Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Michel Foucault: nauki niedojrzałe i ich epistemologia

100%

Bytniewski P.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2011

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tom 47

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nr 1(187)

3-28

EN

The paper provides an overview of various perspectives as well as analysis and expectations concerning the concept of 'immature sciences' suggested by I. Hacking in the context of the Michel Foucault's archeology of knowledge. In this context archeology of knowledge is a kind of epistemology situated beyond standard approaches to the sciences, epistemology, whose main question is: 'How is it possible and how should we examine immature sciences?' The main Foucauldian presumption of this question is: 'But what if empirical knowledge, at a given time and in a given culture, did possess a well-defined regularity? If errors and (truths), the practice of old beliefs, including not only genuine discoveries, but also most naive notions, obeyed, at a given moment, the laws of a certain code of knowledge?' Human sciences are the primary field for such an investigations, because of its peculiar history and specific conceptualizations. What is special in their history? Do this notion (immature sciences) suggest that human sciences are immature by their nature, or in the same manner as bygone forms natural sciences. How can these issues be approached in the archeology? What is capacity of archeology of knowledge to answer this questions?

2

CORPOREALITY AND INVOLVEMENT IN EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Cielesnosc i zaangazowanie w perspektywie epistemologicznej)

100%

Kapusta A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2009

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tom 45

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nr 1(179)

67-104

EN

In the paper, the author presents phenomenological ideas of corporeality by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre showing, how living body is experienced and involved in human world. The bounding between body and its environment, as well as its role in creation of intentions and formation of our understanding of the world are of exceptional significance. He shows, what implication such an understanding of the body has for popular in contemporary cognitive science concept of 'representation' as well as for propositional of knowledge . Finally, he tries to show, to what extend phenomenological concept of corporeality of mind is parallel to pragmatists concept of action.

3

Sociolog fascinovaný jedinečným: epistemologie Raymonda Arona

100%

Skovajsa M.

Sociologický časopis. Czech Sociological Review

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2005

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tom 41

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nr 5

841-861

EN

This article analyses the recurring topics in the epistemology of the leading 20th-century French sociologist and political theorist Raymond Aron, drawing on his doctoral dissertation 'Introduction a la philosophie de l'histoire' (1938) and on a range of works he published in his later years. The author first discusses six different reasons for Aron's conspicuous absence from many contemporary handbooks on the social sciences: his deliberate avoidance of developing a system in his work, his disinclination towards abstract theoretising, his lack of interest in empirical research, and his refusal to specialise in one field, and also the changes that occurred in the social scientific context in which his work was received and changes in the surrounding political and social circumstances, most notably the collapse of the communist regimes. The author notes that a major feature in Aron's epistemological thought was his neo-Kantian awareness of the limits of strictly scientific knowledge, which he identified with the domain of causal analysis. The second crucial theme, recurring throughout Aron's work, is the indispensability of philosophy for providing the foundations for social scientific analysis, always in need of being positioned with respect to values. His enduring interest in international relations and contemporary history is taken as an indication of the third basic element of his epistemology: a passion for the analysis of singular events. The author concludes that, given his preoccupation with the singular and the particular, the key, albeit somehow implicit, aspect of his epistemology is the capacity for judgment in the Kantian sense.

4

Stanislaus Ossowski on Differentiation of Views and Disputes in Science

100%

Tuchanska B.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2004

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tom 40

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nr 3(161)

493-502

EN

Stanislaus Ossowski, a Polish philosopher and sociologist and a member of the so-called 'Lwowsko-Warszawska Szkola Filozoficzna' (The Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School) published several papers on science, especially on social sciences. The authoress presents his analysis of the plurality of scientific views that is triggered by the multiplicity of aspects of studied phenomena and the diversity of issues that can be approached by scientists. Plurality of aspects, issues and descriptions leads - unavoidably - to multiplicity of scientific schools and to arguments among them. There are practical disputes referring to hypotheses and explanations that can be settled with the help of rational arguments and empirical data. Finally, there are fundamental divergencies, which seem insoluble because both sides absolutize their views, or indeed are insoluble when participants represent different political aspirations and programs.

