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Radzieckie/rosyjskie dostawy broni i uzbrojenia konwencjonalnego do Syrii w latach 1955–2012 – podejście ilościowe

100%

Dmochowski T.

Nowa Polityka Wschodnia

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2014

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tom 2(7)

75-102

EN

Gaining by Syria independence from France in 1946 and the rise of the State of Israel supported by Western countries, which from the beginning was in the political and military conflict with the Arab states, created for the Soviet Union the new possibilities of the political game in the Middle East. From 1955 to 1991, USSR became the main supplier of conventional arms to Syria (displacing the United Kingdom). In the years 1955–1991 Syria bought in the Soviet Union arms for $ 34.6 billion in SIPRI trend indicator values , which accounted for 8.04% of the value of the total Soviet arms sales during this period. After the collapse of the USSR cooperation in this regard was continued and throughout the years 1992–2012 Russia remained the main and dominant arms supplier to Syria, though not on this scale as earlier. However, especially the 90s of the twentieth century meant a huge setback in comparison to the previous period – then delivery has been completed of diesel engines for the modernization of tanks ordered in Soviet Union, and 3,000 antitank guided missiles were ordered in Russia. In the years 1992–2012 Russia has sold Syria arms for $ 1.254 billion SIPRI trend indicator values , which accounted for 1.21% of the total sales of Russian arms and weapons of 103.393 billion $.

RU

Получение Сирией независимости от Франции в 1946 году и создание государства Израиль, поддерживаемого западными странами, который с самого начала был в военном и политическом конфликте с арабскими государствами, создало СССР возможность политической игры на Ближнем Востоке. С 1955 по 1991 год, основным поставщиком оружия в Сирию становится СССР (вытесняя Великобританию). В 1955–1991 годы Сирия закупила в Советском Союзе оружие за $ 34,6 млрд. значения тренд-индикатора SIPRI (выраженные в млн. долл. США в постоянных ценах 1990 г.), на долю которых приходится 8,04% от стоимо сти продажи советского оружия в этот период. После распада СССР сотрудничествo в этом отношении былo продолженo и на протяжении многих лет (1992–2012) Россия оставалась главным и доминирующим поставщиком оружия в Сирию, хотя и не в таких масштабах как ранее. Тем не менее, особенно 90-e годы ХХ века оказались огромной неудачей по сравнению с предыдущим периодом – завершено поставки заказаных еще в Cоветском Союзе дизельных двигателей для модернизации танков, в России заказанo 3000 противотанковых управляемых ракет. В 1992–2012 годы Россия продала Сирии оружие стоимость $ 1,254 млрд. значения тренд-индикатора SIPRI, на долю которых приходится 1,21% от общего объема продажи российского оружия общей стоимости 103,393 млрд.$.

2

Rewolucja 1917 r. w strefie wywłaszczonej Kolei Wschodniochińskiej w Harbinie

100%

Dmochowski T.

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2015

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nr Zeszyt 8

91-103

EN

The article presents the revolutionary events in Harbin in 1917. The Author presents the figures of the major antagonists – General Horvath – general manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER, built in the Chinese Manchuria under the contract between the Russo-Chinese Bank and China) and the Bolshevik Martemyan Ryutin who in 1917 attempted to overthrow General Horvath i. e. the legal authorities of the expropriated zone of the CER. This event was opposed by the Allies and the United States and the Chinese authorities, centrally as well as locally, and led to the forcible removal of the Bolsheviks from the zone of CER by the Chinese troops and was the first and the only successful example of foreign intervention against the Bolsheviks and their power.

3

The Settlement of the Russian-Chinese Border Dispute

100%

Dmochowski T.

Polish Political Science Yearbook

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2015

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tom 44

56-74

EN

The establishment of the PRC opened the new chapter in the Sino-Soviet/Russian relations. For many years the existence of the problem of the common border was not openly expressed. In 1957 the first announcements about the territorial disputes between USSR and PRC were issued in China. And in 1960 Zhou Enlai stated that there were insignificant disrepancies in the Russian and Chinese maps, very easy to solve. Over the next nearly 30 years the problem of determination of the border has become a victim of tense and hostile Soviet-Chinese relations and unproductive talks. Gorbachev’s rise to power in the Kremlin enabled to negotiate a solution to the Soviet-Chinese border problem. And consequently to sign “The agreement on the eastern section of the Sino-Soviet state border” on May 16, 1991. The agreement on the western section of the border was signed on September 3, 1994. The demarcation of the western section of the border was finished by Joint Russian-Chinese Demarcation Commission on September 10, 1998. After six years of negotiations on October 14, 2004 the Complementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of the China–Russia Boundary was signed in Beijing. On its basis the Russian side ceded the whole of Tarabarov island (ch. Yinlongdao), half of Bolshoy Ussuriyski (ch. Heixiazidao) and half of Bolshoy (ch. Abagaitu) island. Another halves of Bolshoy Ussuriyski and Bolshoy islands were kept by Russia. Both sides shared disputed territory almost equally. The ceremony of installation of the border landmarks between Russia and China on Bolshoy Ussuriyski island (on October 14, 2008) finished the long process of demarcation of the Russian-Chinese border.

