Edith Stein is widely recognised as a saint, a martyr, a victim of the Holocaust and a female philosopher – but can she be a Doctor of the Church? So far, thirty-seven figures, including four women, carry the title due to their so-called ‘eminent doctrines’, eminentes doctrinae. For centuries, a procedural difficulty existed in awarding the titles to martyrs, however, in the second decade of the 21st century, the Congregation for the Causes of Saints reached a conclusion that martyrdom is not, in principle, an obstacle in awarding the title. A question, therefore, can be posed: does the legacy of someone among the Christian martyrs fulfill the criteria of the Church’s Doctorate? The aim of this article is to investigate the criteria for conferral of the title of the Doctor of the Church, prime among which is a criterion called eminens doctrina, and apply them to one example, that of Edith Stein. In doing so, I consider the question purely historically and philosophically, starting out with definitions of the Father of the Church and the Doctor of the Church in part one (available below). In the second part of the article (available in 2024), I ask what aspects of the female martyr’s theology, philosophy and spirituality fulfill the criteria of an eminent doctrine, as formulated in the Church’s documents, and which are insufficient or lacking. In order to highlight the nature of a particular criterion, I contrast Stein’s case with other recently debated cases, such as those of Irenaeus of Lyons and John Paul II.
Edith Stein is widely recognised as a saint, a martyr, a victim of the Holocaust and a female philosopher – but can she be a Doctor of the Church? So far, thirty-seven figures, including four women, carry the title due to their so-called ‘eminent doctrines’, eminentes doctrinae. For centuries, a procedural difficulty existed in awarding the titles to martyrs, however, in the second decade of the 21st century, the Congregation for the Causes of Saints reached a conclusion that martyrdom is not, in principle, an obstacle in awarding the title. A question, therefore, can be posed: does the legacy of someone among the Christian martyrs fulfill the criteria of the Church’s Doctorate? The aim of this article is to investigate the criteria for conferral of the title of the Doctor of the Church, prime among which is a criterion called eminens doctrina, and apply them to one example, that of Edith Stein. In doing so, I consider the question purely historically and philosophically, starting out with definitions of the Father of the Church and the Doctor of the Church in part one (published in June 2023, no 1, p. 131–149). In the second part of the article (available below), I ask what aspects of the female martyr’s theology, philosophy and spirituality fulfill the criteria of an eminent doctrine, as formulated in the Church’s documents, and which are insufficient or lacking. In order to highlight the nature of a particular criterion, I contrast Stein’s case with other recently debated cases, such as those of Irenaeus of Lyons and John Paul II.
In this article I discuss St. Augustine’s conception of divine or eternal ideas (rationes divinae or aeternae) in respect to its implications concerning the notion of eternity. The analysis of a passage of De diversis octoginta tribus quaestionibus – a classical formulation of the conception of rationes aetearnae – is contrasted with the XX-century exposition of the problem presented in Edith Stein’s Endliches und ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins. I discuss parallels between these two conceptions, drawing conclusionsregarding their similarity. An important common denominator in both approachesis the intelligibility of God understood as Logos that manifests itself in creation and canbe an object of human cognition. Eternity is understood not only as an unending state ofconstant timelessness, but also as an cognitive activity of visio beatifica orientated towardsntelligible God.
The article analyses late ancient Christian appeals to recognize human dignity, specifically those formulated by Basil of Caesarea, Ambrose of Milan, Leon the Great and an anonymous Master of Verona. The analyses is divided into parts pertaining to each listed author and finalized with sections investigating firstly, the interrelations between the presented texts as well as a hypothesis of Leo’s reliance on Basil’s and Ambrose’s texts, and secondly, the influences of the appeals on the subsequent centuries. The study points to biblical, ancient Greek and Roman inspirations of various calls. I argue that Leo’s formulation is indirectly inspired by the Delphic gnothi seauton formula that was specified by the Christian thinkers to human axiological status and filled in with biblical expressions.
