Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

„NEŠŤASTNÉ VEDOMIE“ V KIERKEGAARDOVOM ZVODCOVOM DENNÍKU

100%

Uršič M.

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nr 5

409 – 415

EN

The article tries to show the role and importance of Kierkegaard’s writing The Seducer’s Diary in the frame of his fundamental work Either / Or. What is under scrutiny is not only the dilemma between aesthetical and ethical consciousness, but also the “unhappy consciousness”. The latter has in Kierkegaard – contrary to Hegel’s definition of this concept – strong existential connotations.

2

Kant and the Problem of Self-Consciousness

80%

Frank M.

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2004

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tom 13

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nr 4(52)

263-274

EN

The point of departure in the paper is the problem of identification of the foundations of knowledge, its beginning and status in modern philosophy (Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Hume, Fichte, Chisholm, Shoemaker). The author undertakes an analysis of the position taken by Kant in the context of the problem of transcendental deduction of categories and its fundamental principle - the transcendental unity of apperception. He focuses on the connection between transcendental apperception with pre-predicative existence of pure consciousness and intellectual insight. Kant held that consciousness is a result of the self-referring operation of auto-reflection. This means that self-consciousness is not some kind of knowledge, nor is it any sort of mental content through which it would be possible to identify the subject.

3

PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS AN EVOLUTIONARY INVENTION: EXPLAINING THE POSITIVE FUNCTION OF ILLUSIONISM

80%

Marcinčinová K.

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2024

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tom 79

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nr 2

195 – 211

EN

The article’s main objective is to analyse the positive aspect of illusionism and the so-called “illusion problem” that lies at its heart – the problem of explaining the origin and causes of the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that a key aspect of the illusion problem is explaining the function of the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. Some authors suggest that the illusion probably has no particular function but is a by-product of introspection. Whereas others have pointed out that it has played an important role in the evolution of consciousness. I focus on Nicholas Humphrey’s evolutionary theory of consciousness, “phenomenal surrealism,” in emphasizing this crucial part of the illusionist program.

4

INGARDEN'S REALISM

80%

Poltawski A.

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tom 36

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nr 2

5-14

EN

In his attempt to analyze the problem of realism, Ingarden started from the Husserlian distinction between the world and 'pure consciousness'. Nevertheless, he rejected all the ontological - or rather metaphysical - features attributed to consciousness by Husserl, while at the same time he was convinced of the indubitability of our knowledge of the basic characteristics of it as a sort of being existent inside the human person. If he had resigned from this epistemological feature of a privileged access, he would have had to grant that we do not need to seek a proof of the existence of the world at all. Other ways in which Ingarden tried to elucidate the problem of being - in the first place the problem of human nature - led him to the sphere of free persons. Understanding our knowledge of this sphere demands an understanding of the human senses in a dynamic and holistic way and the acceptance of a personal model of the world as the basis of our knowledge. The 'primary data' of our experience are, in fact, human persons; they are the paradigm of independent being and full realism means accepting them as similar to us, as free creatures.

5

THE CONCEPTS OF MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM (Podstawy abhidharmicznej koncepcji umyslu. Pojecie swiadomosci)

80%

Szymanski M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2009

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nr 9

143-161

EN

According to Abhidharma thinkers mind is a set of many mental elements (dharmas). All these elements were regarded as impermanent. The basic dimension of the diachronically considered mind was believed to be a continuous succession of consciousness (citta) elements. They were believed to lie at the foundation of any psychical activity. They were to be accompanied by other mental elements (called caitasika) to determine the nature of cognitive, emotional and volitional activity of the mind at any given moment. Among them they recognised dharmas unavoidably accompanying citta elements (feelings, elements of attention, conceptual identifications, volitions etc.). The mind was apparently treated as an integral whole which is signified by the conviction that every mental dharma is adjusted to the character of the other simultaneous mental elements. Such a combination of mental dharmas was believed to determine the content of the mind in the succeeding moment (i.e. to bring about the new set of mental elements before it ceases), which is effected with such participating factors as karmic compensation and the influence of the environment.