4

ZEWNĘTRZNI AKTORZY I ICH INTERESY JAKO CZYNNIKI WOJNY DOMOWEJ W SYRII (WIOSNA 2011 – WIOSNA 2014)

100%

Dmochowski T.

Colloquium Wydziału Nauk Humanistycznych i Społecznych AMW

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2015

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nr 2

101-143

EN

The civil war in Syria led to the emergence of new players in the Syrian political, ideological, economic and arms market, and in the event of the fall of the Assad regime, it can be assumed that Russia will lose the rest of influence in the region and will cease to be the main supplier of arms to Syria, and its place will be taken by the victorious Western countries. Pro-Western Syria will mean the end of the of Russian influence, and will allow the United States to increase pressure on Iran, extending Washington the possibilities of antyiranian game in the region. At the same time, there is also concern that the new after-Assad government in Damascus will be faced with similar problems of disintegration of the state, as is the case of Iraq and become the next place of fight between the moderate forces and Islamic extremists, conducting war with the West and its values. And above all, Syria is a battleground between not only internal political and religious groups but also the field of play between the United States, Israel, Western countries and Russia, the United States and Iran, Shiites and Sunnis, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

5

Chiny (ChRL) i ZSRR wobec wojny w Zatoce Perskiej (1991 r.)

100%

Dmochowski T.

Nowa Polityka Wschodnia

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2012

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tom 2(3)

86-108

EN

The article shows the stand China (People’s Republic of China) and the split by inner political fights USSR took regarding the American initiative to militarily force out the Iraqi aggressor from Kuwait, as well as regarding the American anti-Iraq operation, Desert Storm. Both communist superpowers agreed with each other only 2 years before the operation, thus ending the 30-year long schism and hostility. However, among others due to Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of new thought from one side and Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and open policy from the other, supported by Chinese independent foreign policy, despite many mutual points within foreign policy, Moscow and Beijing held different policies regarding the American intervention (arranged officially with the UN’s mandate). While agreeing about the necessary withdrawal of Iraqi armies from Kuwait, as well as the restitution of its sovereignty, China and USSR differed in the coalition’s (particularly American) support towards military intervention against Iraq. For Beijing the intervention was only an element of the supremacy battle between USA and Iraq. For Gorbachev, it was a part of Soviet–American cooperation in building a partnership, as well as creating universal standards of political activities on the international arena. The Soviet political scene however, was deeply diversified. The followers of the west and of the USA supported the Iraq intervention, but left-wing politicians were appealing to Soviet politics’ tradition and were against following America’s moves. They wanted to continue the anti-USA policy in the Persian Gulf region, to hold friendly relations with Islamic countries and to bloc American initiatives cin the region, which according to them served to monopolize the USA’s domination in the area.

6

Prawosławie i katolicyzm na Ukrainie w latach 1989–2014 – podejście ilościowe

100%

Dmochowski T.

Nowa Polityka Wschodnia

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2020

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tom 2(25)

36–60

EN

The complex reality of religious and institutional situation in Ukraine (three orthodox churches; two catholic churches), imposed on ethnic relations, has a significant impact on the balance of power in Ukraine, reinforcing existing divisions: between Ukrainians and Russians, between west and east Ukraine, between Orthodox and Catholics. Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is the most conservative force, with canonical and political ties (specially part of hierarchy) with Russia. It is the best organized religious structure in Ukraine with 12485 parishes and 10068 priests. Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (4536 parishes and 3141 priests) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (1205 parishes, and 731 priests) are much more related to Ukrainian statehood and are supported by the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian political parties on their road to autocephaly and canonical independence from Moscow Patriarchate. The most aroused nationalist forces (the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”, Right Sector) are often associated with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (3734 parishes and 2594 priests), the main supporter of the Ukrainian nationalism.

RU

Сложная реальность религиозной и институциональной ситуации в Украине (три православные и две католические церкви), которая накладывается на межэт¬нические отношения (украинцы, русские), оказывает существенное влияние на политическое равновесие и баланс власти в Украине, укрепляя существующие различия: между украинцами и русскими, между западом и востоком Украины, между православными и католиками. Украинская Православная Церковь (Московский Патриархат) является наиболее консервативной силой, с каноническими и политическими связями (особенно часть иерархии) с Россией. Это наиболее организованная религиозная структура в Украине с 12 485 приходами и 10068 священнослужителями. Украинская Православная Церковь Киевского Патриархата (4536 приходов и 3141 священников) и Украинская Автокефальная Православная Церковь (1205 приходов и 731 священник) намного больше связаны с украинской государственностью и поддерживаются украинским государством и украинскими политическими партиями на их пути автокефалии и канонической независимости от Московского Патриархата. Наиболее националистические силы (Всеукраинский союз «Свобода», Правый сектор) часто ассоциируются с Украинской греко-католической церковью (3734 прихода и 2594 священника), главным сторонником украинского национализма.

7

Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Rosyjska elita władzy centralnej w latach 2000–2008, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2011, ss. 379.

75%

Dmochowski T.

Nowa Polityka Wschodnia

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2012

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tom 1(2)

276-282