The inauguration of Roh Tae Woo as president of the Sixth Republic of Korea in February 1988 can be considered as a turning point in South Korean political history. The five years of the Roh Tae Woo administration, 1988–1993, contained many of the first steps, albeit sometimes transitionally imperfect, toward democracy and an ultimate return to civilian rule of law, as well as greater political freedoms. According to Samuel P. Huntington, the Korean form of democratization was an example of transplacement, in which the government made concessions and opposition political groups accepted it to avoid mutual catastrophe. Furthermore, a case can be made for the mode of democratic transition in South Korea also being like Donald Share’s transition through transaction, Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter’s transition by pact, and Adam Przeworki’s democracy with guarantees.
The purpose of the article is to describe the 2022 South Korean presidential election against the backdrop of a paradigm shift and to show the challenges and directions of Yoon Suk Yeol’s new administration. The author focuses on the research problems present in the new South Korean politics. Elements of change and continuity, which were also present in previous administrations are highlighted. In May 2022, Yoon Suk Yeol was sworn into the South Korea’s highest office. Yoon’s win in the presidential election ended a trend in which a decade of progressive rule was followed by a change to conservative rule. Since 1998, progressive and conservative presidents have alternated every two terms. The minimal difference in votes in favor of the conservative candidate reflected the divisions and social preferences of Koreans who favored a change from progressive to conservative government. The results of the 2022 presidential election revealed the polarization of South Korean society. Yoon will face a series of difficult challenges. In domestic politics, he must confront the housing crisis, widespread dissatisfaction with economic inequality, and generational tensions, among other issues. Yoon will also be challenged by the parliamentary majority currently held by the Democratic Party in the National Assembly. In foreign policy, South Korea’s new president advocates strengthening the alliance with the United States and cooperation with the Quad countries; he promises to improve relations with Japan, and to take steps toward South Korea playing a greater role in the world. In his inter-Korean policy, on the other hand, Yoon follows the traditional position of the conservatives, pledging to strengthen a policy of deterrence against acts of aggression and provocation by North Korea.
Podejmując problematykę stosunków japońsko-koreańskich starano się przedstawić je w trzech kontekstach: historycznym, bezpieczeństwa regionalnego w Azji Wschodniej po zimnej wojnie i teorii stosunków międzynarodowych. Od najdawniejszych czasów historia stosunków między Japonią a Koreą naznaczona była aktami agresji i przemocy ze strony Japonii. W wyniku najazdu dokonanego przez Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1592–1598) Korea na długie lata popadła w zapaść gospodarczą. Japońska okupacja Korei (1910–1945) zapisała się w świadomości narodu koreańskiego jako okres prześladowań i eksterminacji. Pamięć o próbach wykorzenienia tożsamości narodowej w okresie japońskich rządów kolonialnych jest ciągle obecna wśród Koreańczyków. W 1948 roku na mapie politycznej świata pojawiły się dwa państwa koreańskie, komunistyczna Północ i mające demokratyczne aspiracje Południe. Wybuch wojny koreańskiej (1950–1953) był symbolem globalnego konfliktu ideologicznego zimnej wojny. Podzielona Korea stała się głównym źródłem zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa regionalnego w Azji Wschodniej. Na skutek mediacji Stanów Zjednoczonych doszło do podpisania w 1965 roku traktatu normalizującego stosunki japońsko-koreańskie. Traktat ten umożliwił nawiązanie stosunków dyplomatycznych między Japonią a Republiką Korei. Pomimo, że nie zostały nawiązane oficjalne stosunki dyplomatyczne między Japonią a Koreańską Republiką Ludowo Demokratyczną, w Japonii w 1955 roku zezwolono na utworzenie Związku Rezydentów Koreańskich. Jednakże antyjapońskie uprzedzenia wynikające z negatywnych doświadczeń historycznych nadal stanowią źródło napięć i kontrowersji między trzema państwami. W stosunkach Japonii z państwami koreańskimi miejsce szczególne zajmuje problem denuklearyzacji Półwyspu Koreańskiego. Istnieje bowiem realne niebezpieczeństwo wynikające z posiadania broni atomowej przez reżim północnokoreański. Prowadzone z przerwami rozmowy sześciostronne nie przyniosły oczekiwanych efektów. Półwysep Koreański ciągle pozostaje miejscem regionalnego zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa. W niniejszym artykule stosunki japońsko-koreańskie są także rozpatrywane przez trzy podejścia teoretyczne: neorealizm, neoliberalizm i neoklasyczny realizm.