5

New Epistemology of Jan Srzednicki. Strategy -not a System -'Incompleteness' as a Theoretical Fact

80%

Zurkowska G.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2004

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tom 40

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nr 3(161)

409-430

EN

Although Srzednicki accepts Wittgenstein's critical conclusion concerning traditional epistemology, he claims that Wittgenstein 'failed to identify the reason for this difficulty, and consequently was unable to proceed further'. A completely new perspective is needed to meet his challenge. However, we have to abandon the idea that there is only one single move to do so or that there is a linear (systematic) way of building such a strategy. By building a complex multilevel architecture of reasoning Srzednicki proves that it is possible to deliver a positive answer to the Kantian question : 'how knowledge is possible at all', if and only if we liberate ourselves from traditional unidimensional way of seeing things. The epistemic questions are 'complex' and cannot be answered 'directly' - they require many subtle logical distinctions and 'indirect' treatment.

6

The Concept of Science of Science of Maria and Stanislaus Ossowski

80%

Bronk A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2004

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tom 40

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nr 3(161)

443-454

EN

When Maria i Stanislaus Ossowski published in 1935 a paper 'Science of Science ', they proclaimed the most universal, uniform and consistent program of the investigation of science (sciences). Their crucial views on the way how to practice an integrated science of science as epistemology and anthropology of science, on the issues characteristic to science of science , on the division of tasks and issues in the science of science, on the problem of autonomy and unity of science of science and on the significance of the science of science itself are presented and discussed. Today the views of Ossowski's are of mainly historical importance. Their notion of unified, universal science of science is no more in general use. The contemporary research in the field of philosophy of science comprises many specialised disciplines dealing, among others, with the structure, functions and logical aspects of science

7

THE UNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE: GALEN ON THE NOTION OF ΤΕΧΝΗ ΣΤΟΧΑΣΤΙΚΗ

80%

Di Piazza S.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2016

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tom 71

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nr 9

779 – 790

EN

In this article we try to show the Galen’s perspective on the epistemological status of medicine, in particular starting from the conceptual category of τέχνη στοχαστική. Even though the qualification of τέχνη στοχαστική attributed to medicine does not have an explicitly negative connotation in Galen’s Corpus, it does occupy a subordinate position compared with the solidity furnished by the more geometrico method, and is almost a necessary evil that Galen introduces to justify that fallibility of medicine, which at the same time he himself tries in every way to minimize.

8

The Problem of the Representation against a Background of the Dispute between Realists and Constructionists

80%

Sikora M.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2005

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nr 3-4

379-398

EN

The paper presents a critical reconstruction of the problem of representation against a background of the dispute between realists and constructionists. It tries to show that a traditional approach to the representation applied in the frames of both positions needs revision today. On the one hand, it is not possible to limit the application of the category only to the relation of mirroring in the knowledge of the empirical world (as realists believe), on the other, however, the representation should not be completely eliminated from the area of present epistemological investigations ( as constructionists claim). Considering these requirements the author proposes the notion of the representation composed with many units with essential role played by teleological factor. .

9

Pragmatism in W.V.O. Quine's Philosophy

80%

Szubka T.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2008

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tom 17

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nr 4(68)

105-116

EN

In various accounts of contemporary and recent philosophy W.V.O. Quine is presented as a towering figure which to a large extent shaped the philosophical landscape of the second half of the twentieth century, at least as far as the Anglo-American philosophy goes. There are, however, two different, and to some extent incompatible, ways of construing his thought in the historical perspective. The prevailing view is that although he was highly critical of logical positivism, and even brought this powerful philosophical movement to an end, he should be seen as a pupil and follower of Rudolf Carnap. Nevertheless taking into account his Harvard milieu, and the concluding paragraph of his famous 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', where Quine declared that by washing out the boundary between the analytic and the synthetic he put forward a more thorough pragmatism, he is quite often portrayed as a characteristically pragmatist thinker. In his later writings Quine distanced himself from the latter construal, insisting that it is not clear to him what it takes to be a pragmatist. He also admitted that his knowledge of classical pragmatism was limited: 'I must say that I have not read widely in it. Some of it came through in a modified form from C. I. Lewis, who taught me during one of my two years of graduate study'. The auyhor thinks that this passing remark is a useful historical hint that can shed a new light on Quine's pragmatism by construing it almost exclusively in the context of Lewis' philosophy, and its distinctively pragmatic features.

