Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Ograniczanie wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 2

Liczba wyników na stronie

Wyniki wyszukiwania

Wyszukiwano:
w słowach kluczowych: EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

Sortuj według:

Ogranicz wyniki do:

PROPER NAMES AND APOSTERIORITY OF IDENTITY STATEMENTS

100%

Cmorej P.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

2006

tom 13

nr 4

481-494

The author of the article seeks to find an answer to the question whether it is possible to determine a priori the truth value of the statement 'M = N' where 'M' and 'N' are proper names of the same particular. He analyses the argumentation of the conception defending the positive answer to the question and tries to present arguments in favor of the opposite view. Let us suppose that the individual 'I' is named by 'M' at time 't1' and by 'N' at time 't2'. If the individual changes considerably during the interval (t1, t2) or presents us from quite different sides at 't1' and 't2', respectively (e.g., as a mountain seen from different sides at the respective time moments), we will be unable to find out a priori, without certain empirical knowledge, whether 'M = N', although there were any doubts about the identity of the baptized individual neither at 't1' nor at 't2'.

WITTGENSTEIN ON KNOWLEDGE AND OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY (Wittgenstein o wiedzy i pewnosci obiektywnej)

75%

Czesna E.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

2009

nr 9

In 'On Certainty' Wittgenstein describes the valid uses of 'I know'. On the one hand, he criticizes Moore for relating 'I know' to certainties (hinge propositions) of our world picture (certainties such as 'I have two hands', 'The earth existed long before my birth', 'Cats do not grow on trees'). He argues (against Moore) that saying 'I know that I have two hands' in standard circumstances is nonsensical since it yields no information. On the other hand, Wittgenstein himself occasionally uses the verb 'to know' with reference to the said certainties. The author argues that it is not a contradiction on the account provided in his investigations. The critique of Moore's utterances in 'On Certainty' focuses on Moore's attempt to make assertions about reality, i.e. to voice empirical knowledge, while being hardly concerned with grammatical or practical knowledge. The author reckons that apart from some epistemic uses of 'to know' (know-that), Wittgenstein allows some non-epistemic uses of this verb (know-how). In the second listed meaning, 'I know' could be replaced by: 'You can absolutely rely on it; there is no doubt about it', 'It makes, in this case, no sense to talk of a doubt', 'I shall act with a certainty that rules out all doubt, in accordance with my belief'. Shortly speaking, 'I know' can express objective certainty (if, of course, there is a grammatical place for such an expression in our practice). Objective certainty, which is the subject of Wittgensteinian investigations, can be interpreted in terms of practical knowledge (know-how).