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This paper focuses on relations between Japan and the two Koreas, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Relations between Japan and the two Koreas can be simultaneously examined in three related contexts: the history of the national entities which is still subject to divergent interpretations, the post-Cold War East Asian security environment, and international relations (IR) theory, particularly the contrasts between neorealism, neoliberalism and neoclassical realism. In addition to traditional relations, the Japanese occupation of Korea (1910–1945) still serves as a relevant area of sensitivity between all three nations. The post-Cold War East Asian security environment is a complex mixture of vestiges of the Cold War and new regional paradigms and shifts of power, particularly against the backdrop of competing big-power interests converging on the region. Both the relations between these three nations and as well as the regional concerns of other state-actors have often been focused in recent years by North Korea’s developing nuclear weapons and missile technologies. Japanese-Korean relations present a contentious subject for IR scholars to debate the respective merits of various theoretical approaches. It is the opinion of the author that on balance, at least for the time being, neoclassical realism is a better lens through which to view these relations.
This paper briefly examines the issue of Christianity in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, also known as North Korea. The prevailing foundational ideology of the North Korean state is Juche, which means “self-reliance.” The North Korean regime has harshly repressed the Christian religion because it is perceived as having the potential to challenge many of the Juche ideology’s orthodox assumptions. Additionally, the North Korean authorities regard Christianity as anathema because it is thought to be a conduit for outside influences, particularly from the West. Christianity had a struggle gaining a foothold in Korea during the nineteenth century, but ultimately became part of the Korean religious environment. Protestant Christianity, in particular, played a central role in the early cultural nationalist opposition to Japanese occupation (1910–1945). Ironically, parts of present-day North Korea had very large Protestant Christian populations prior to the establishment of the Communist regime in 1948. Currently, the official total Christian population of the country is over 12,000 faithful, though some Christian organizations outside North Korea estimate the real number to be much higher, with many Christians rumored to be worshipping in secret. Beginning in the 1940s, the North Korean regime began its suppression of Christians and has continued to do so up to the present, though the North Korean Constitution technically allows for freedom of religion. The Juche ideology was permanently enshrined in the 1972 North Korean Constitution as the country’s unitary ideology related to all fields of endeavor. Juche is often described by North Koreans as a creative application of MarxistLeninist principles adapted to the unique characteristics of Korea, and its creation is attributed to the founder of the North Korean state, Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung’s son who inherited the leadership of North Korea after his father’s death in 1994, is the ideology’s authoritative theorist. The Juche ideology has both a foreign policy and domestic relevance. It can be argued, however, that the domestic application, particularly the ideology’s role in nurturing loyalty to the state and to Kim Jong Il, has become the dominant axis of use by the regime. The repression of Christianity inside North Korea is only a part of the picture. The quasi-religious characteristics of Juche, which is often referred to as civic or political religion, makes the persecution of a small Christian minority all the more intriguing. North Korea’s protracted economic difficulties have caused thousands of North Koreans to illegally cross the border into China and live in Korean communities. Since the 1990s, South Korean Protestant missionaries operating in the part of Manchuria where Koreans are the dominant ethnic group have assisted hundreds of North Koreans to travel through China and escape to third countries, usually in Southeast Asia, before defecting to South Korea. In the last decade, there have continued to be unsubstantiated reports of a Christian religious revival in North Korea, with rumors of Christianity spreading through the North Korean Armed Forces. This story, with its religious and political elements and implications intertwined, is still being written.
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