In this paper I briefly examine the empiricist interpretation of St. Anselm’s ontological proof proposed by Nicholas Rescher. Rescher writes: “I propose to classify the word ‘God’ within the category of words which cannot be given an explicit definition, but whose meaning can only be grasped within experience. On this view, a person whose history is devoid of religious experience simply cannot have an adequate grasp of the meaning of the word ‘God’. And I submit that a person who does have a basis of experience adequate to an understanding of this term, also has, ipso facto, the experiential basis of evidence adequate to underwrite rational, warranted assent to the proposition that God exists.” I find this modern re-reading of the classical text intriguing, but rather untenable, mostly because Rescher’s first premise is an alleged analogy between the term “God” and qualia-terms. However, to strengthen his point in a way, I make some observations concerning, among other things, the problem of qualia. Then I clarify his second premise, that an experience is a basis for a warranted belief by noting that one can hold that an experience of X is only a prima facie argument for the existence of X, which makes experiential evidence even less persuasive than Rescher seems to suppose.
In my article, I propose an abstract definition of a quale, which (generally speaking) identifies qualia with sets belonging to certain relational structures. I maintain that my definition, by not taking advantage of psychological terms, makes the notion of a quale more understandable and the existence of qualia themselves less disputable than is commonly supposed. In addition, I briefly discuss the traditional concept of a quale.
The paper offers an outlook on St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument (stated famously in the Proslogion) which is a result of reconsidering the possibility that being a subject of the laws of logic (especially the laws that are relevant for the argument itself), constitutes itself a perfection (assuming, understandably, with many modern defenders of the ontological argument, that there is a sense of the term ‘perfection’ applicable within the line of thought in question). The more or less obvious parts of the historical context of such a hypothesis are noted, and some of its variants or alternatives, including negation, are assessed as well. It is argued that one of them, which states that God is “logically transcendent” (in a sense specified in the paper) may be perhaps of some use in defense of St. Anselm’s Argument, or indeed any argument of that sort.
The present essay is concerned with George Berkeley's theory of mind. An outline of his (sketchy) immaterialist theory of mind is presented and some of the principal (and well-known) difficulties are pointed out. The main problem seems to be that his attack on materialism can be easily converted into an attack on his concept of (immaterial) soul. Moreover, Berkeley offers no principle of the identity of minds; hence it is possible to argue that a troublesome consequence of his theory of mind is the possibility of an agnostic conclusion (the paper outlines an analogy between Berkeley's concept of mind and Kant's theory of the transcendental unity of apperception). In the present paper I show that it is possible to overcome these difficulties by formulating Berkeley's philosophy in pragmatic terms.
In this paper I briefly examine the idea that a certain moderate version of pantheism (hence, strictly speaking, of panentheism) can be both formulated and maintained within Leibniz’s mature philosophical system. I argue that this pan(en)theistic programme fails, however, because it violates his non-negotiable principles concerning God, creation, and created substances.
In this paper I briefly discuss principles of “independent ethics” formulated and popularized by the Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbiński. I focus on the notion of “conscience” which seems to play a fundamental role in this moral theory.
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