In this article the author tries to justify the possibility of Bañezianism as a form of Thomism. Bañezianism, the teaching of Domingo Bañez OP (1528-1604) and his followers, claims that human beings act in cooperation with God in such a way that the act is preceded by a previous divine concurrence (praemotio physica). Nevertheless, humans remain free to act differently. The defence of the possibility of Bañezianism is based on refuting the critique of Bañezianism presented in the work of some molinists, who see contradictions in Bañezianism. First, the paper clarifies the concept of physical premotion in Thomas Aquinas. Second, it discusses the views of Bañez and Alvarez OP on the same topic. Third, it introduces the critique of Bañezianism formulated by some molinists. Last, the author refutes this criticism, showing the possibility of the views of Bañez on the topic.
Contemporary metametaphysics studies foundations and methodology of metaphysics. There are two basic positions when it comes to comparing methods of metaphysics and natural sciences. Some authors want to naturalize metaphysics because they see it as a continuation of natural sciences. On the other hand, there are authors who argue that metaphysics is something specific. Both in metaphysics and natural sciences there is a place for the a priori and a posteriori methods. The exclusive use of the a priori methods is problematic with respect to their justification. The a posteriori methods start from experience and can reveal similarities and dissimilarities between metaphysics and natural sciences. Hence, some philosophers combine the a priori and a posteriori methods in metaphysics (e.g. Lowe, Tahko). The relation between the a priori and a posteriori methods is analysed within the framework of Aristotelian essentialism. The paper will also examine the advantages of Aristotelian essentialism comparing it with the bundle theory and the theory of bare particulars. Naturalization of metaphysics can lead to the dissolution of metaphysics in natural sciences. Therefore, the author ś thesis is that the methods of metaphysics differ from those of natural sciences. Although metaphysics and natural sciences share the same object, namely the explanation of the world, with regard to methods their overlap is only a partial one. They both used models, idealization, and abstraction, but they differ when it comes to the forms of confirmation they use.
The paper deals with the history of Christian philosophy and its two main versions, Thomistic and Augustinian, as well as the criteria of the rationality of a worldview. The comparison of the two versions of Christian philosophy enables us to argue that the Thomistic version of Christian philosophy is more conductive to the dialogue with other worldviews than its Augustinian counterpart. Further, the article introduces the criteria of the rationality of a worldview and addresses the question whether Thomistic version of Christian philosophy meets them.
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John Paul II's encyclical 'Fides et ratio' recognizes the possibility of the existence of different Catholic metaphysical conceptions. Using the issue of transubstantiation as the central expression of the Catholic faith as an example, the suitability of current systems of analytic metaphysics is examined for their use within Catholic philosophy. Those that enable such a use are labeled as suitable in a broad sense for Catholic theology. Moreover, using the example of a truth of faith concerning the relationship between soul and body, an examination was undertaken which showed that, even within the framework of metaphysical conceptions which are suitable in a broad sense, they must remain open for this particular truth of faith if they are to be suitable, not only in a broad, but also in a narrow sense, for their use in Catholic theology.
In this article the author shows that the understanding of free will in Bañezianism is compatible with God’s influence on human action. He also proposes modifications to selected interpretations of Bañezianism in order to render these more intelligible. This view will be presented in relation to Molinism, which proposes a different solution to the question of God’s role in human action, one that coincides with libertarianism.
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This paper argues for the thesis that the reality of mind is a necessary as well as sufficient condition for a diachronic identity of human person. The impossibility of elimination of qualia and intentionality and thus the impossibility of eliminative materialism was proved here. An impossibility of the theory of identity of types and individuals, together with the impossibility of functionalism as one of the versions of eliminative materialism was proven through a careful consideration of Libet's experiments. Subsequently, dualism surfaced as further option. The views of interactive dualism of Popper and Eccles and that of pragmatic dualism of Carrier and Mittelstrass turned out to be unsuitable in some of their consequences. Hylemorphic dualism turned out to be the best explanation from the sorts of dualism discussed in this paper. Through its understanding of mind as a form, hylemorphic dualism enables us to explain causality as formal and final and thus to separate it form the efficient causality of empirical objects. By this, it also explains the diachronic identity of human person possible.
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