Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

HISTORICKÝ FAKT, REALIZMUS A KONŠTRUKTIVIZMUS

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Zeleňák E.

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2009

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tom 64

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nr 7

625-633

EN

The aim of the paper is to discuss the definition of the fact presented by Vaclav Cernik. At first, the author outlines the views of the defenders of the naive realism, constructivism (or narrativism), and critical realism in historiography. The leading proponents of narrativism hold that what the historians construe are not single facts, but general narrative interpretations. The second part offers a critical analysis of some notions and distinctions introduced by Cernik in his theory of the social fact. The most questionable is his concept of observation statements and his way of differentiation between observational and theoretical statements. The author's conclusion is that the most reliable is the middle ground between naive realism and constructivism in their radical forms.

2

PREKONÁVANIE RELATIVIZMU V SÚČASNEJ FILOZOFII HISTÓRIE

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Zeleňák E.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2021

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tom 76

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nr 1

18 – 30

EN

During the last decades, narrativism has been one of the most influential approaches in the philosophy of history. Proponents of this movement argue that historical works are not faithful descriptions of the past reality but rather original constructions or interpretations of historians. The views of narrativists have been criticized for being relativistic. For it seems that on their view historians may shape the same data using various interpretative frameworks or conceptual schemes and this leads to plurality in history. In recent years several authors, including Paul Roth and Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, developed some of the points and conclusions of narrativism. Although these authors are inspired by narrativism, they significantly change understanding of historical works and that is why their accounts avoid relativism. The aim of this paper is to show that these authors overcome relativism. Dualism of content and form, as Donald Davidson puts it, supports conceptual relativism. Since Roth and Kuukkanen avoid this dualism in their understanding of history, they overcome conceptual relativism in current philosophy of history.

3

O DVOCH POHĽADOCH NA NARATÍVNU EXPLANÁCIU

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Zeleňák E.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2010

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tom 65

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nr 8

762-769

EN

The paper deals with one of the central topics of the philosophy of history - the narrative. Two different views of narrative and consequently of narrative explanation are distinguished. According to the first position (defended, for instance, by Hayden White), reality itself does not have a narrative structure, but since we are familiar with the narrative form, we can explain events if we present them as a story of a particular kind. According to the second position (maintained, for instance, by David Carr), in order to explain, we need to capture real connections (narrative or other) between events. That is, our narratives should depict structures already present in reality. The paper outlines these two general views and points out to the fact that they are based on different ontological presuppositions and different views of the nature of the explanatory power of narrative.

4

NA POČIATKU BOL MODEL POKRÝVAJÚCEHO ZÁKONA

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Zeleňák E.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2007

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tom 62

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nr 9

934-845

EN

The paper deals with the covering-law model of explanation as formulated by Carl Hempel and the role it plays in the area of philosophy of explanation. The first part of the paper begins with the exposition of the model and finishes with emphasizing some of its most important features, such as its non-causal and non-pragmatic character and the thesis of the symmetry of explanation and prediction. The main goal of the second part is to show that the covering-law model is the starting point in the modern discussion about explanation. Therefore, without a proper understanding of Hempel's model it is impossible to correctly appreciate the subsequent developments in the area of philosophy of explanation.

5

AKO DAVIDSON PRISTUPUJE K UDALOSTIAM

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Zeleňák E.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2008

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tom 63

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nr 8

683-694

EN

The aim of the paper is to present Davidson's account of events and to show his semantic way of approaching this metaphysical issue. The author outlines Davidson's views on action sentences and other parts of natural language, which led him to postulating a special variable for events, i.e. in event ontology. Secondly, the author gives a brief summary of the most important views presented in the discussion on events and their nature. On this background the uniqueness of Davidson's approach is highlighted. Finally, the author emphasizes the difference between semantic and metaphysical approaches to events and argues that Davidson is primarily interested in the semantics of the natural language. His argumentation concerning the nature of events is based on the latter. In the author's view this type of semantic approach to a metaphysical topic is one-sided and it may suffer from the shortcomings mentioned in conclusion.