Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Kłopoty z Davidsonem, czyli „O pojęciu schematu pojęciowego” inaczej

100%

Godlewski R. P.

Filo-Sofija

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2008

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tom 8

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nr 8

207-223

EN

In his article “On the very idea of the conceptual scheme”, Davidson rejected the dualism of content and conceptual scheme. The article is hard to understand for the following reasons: 1. Davidson seems to claim that the third dogma of empiricism is independent from the first one; 2. he seems to maintain that the idea of conceptual scheme may have sense even when the notion of meaning is rejected; 3. he does not fight conceptual relativism arguing that it breaks the principle of contradiction or that incommensurable conceptual schemes cannot speak about the same; 4. he considers only the question of how to identify an alien scheme at another person but passes over the possibility that one person has a few schemes; 5. contrary to his previous statements, he says that translatability is not necessary for the concept of conceptual scheme but in return he gives a few metaphors only.

2

FROM THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN TO RADICAL CONCEPTUAL DIVERSITY

100%

Edward T. R.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2015

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tom 22

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nr 1

3 - 8

EN

This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.

3

RELATIVISM AND ALETHIC FUNCTIONALISM

100%

Zeman D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2007

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tom 14

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nr 1

53-71

EN

The essay is an attempt to offer a version of the conceptual relativism that escapes Donald Davidson's (widely thought) decisive criticisms of the notion of 'conceptual scheme'. Two variants of relativism are distinguished, a weaker and a stronger one. The concrete proposal involves accepting a version of 'alethic' pluralism. After discussing 'alethic' pluralism in general, and after exploring both strong and weak versions of it, a suitable version is presented: 'alethic' functionalism. The final part offers an illustration of how embracing 'alethic' functionalism may help the relativist.

4

Prawda, schemat pojęciowy i świat

88%

Orlewski B.

Filo-Sofija

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2007

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tom 7

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nr 7

181-205

EN

In my article I criticize the conception which says that the conceptual character of human cognition makes false the theory of truth understood as a kind of correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker. Arguing against the conceptions of Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty and Andrzej Szahaj, I defend the claim that the conceptual character of human cognition is irrelevant to the critique of correspondence theories of truth. I justify this claim with the example of Nicholas Rescher’s conception of conceptual idealism, which is similar to the internal realism of Hilary Putnam but does not rule out the truth as a kind of correspondence.

5

Dilema schématu a skutečnosti v sociologické teorii

88%

Balon J.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

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2008

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tom 17/30

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nr 3-4

185-199

EN

The idea of conceptual scheme is clearly present in the classical and modern sociological theory. However, contemporary sociological thinking is highly critical of it and in its radical versions this idea is dismissed altogether. This article traces various historically formed insights into the nature of concept formation in sociology and tries to demonstrate that without the attempts at creating a coherent conceptual scheme, sociology would be deprived of any possibility to push through a specifically sociological perspective on the social world. Talcott Parsons' conceptual level of theory is examined in detail and taken as an example of a viable theoretical approach based on the transformation of sociological concepts. The account of the sociological dilemma of scheme and reality is brought together with Donald Davidson's argument against the dogma of scheme and reality. The idea of a conceptual scheme has been discredited in contemporary thinking together with the idea and the project of (grand) general theory of society. It is argued that from the generalizing critique of the idea of general theory it does not follow that sociology does not need sound concepts. If it were so then no sociological knowledge that would not refer only to itself would be possible.

6

The Theory of Action: Talcott Parsons and After

75%

Balon J.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

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2009

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tom 31

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nr 2

41-70

EN

This article focuses on the problems and contradictions of sociological theories of action. It investigates critically the development of the theory of action after the Parsonian synthesis, drawing attention to the limitations of articulating the concept of action systematically within a presuppositional framework of analytical theory. Having exposed Parsons general theory of action and some interpretations and criticisms, the paper addresses the so-called 'return of grand theory', spearheaded in the early 1980s by authors such as Alexander, Habermas, Giddens and Luhmann. The article analyses the conceptual innovations introduced by their theories according to Parsons own definition of theoretical work, which - as he said - consists in reconstruction and transformation of categories in the moments of their failure. While it is argued that sociological theory cannot do away with general concepts, it is also argued that these need not have the form of a synthetic theory of action of the kind outlined by Parsons and the Post-Parsonians.