Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

El voluntarismo en Escoto: voluntad y libertad

100%

Gordillo Álvarez-Valdés L.

Studia Ełckie

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2012

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tom 14

95-115

EN

The article reveals reasons of the voluntarism of Duns Scotus. In his conception of freedom, understood as the freedom of will, Duns Scotus endows will with priority. Will becomes a real rational power, followed by intellect that is a natural power. Then ethical and anthropological consequences emerge to show a new way of understanding man. The reasons of the voluntarism of Scotus are analyzed in their historical context. To return his omnipotence to God, Scotus has to prioritize an infinite and limitless willingness in God, understood as charity. Through his will also man relates with God and reaches his ends in praxis. This means a break with tradition since man is to discover le raison d’être of the things not by his ratio, but by his praxis which directs him and allows him to achieve his goals.

2

THE ACTS OF THE WILL ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

88%

Wiśniewski H.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2015

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tom 4

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nr 2

149-163

EN

The article attempts to clarify an important aspect of St. Thomas Aquinas’s theory of human action, namely to show these acts of man which are immediately caused by the will. According to some contemporary philosophers, the acts of the will are limited to those of trying or of intending. Do they exhaust the whole possibility of the will to act? The author seeks to answer this question basing his considerations on the analysis of the Summa Theologiae by St. Thomas Aquinas.

3

Charakterystyka semantyczna wyrażeń chcąc nie chcąc i mimo woli

88%

Żochowska N.

Linguistica Copernicana

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2013

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nr 1(9)

143-163

EN

The article discusses lexical units chcąc nie chcąc and mimo woli, which are used in contemporary Polish. Firstly, the author justifies why she considers chcąc nie chcąc and mimo woli as lexical units. Later, she describes features of the expressions under discussion by showing restrictions in their lexical collocations. Among other things, the author investigates whether there is a component communicating necessity in the expression chcąc nie chcąc and whether the unit mimo woli refers to a moment preceding the initation of an action. The analysis conducted in the article shows that when we describe an activity with the expression mimo woli, we declare that somebody did not decide on initating it. Whereas the expression chcąc nie chcąc, states that something caused a given action and that it was not the will of the person who initiated it to do so. At the end of the article, the author presents the semantic explications of the expressions studied.

4

Maxa Schelera pojęcie wolności osobowej

88%

Prusik W.

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2012

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nr 1

19-31

EN

This article constitutes a critical analysis of M. Scheler's understanding of freedom. Scheler demonstrates freedom as a "potency” or "power” (Können) of the will, which is the basis for the freedom of choice and action. Thus, freedom is a personal habitus (Gesamthabitus innerer Freisein); its essence is given in an internal (intentional) feeling, but not in a theoretical consideration. This signifies that the consciousness of freedom is a consciousness of independence of a higher (superior) sphere (centrum) of person from the lower one (spirit from psyche, psyche from vital sphere, vital sphere from the sensual). If freedom is realized in an order of acts of the will, then it is realized in acts of the will and it becomes a "motivated” will. An internal feeling of value (as the motive) is represented as subjective necessity of the will and it therefore makes the will not passive, but rational and free. The reasonable will is a will determined by the motive, given in an internal experience. Thus the freedom of the will is the will "motivated”, i. e., caused by the consciousness of necessity. In this context, freedom is a direct consciousness of indispensable reason; it gains a Neo-Platonian connotation.

PL

Artykuł stanowi krytyczną analizę M. Schelera rozumienia wolności. Scheler pokazuje wolność jako „możność” bądź „moc” (Können) woli, która jest podstawą wolności wyboru i działania. W ten sposób wolność stanowi osobowy habitus, zaś jej istota dana jest w wewnętrznym (intencjonalnym) przeżyciu, a nie w rozważaniu teoretycznym. Znaczy to, że świadomość wolności jest świadomością niezależności wyższej sfery („centrum”) osoby od sfery niższej (ducha od psychiki, psychiki od sfery witalnej, sfery witalnej od zmysłowej). Jeżeli wolność realizuje się w porządku aktów woli, to chcenie staje się „chceniem umotywowanym”. Wewnętrzne przeżycie wartości (jako motywu) przedstawia się jako subiektywna konieczność chcenia, sprawiająca, że chcenie nie jest już dowolne, lecz racjonalne (sensowne) i wolne. Sensowne chcenie to chcenie zdeterminowane przez motyw dany w wewnętrznym doświadczeniu. Wolna wola jest więc chceniem umotywowanym, podyktowanym świadomością konieczności. W tym kontekście wolność jest bezpośrednim uświadomieniem konieczności i uzyskuje konotację neoplatońską.