6

SARTROV POJEM INTENCIONALITY OPTIKOU AKTUÁLNYCH SKÚMANÍ

80%

Smreková D.

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tom 62

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nr 5

457-467

EN

The paper deals with those current Sartrean researches, which are concerned with Sartre's early phenomenological writings. The researchers involved see the latter as important as Sartre's later fundamental works. Their interpretations go beyond the view traditional of those works. Beside Sartre as a philosopher of subjectivity they try to emphasize the 'other' Sartre, who is concerned with the power 'of things' and the potential abilities of the consciousness deprived of ego as the uniting centre of experience. Adopting this perspective requires to resort to his conception of intentionality. It is necessary to comprehend, how the world oriented consciousness with its typical compulsory self-transcendence becomes also self-consciousness due to the experience of the sense of the given. The issue under question is not only the profit brought by this process, but also the loss involved in such approach to consciousness.

7

DENNETTOVA NATURALISTICKÁ KONCEPCIA VEDOMEJ SKÚSENOSTI

80%

Sklutová K.

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2021

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tom 76

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nr 9

674 – 687

EN

The main aim of the study is to analyse key features of Dennett’s naturalistic conception of conscious experience. The paper proceeds from the assumption that Dennett’s primary intention is the naturalization of consciousness through the so-called “Hard Question”: And then what happens? The structure of the text consists of two main levels of Dennett's naturalistic program: a) negative level – rejection of the Cartesian model of consciousness, b) positive level – formulation of the multiple drafts model. I assume that examining these levels will justify the importance of the Hard Question, thus contributing to a better understanding of Dennett's naturalization of conscious experience.

8

DILEMMA ABOUT THE MENTAL

80%

Elpidorou A. , Dove G.

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tom 28

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nr 4

867 - 895

EN

Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing one—viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a scientifically derived physical theory—is met with serious trouble. Proponents of physicalism can either appeal to current physical theory or to some future physical theory (preferably an ideal and complete one). Neither option is promising: currentism almost assuredly renders physicalism false and futurism appears to render it indeterminate or trivial. The purpose of this essay is to argue that attempts to characterize the mental encounter a similar dilemma: currentism with respect to the mental is likely to be inadequate or contain falsehoods and futurism leaves too many significant questions about the nature of mentality unanswered. This new dilemma, we show, threatens both sides of the current debate surrounding the metaphysical status of the mind.

9

Świadomość mityczna jako problem filozoficzny

80%

Ples M.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

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2012

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tom 24

5-18

EN

The article Mythical consciousness as a philosophical problem is an at- tempt to analyze the subjective reflection of a myth that is concentrated on such notions as: “mythical consciousness”, “mythical imagination”, “mythical thought” or “logic of myth”. The analysis shows the main theses and pro- blems of subjective reflection of the myth, based on philosophical theories (E. Cassirer, L. Kołakowski) and also on the concepts which developed in the area of the cultural anthropology (B. Malinowski, L. L´evy-Bruhl, J.G. Frazer, C. L´evi-Strauss).

10

Reprezentacja, milczenie, inny. Od samowiedzy przedmiotowej do samoświadomości transcendentalnej w psychologii opisowej Franza Brentany

80%

Moroz K.

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nr 2

5 - 23

EN

In this paper I use the distinction between self-consciousness as an object of expe-rience and self-consciousness as the subject of experience proposed in Peter-Rudolf Horstmann's article „The Limited Significance of Self-Consciousness" in order to analyse Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology. The result of this analysis can be expressed in three theses: 1) Every self-consciousness is the consciousness of another self-consciousness. If there is self-consciousness, we have the essential conditions for it to know another self-consciousness. 2) Every self-knowledge is knowledge about another self-knowledge. I cannot know anything about myself which could not lead to knowledge about another. Even if the self-knowledge is not propositional, it is not an exclusive and unique fact. 3) Every objective self-knowledge is also non-objective self-knowledge. Selfconsciousness cannot be reduced to empirically tested features because it is always something more.