PL
Artykuł omawia późnostarożytne chrześcijańskie apele o uznanie godności ludzkiej sformułowane przez Bazylego z Cezarei, Ambrożego z Mediolanu, Leona Wielkiego i anonimowego Mistrza z Werony. Analiza podzielona jest na części odnoszące się do każdego z wymienionych autorów, a kończy ją sekcja poświęcona, po pierwsze, wzajemnym powiązaniom między przedstawionymi tekstami i hipotezie o wzorowaniu się Leona tekstami Bazylego i Ambrożego, a po drugie, wpływom tychże apeli na myśl późniejszych wieków. Badanie wskazuje biblijne, starogreckie i rzymskie źródła chrześcijańskich wezwań. Twierdzę, że sformułowanie Leona jest pośrednio inspirowane delficką formułą gnothi seauton, która została przez chrześcijańskich myślicieli doprecyzowana do statusu aksjologicznego człowieka i uzupełniona wyrażeniami biblijnymi.
This article discusses the emergence of the anthropological-axiological category of human dignity in the writings of Jerome of Strydon. In order to estimate’s Jerome’s originality, the article analyses his sources: writings of Origen of Alexandria and Cicero’s De officiis. Pointing out the watershed moment in the history of European thinking on human dignity, when Jerome created a systematically applied name for the axiological status of human beings, dignitas hominis, allows us to undermine the findings so far operating in the scientific debate, which point to authors such as Augustine of Hippo or Leo the Great as pioneers in the application of the category of “human dignity.” Showing that the category of dignitas hominis was used for the first time around the year 397 by a Bethlehem’s hermit thus postpones by several decades the first systematic occurrence of the concept of human dignity in European culture.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł omawia powstanie antropologiczno-aksjologicznej kategorii ludzkiej godności w pismach Hieronima ze Strydonu. Aby ocenić oryginalność Hieronima, artykuł omawia jego źródła: pisma Orygenesa z Aleksandrii i Cycerona De officiis. Identyfikacja przełomowego w historii europejskiego myślenia o ludzkiej godności momentu utworzenia przez Hieronima systematycznie stosowanej nazwy dla statusu aksjologicznego człowieka, dignitas hominis, pozawala podważyć dotychczas funkcjonujące w debacie naukowej ustalenia, które wskazywały na autorów takich jak Augustyn z Hippony czy Leon Wielki jako pionierów stosowania kategorii „ludzkiej godności”. Pokazanie, że kategorią dignitas hominis posługiwał się około roku 397 r. betlejemski pustelnik przesuwa zatem o kilkadziesiąt lat pierwsze systematyczne występowanie pojęcia godności ludzkiej w kulturze europejskiej.
This article proposes the thesis that Edith Stein’s late anthropology has a theocentric orientation. The threefold structure of a human being consisting of a body, soul and spirit is examined in order to validate the thesis. First of all, the finitude of a human being points out to the eternal being and – consequently – human beings are not conceivable by themselves, without the context of God. Moreover, the hylomorphic union of the body and soul adopted from Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy is enriched in Stein’s anthropology by the concept of spirit. This results in a threefold structure and is reason enough to suggest man’s iconic similarity to the Trinity. Furthermore, Stein takes over St. Teresa of Avila’s concept of an internal center of the soul, which can be a meeting point between a person and God. The analysis of the soul’s center supports the main thesis.
The aim of this article is to investigate the taxonomy of emotions formulated by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Thomas’ vision of a human being as a unity of soul andbody results in a conclusion that emotions are states of persons, yet it is possible to name a particular power of a soul responsible for the appearance of emotions – it is a sensitive appetite. Referring back to Aristotle’s theory of motion, St. Thomas calls emotions passive movements of a sensitive appetite into two directions: towards good or away from evil. In this article bonum and malum are considered as objects of emotions what poses a question about the positive or negative value of purely emotional states.
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