argue that musical works are bound idealities. I maintain that the listener’s capacity to apperceive physical sounds as musical melodies, which can be repeatedly and intersubjectively experienced, accounts for the ideality of musical works. Conceived of as bound idealities, musical works 1) are bound to the acts that sustain them; 2) do not have retroactive validity; 3) are inseparable from their reproductions; 4) are modified by the performances. I conclude with some reflections on the importance of bound idealities for the phenomenologically-oriented philosophical anthropology.

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Husserlovo absolutní vědomí

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Trnka J.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2016

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tom 64

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nr 1

45-57

EN

The article focuses on Husserl’s move from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology, and it attempts to explain what that move to transcendentalism means and what it consists in. It is argued that Husserl’s step does not amount to a wilful turn, or a one-off metaphysical decision, but rather to a systematic thinking-through, and deepening, of the original “psychological” position. The focus on the concept of absolute consciousness at the same time attempts to show that Husserl’s transcendentalism is in no way solipsism, but rather that it involves a committing to the absolute claim of demonstrative self-evidence, which Husserl thinks should be the main theme of all theoretical endeavour.

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Transcendentalizm jako podstawa projektu zradykalizowanego dyskursu metafilozoficznego

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Wawrzynowicz A.

Człowiek i Społeczeństwo

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2022

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tom 53

201-220

EN

The article is a comparative study of selected elements of three philosophical positions which arose on the theoretical underpinning of the concept of transcendental idealism: Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Theory of Knowledge, Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, and Marek J. Siemek’s transcendental philosophy. The primary aims of the study are to examine the epistemological assumptions underlying the three positions, and then critically reconstruct and bring into focus their metaphilosophical component. The article seeks to corroborate the titular thesis that transcendentalism as an epistemological position provides the concepts discussed here with a theoretical framework for a radically conceived interpretation of metaphilosophical discourse.

16

Merleau-Pontyho pojetí těla jako pole strukturace a jeho ontologický význam

75%

Halák J.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2015

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tom 63

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nr 2

197-214

EN

Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the pathology of perception show “objctive” and “subjective” events have sense for the living body only in relation to its whole equilibrium, that is, to how it organises itself overall and how it thus “meets” those events. If we apply this conception to Husserl’s example of two mutually-touching hands of one body we must then state not that we perceive here a coincidence of certain subjective sensations with certain objective qualities, but rather that my body, in the sense of an object, results from a restructuralisation of the whole field of the body accomplished by the body as the performer of perceptual intentions. The body-object, and for the same reasons also the body-subject, is therefore the product of the analysis of the body in the sense of a field of structuralisation or polarisation, not its original phenomenological “stratum”, as in Husserl. If the body grasps itself as perceptible only by a change of its own structure, inasmuch as it is a certain field of structuralisation, then an “external” thing, which is likewise a pole of such grasping, must belong to the same ontological “field” as the body. Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh”, that is the circularity between questioning of perception and answering of the perceived, is thus a phenomenon taking place beyond the boundary of the body as a singular being. This fact allows the concept of flesh to be extended and to be understood as an “element”, that is, as a dimension in which individual beings only appear

17

The Problem of Realism in Andrzej Półtawski’s Phenomenology

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Piekarski M.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2015

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nr 3

151-161

EN

The paper analyzes elements of Andrzej Półtawski’s (Roman Ingarden’s student) realistic position within phenomenology. His views are centred on embodied, dynami-cally understood consciousness.

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Husserlova raná teorie časového vědomí

71%

Janoušek H.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2019

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tom 67

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nr 3

383-401

EN

Husserl’s analysis of inner time consciousness belongs among classic topics of modern philosophy as it is rich in insights and proved to be highly influential for the development of the phenomenology of time. This fact has been appropriately reflected in the scholarly literature on the topic. It is therefore surprising that the account of the early development of Husserl’s thinking about time is not faithful to the actual texts published by him. A closer look at works published by Husserl suggests that he initially used the theory of time consciousness of his teacher Brentano in his first book Philoso- phy of Arithmetics (Philosophie der Arithmetik, 1891) to refute time based accounts of constitution of multiplicities (also called “sets” or “totalities”) and that somewhat later, he tried to improve on it by introducing the concept of representation in his second psychological work “Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic” (“Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik”, 1894). This step opens up a possibility of an analysis of inner time consciousness and allows for differentiation between the retentional unity of time intuition on the one side and perceptional presence of a freshly passed perception of time objects on the other.

DE

Husserls Analyse des inneren Zeitbewusstseins gehört zu Recht zu den klassischen Themen der modernen Philosophie, bietet sie doch einen Reichtum an Perspektiven, die die Entwicklung der Phänomenologie der Zeit beeinflussten. Die Bedeutung dieser Analyse spiegelt sich auch in der großen Menge an Fachliteratur wider, die sich mit diesem Thema auseinandersetzt. Es ist daher auffallend, dass die Interpretation der frühen Entwicklung von Husserls Gedanken zum Thema Zeit nicht den von Husserls selbst veröffentlichten Texten entspricht. Schauen wir uns diese Werke genauer an, so zeigt sich, dass Husserl in seinem ersten Buch, Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), die Theorie des Zeitbewusstseins seines Lehrers Brentano dazu verwendete, um die Theorie der Vielheit (für die auch die Begriffe „Menge“ bzw. „Summe“ verwendet wurden) abzulehnen. Später versuchte er dann, diese Theorie auszubauen, indem er in seinem zweiten Werk zur deskriptiven Psychologie, „Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik“ (1894), den Begriff Repräsentation einführte. Dieser Schritt ermöglichte die Analyse des inneren Zeitbewusstseins und die Unterscheidung einerseits der intentionalen Einheit des Zeitdenkens und andererseits der Gegenwart vergangener Eindrücke zeitlicher Gegenstände.

CS

Husserlova analýza vnitřního vědomí času právem patří mezi klasická témata moderní filosofie. Tento význam se odráží i v množství odborné literatury, která se tomuto tématu věnuje. Výklad raného vývoje Husserlova myšlení o tématu času však není práv textům, které sám Husserl publikoval. Přihlédneme-li blíže k těmto dílům, ukáže se, že Husserl ve své první knize, jíž byla Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), využíval teorii časového vědomí svého učitele Brentana k tomu, aby odmítl teorii mnohosti (pro niž se také užívaly termíny „množina“ či „souhrn“). O něco později pak ve svých „Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik“ (1894) zavedl pojem reprezentace. Tento krok umožnil analýzu vnitřního časového vědomí a odlišení intencionální jednoty časového názoru na jedné straně od spolupřítomnosti právě minulého vjemu časových předmětů na straně druhé.

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Idea of science and the project of phenomenology as exact science — Edmund Husserl

71%

Filozofia i Nauka

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2019

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tom 7

20

Fenomenologia jako nieskończona praca filozofowania

71%

Wesołowska A.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

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2015

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tom 27

117-137

EN

The main aim realized in this article is to present Husserl’s phenomenology as an indefinite work of philosophizing. This interpretation of classic phenomenology is a result of analyses connected with dogmatic and critical in Husserl’s philosophy. Considering the evolution of the Husserl’s thought, phenomenology can be understood as a never fully realized project, outlining a horizon of classic philosophical problems: epistemologic, metaphysical and ethical. Openness and criticism that characterize Husserl’s philosophy are connected with inner dynamism and the process of overestimating dogmatic and critical motives. In the light of the interpretation of phenomenology presented in the paper, Husserl’s project of philosophy can be taken as a never fully realized process of philosophizing.