11

ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITY OF FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE BUDDHIST PATH OF SELF-REALIZATION

80%

Koehler B.

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nr 8

101-112

EN

The following publication specified the subject from the perspective of Abhidhamma - the Buddhist empirical study of personality. From the starting point of a structure of consciousness and a classification of factors (cetasika) of consciousness the authoress outlines the psychological dimension of Buddha's science. The fundament of Buddhist psychology is a dynamic process of transformation of individual consciousness (bhavanga-sota) on the Buddhist path (atthangika magga). The positive (kusala//sobhana)-, negative (akusala)- and neutral (annasamana) factors of consciousness determine the creative act of evolution of spirit. The aim of the immediate experience (meditation) is to eliminate the negative (akusala) factors of consciousness. On the highest (lokuttara) levels of consciousness negative (akusala) factors of consciousness do not subsist.

12

Freud and Kant: Two Conceptions of Subject and Self

70%

Dybel P.

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2004

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tom 13

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nr 4(52)

287-302

EN

The starting point of the article is the assumption that the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud grows from a new conception of the subject and the self, different from the conception used by Kant. The author tries to make his point by analysing selected fragments of one of the first publications by Freud 'Entwurf einer Psychologie'. It is clear in that work that Freud already had at that time his own idea of the psychic apparatus, and that it consisted of three different systems: consciousness, pre-consciousness and unconsciousness. In this proposal the synthesising operation of consciousness, which is the home of the self, can be reduced to a specific 'defence activity' which protects the self from the loose process of shifting and condensing imagery (the original process) that occurs in the unconsciousness. This approach presupposes, first, new understanding, previously unknown to German idealism, of the subject that does not function as the ultimate foundation of all psychic processes but is engaged in interpreting the original process by rearranging its imagery in a loose and spontaneous manner. Secondly, the synthesising function of the self can no longer be explained as a process of reaffirming one's self-identity - which was presupposed in the Kantian concept of transcendental unity of apperception - but must be seen as a synthesising activity that occurs at the level of the original process by repeated efforts to select and repress its imagery

13

DOES THE CONCEIVABILITY OF ZOMBIES ENTAIL THEIR POSSIBILITY?

70%

Polcyn K.

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nr 3

395 – 410

EN

According to the two-dimensional argument against materialism, developed by David Chalmers, the conceivability of zombies entails primary possibility, and the primary possibility of zombies entails further secondary possibility. I argue that the move from the conceivability to primary possibility of zombies is unjustified. Zombies are primarily impossible despite being conceivable if the corresponding phenomenal and microphysical concepts have coinciding primary intensions (refer to the same properties in all possible worlds considered as actual) despite being distinct concepts. But there is no good reason to think that phenomenal and microphysical concepts cannot have coinciding primary intensions despite being distinct concepts. As I argue, this conclusion follows from reflection on special cognitive features of phenomenal concepts.

14

Wewnętrzna świadomość czasu muzycznego w ujęciu Edmunda Husserla

70%

Krawiec A.

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tom 45

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nr 3

27-48

EN

The article discusses the problem of musical time presented in Edmund Husserl's On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. The author of this article aims to describe the basic properties of immanent time on the basis of an analysis of the musical, resp. sound examples given by Husserl. Husserl's reflections on inner time-consciousness – preceding Roman Ingarden's examination of musical time included in The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity – constitute an important stage in the reflections on immanent time in a musical work. The article, as a study belonging to the phenomenology of music, is a critical analysis of the basic terms of phenomenology of time, such as original impressions, retention, protention, consciousness, perception, and intentionality.

15

A PROBLEM WITH OBJECTS OF IMAGINATION AND THEIR APPEARENCES (Problem wygladów przedmiotu wyobrazonego)

70%

Zuchowski P.