10

The Davidson-Quine Dispute on Meaning and Knowledge: A Concise Guide

80%

Marvan T.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

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2007

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tom 16/29

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nr 1

113-128

EN

The paper addresses the debate between Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine on the nature of meanings and knowledge. It is argued that Davidson's misgivings, though interesting, are not devastating for Quine's version of empiricism, which is not easily translatable into traditional philosophical categories.

11

The 'Brains in a Vat' - hypothesis and the internal realism

80%

Kertesz G.

Magyar Filozofiai Szemle (Hungarian Review of Philosophy)

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2004

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tom 48

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nr 4

409-443

EN

This paper investigates Hilary Putnam's famous 'Brains in a vat' hypothesis. In the literature of the problem, it is mostly discussed as an antisceptic hypothesis. It was introduced firstly in 1981 in the book 'Reason, Truth and History'. No doubt it is not self evident at first sight that the real point of the argument is not the refutation of scepticism, but the grounding of the author's own epistemological view. In part he launched an attack on the view he termed 'metaphysical realism', in another part he wanted to ground his own internal realism. The author claims Putnam's argument is imperfect either if we think of his thinking experiment as an antisceptic hypothesis or if in correspondence to the previous approach we investigate it as a review of metaphysical realism. And the last but no less important thing is that it fails to sufficiently support Putnam's own epistemology.

12

HIGH STANDARD EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE APPEAL TO INTUITION

80%

Gasparatou R.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2009

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tom 64

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nr 7

680-692

EN

In the analytic tradition, the appeal to intuition has been a common philosophical practice that supposedly provides us with epistemic standards. The authoress argues that the high epistemological standards of traditional analytic philosophy cannot be pursued by this method. Perhaps within a naturalistic, reliable frame intuitions can be evoked more coherently. Philosophers can use intuition as scientists do, in hypothesis- construction or data- collection. This is an ironic conclusion: Traditional analytic epistemologists rely on the appeal to intuition, but cannot justify it. Naturalists, on the other hand, are not those who need such a method; yet they can better accommodate it within their view.

13

Borderline of Cogitivism and Epistemology and Theory of Teaching

80%

Kruk J.

Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny

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2005

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tom 50

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nr 4(198)

101-112

EN

This article is an attempt to answer the question 'how the teaching theory can benefit from such disciplines as cognitivistics and epistemology?' These two disciplines provide interesting answers to the following questions: 'what is the process of cognition?' and 'what is causality and intentionalism?' Theory of teaching can introduce to its range of interest these categories on the basis of cognition research. It would be an important thread improving our understanding of the process of learning and building knowledge.

14

Knowledge and Artifacts. Barry Allen's Concept of Knowledge

80%

Czarnocka M.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2005

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nr 3-4

351-367

EN

Barry Allen postulates that the unit of knowledge is artifact and rejects traditional idea that knowledge consists of true, justified beliefs. Analysis of Allen's concept of knowledge, being a restrictive form of pragmatism, shows that the epistemological change proposed by him is radical to a great degree. Allen neglects all important epistemological distinctions and categories. The concept is rooted in a different culture, activist and one-sidedly pragmatic, far from this one ( which emerged from the ancient Greek ideas) that constitutes a basis for all traditional epistemological models of knowledge.

15

K NIEKTORÝM SÉMANTICKÝM A KOGNITÍVNYM ASPEKTOM VLASTNÝCH MIEN

80%

Zouhar M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2006

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tom 61

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nr 4

265-280

EN

The paper deals with the understanding of proper names. Though the theme goes across various disciplines - e.g. semantics, epistemology, psychology - the paper examines only selected semantic and cognitive aspects of the problem. The question runs: How should we comprehend the thesis of understanding a proper name as knowing what the name refers to? What kind of knowledge is involved here? The question is posed within the direct reference theory framework enriched by the notion of singular proposition and the compositionality principle. The distinction between an expression and an utterance of it is accepted and the original question is split up accordingly. As for expressions (as ideal signs), to understand a proper name is to grasp a meaning axiom along the lines of D. Davidson and J. McDowell. As for utterances of expressions, to understand an utterance of a proper name is to know a piece of information concerning the referent of the name; ideally, it is a fact that can be expressed by an identity statement claiming that the referent of the name under discussion is identical with the individual about which the speaker has a mental file at her disposal.

16

Fiction czy non-fiction? Uwagi na marginesie pewnego sporu

80%

Chomiuk A.

Białostockie Studia Literaturoznawcze

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2013

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tom 4

233-249

EN

The article, being part of the debate on cognitive assumptions of the nonfiction literature is a polemic with the theses of Paweł Zajas’s work Jak świat prawdziwy stał się bajką: O literaturze niefikcjonalnej. (How the real world has become a fable. On nonfiction literature), questioning, in reference to Lejeune’s referential pact, the epistemological dimension of a part of modern reportage literature.

17

O zmysłach i postrzeganiu – czyli czego nie wiemy o Berkeleyu, a dowiadujemy się od Smitha i vice versa

80%

Markwart A. , Szymańska M.

Filo-Sofija

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2012

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tom 12

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nr 2(17)

147-154

EN

Adam Smith’s epistemology, described primarily in the essay Of the External Senses, was strongly inspired by George Berkeley’s thought expressed in his New Theory of Vision (1709). Both philosophers distinguished between the Objects of Sight and the Objects of Touch and analyzed the perception of distance between objects and size of objects (Berkeley’s thorough analysis was limited to the sense of sight, whereas Smith described also the features of other senses.). They also noticed the observer’s role in the process. Both philosophers made a parallel between their epistemology and moral/ social theories. However, their conclusions turned out to be quite different, despite some similarities in their views on the problem of external senses. Smith focused on the issue of sympathy and the Impartial Spectator, and underlined the fact that our moral judgements are strongly altered by our relation to those who are judged and that we learn how to give opinions on the basis of how others judge our behaviour. Berkeley, on the other hand, focused on the role of laws and reason in both epistemological and moral judgements.

18

PROPOZIČNÍ SÉMANTIKA WALTERA BURLEYHO

80%

Varga J.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2016

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tom 71

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nr 6

474 – 486

EN

This article deals with Walter Burley’s (1275 – 1344) propositional semantics. Its aim is to examine his notion known as propositio in re (i.e. real proposition). All his relevant texts written between 1297 and 1337 are taken into account, first of all his commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation and Posterior Analytics. This study is divided into three parts: in the first one an old controversy concerning the subject of logic is mentioned, as well as Burley’s own answer to it; the second part sheds light on Burley’s early articulation of his propositional theory; the final part focuses on the definitive explanation and justification of this theory from his last commentary on the Ars vetus from 1337.

19

EPISTEMOLOGY AND SCIENCE. INTEGRALISM OR SEPARATISM (Epistemologia a nauka. Integralizm albo separatyzm)

80%

Pobojewska A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2009

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tom 45

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nr 2(180)

145-154

EN

Epistemology, confronted with a rapid development of individual branches of science, has been pressed to establish its own status and position as well as to define its relation with science. The multiple perspectives on this issue can be grouped into two major positions: integralism (postulates a close co-existence between epistemology and science) and separatism (argues in favour of a full independence of science and epistemology). In the paper, the authoress analyses the two views and tries to prove that the debate between integralism and separatism cannot be resolved, as the two approaches belong to different and incompatible philosophical traditions: analytical and transcendental. In the article, these issues are examined, and arguments in favour of the separatist view are offered. It is argued for clear separation of epistemology from science.

20

Theory of Epistemic Valuation:The Logic of Valuation

80%

Hajduk Z.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2005

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tom 41

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nr 1(163)

15-24

EN

The problems connected with the issue of valuation in selected sections of philosophical logic were presented and the substantial elements of those sections of logic, which are taking a related view of valuation, were included as well. These problems should be preceded with remarks, which constitute the draft of the theory of valuation and values in science. In this preparatory framework the evaluative character of R. Carnap's, K.R. Popper's, and Th. S. Kuhn's methodology is stressed. These methodological theories report the process of valuation, which is present in science, and the methods of determination of the epistemic usefulness. The primary and the secondary values of science and the pluralistic conception of values should also be discussed. In this context, current discussions on the well-known thesis of axiological neutrality of science (M. Weber) should also be taken into consideration. A few essential axiological problems formulated in the perspective of philosophical logic have been considered and presented. Among them are: 1. Involved in that set of problems three sections of non-classical ( philosophical) logic; 2. The logic of absolute and comparative valuation; 3. The logical structure of valuation - four elements are distinguished here; 4. The opposition between the description and the valuation from semiotic point of view; 5. The valuation as one of the epistemic categories; 6. Formal and substantial or material conditions of the rationality of such conceptions.