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tom 37

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nr 3

223-244

EN

The article consists of four parts. In the first three parts the author investigates Husserl's and Ingarden's theses concerning the appearances of objects of perception and imagination. Though Ingarden's concept differs from Husserl's in some important respects, both philosophers agree that objects of imagination present themselves to our consciousness via appearances. According to Husserl only acts of immanent perception do not require appearances to present their object. As far as Ingarden's concept is concerned, the necessity of appearances stems from the thesis of the transcendence of intentional objects. In part four the author argues that objects of imagination, in opposition to real spatio-temporal objects, cannot present themselves through appearances, thus an object of perception is nothing more than its 'appearances'. In turn his arguments are pointed against the thesis of the transcendence of intentional objects and go in the direction of a critique of their (double) subject-properties structure.

16

Neurofenomenologia: zaproszenie do dyskusji

70%

Gładziejewski P.

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2010

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tom 1

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nr 1

169-177 (en: 179–189)

EN

No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain is turned into a wine of consciousness” is now among the mainstream problems of cognitive science.

17

DOES EPISTEMIC SUBJECTIVITY HAVE MORAL IMPORT?

70%

Boltuc P.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2007

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nr 6

5-23

EN

We start from the basics: there is a meaning of the notion of epistemic subject under which it is not an object at all. This statement does not lead to dualism of substance; it fits with any sort of non-reductionism. What follows is that we assume certain subjects that are not objects, hence entities that we can't build direct predicative statements about. Whatever we can say about them comes indirectly, from the influence subjects have on certain objects. Hence, loosely speaking, subjectivity can be viewed as a feature of certain ontological entities (objects), such as persons. But an ontology of pure subjects is possible, based on the indirect influences they have. Such ontology of subjects that are not objects allows us to have subjects consistently as a part, though a very specific one, of the ontological furniture of the world. The author also claims that subjectivity is what, prima facie, deserves a moral standing though only certain additional capacities make a being a moral patient.

18

Lost in time: a historical frame, elementary processing units and the 3-second window

70%

Poppel E.

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nr 3

295-301

EN

The main topics of time and timing in psychology, cognitive neuroscience and biology have been formulated already in the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, time and timing as a challenging topic has been put to rest for quite some time, but has become a central issue again during the last years. It has become clear, that perceptual or cognitive processes can only be understood if the dimension of time is taken more seriously. The reduction of complexity in neuronal systems is for instance, achieved by temporal integration mechanisms which are independent of the content of a percept or a cognitive act but are presemantical operations. It is essential to distinguish between content functions and logistical functions that provide presemantically defined temporal frames for mental activity.

19

DARWIN BICENTENARY: ON THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL CONSCIOUSNESS (Darwin bicentenarium: a szemelyes tudat evoluciojarol)

70%

Adam G.

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nr 3

513-528

EN

The paper contains the abridged lecture delivered by the invitation of the Hungarian Psychological Association in honour of the bicentennial birthday of Charles Darwin (1809). The results obtained following the examination of the sensations starting from the human small and large intestines have guided the author to the realization of the possibility of rendering conscious the unconscious, through electrophysiologically detectable impulses originating from the gut, by the help of learning. The article is a short summary of the author's theory according to which personal awareness and the non-conscious domain are complementary psychic phenomena steadily in transition from each-other. The twin conscious- unconscious signals can be regarded as important steps in the process of Darwinian selection. They indicate the priority of the human race in evolution and at the same time they represent a stable relief from the burden of adaptation to the natural and social environment. Some of the ideas of the present study have been outlined earlier in this Journal (58 (2003) No.2), as well as in the Hungarian book 'A rejtozködo elme' (The hiding mind', Vince Kiadó, 2004).

20

Ogólne pojęcie świadomości w filozofii tybetańskiej. Uwagi filozoficzno-filologiczne

70%

Przybysławski A.

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tom 45

|

nr 2

95-109

EN

The text is an inquiry into the concept of consciousness in the Buddhist philosophy of Tibet. The point of departure is an analysis of the verb 'shes' – to know, to be conscious of. These philological considerations will help us to understand the model of non-volitional consciousness which is defined in terms of two non-volitional acts, namely the acts of awareness and receptivity. The text provides also a general division of consciousness in Tibetan philosophy.