5

The relationship between will and reason in the moral philosophies of Kant and Aquinas

88%

Rowan A. M.

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2015

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nr 1(38)

93–130

EN

Both Kant and Aquinas ground moral action in reason and will; however, this seems to be the end of the similarity in their approaches with respect to the role of reason and will in moral action. The goal of this essay is to show that Aquinas’ notion of the will as the rational appetite is superior to Kant’s notion of good will in providing the foundation for moral action. To this effect, I analyze the relationship between will and reason in their moral philosophies. I discuss Kant’s notion of will in both its moral and phenomenal modes, and Aquinas’ notion of will as the rational appetite and of human act. I argue that Aquinas’s notion of will and moral act is superior to that of Kant for several reasons. First and foremost, the notion of morally worthy action accommodates human nature with its inclinations, tendencies, and desires. It is not divorced from human physical and emotional nature. Second, in contrast to Kant’s will, Aquinas’s will retains its own identity. That is, it avails itself of reason’s search for truth and meaning, yet it does not collapse into reason, specifically logic. Third, Aquinas’ will is dynamic. In contrast to Kant’s, which in order to be moral simply follows the laws of logic, Aquinas’ will desires the good and propels a person to action. Finally, Aquinas’ notion of human act, in the sense that it involves both the counsel of reason and will’s capacity to desire the good, offers a more holistic understanding of human moral act and its possible consequences. In contrast to Kant’s will’s rigid command to obey the law, Aquinas’ notion of will and human act also gives reasons why we need to be moral. We must act morally, not only because our action would otherwise be self-contradictory or not live up to the letter of the law, but because our choices and our actions have real consequences in the world.

6

Autonomie a druhý

88%

Sikora O.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2014

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tom 62

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nr 4

523-538

EN

The article examines the meaning of the other for Kant's idea of autonomy. Autonomy is interpreted, in relation to the universal demand of the ethical, as governing the will by principles. Autonomy as principled self-determination by means of the practical law cannot be understood as the standpoint of an isolated subject. Instead we must understand it as a standpoint taken towards others, which we treat as the aspect of spontaneity, and at the same time as a standpoint taken thanks to others, since others make possible its awakening and development - here the aspect of receptivity is discussed. In this two-way relation between autonomy (enabled by a self-determining goverment by principle) and the other, the character of dialogical mutuality is exhibited: autonomy is the principled considerateness of a good will towards others, and, in order for it to be such, it must be initiated by others.

7

Karteziánská subjektivita podle „raného“ Levinase

75%

Starzyński W.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2014

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tom 62

|

nr 2, Special No: Za hranicemi tváře. Levinas a socialita

83-97

EN

In this text we aim to analyze the Cartesian motifs in the “early” period of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought. Our goal is to explore whether Levinas’s Cartesianism is merely a singular phenomenon, or if it can be set into the wider current of “phenomenologi-cal Cartesianism”. In order to confirm the second possibility, it seems that we must reconstruct the motifs, continuing in Descartes’s specific line of argumentation, which we can directly designate as the “Cartesian way”. These Cartesian motifs can be found in Levinas’s wider context of the issue of subjectivity, and it is these deliberations that form the structure in which the famous formulation of the definition of infinity is made. The first text in which we attempt to identify this general structure that Des-cartes provides for Levinas’s thought and the function that it fulfills in it is Description of Existence. The second motif is Cartesian subjectivity in the book Existence and Existents.

8

Grundlinien der Ethik von Maximilian Beck

75%

Ferrer U.

Studia Ełckie

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2012

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tom 14

69-80

EN

Beck, a member of the Göttingen-Munich phenomenological circle and direct disciple of Alexander Pfänder, defends an acute realism with respect to both physical things and human psychism. The first section analyses consciousness and freedom as features of moral personality. Consciousness is not merely intentional direction to objects but also immediate apprehension of them, whereas the I means the individual enclosed in itself. Analogously, the will can open itself to reality in its concretion through love or it can engage solely in the search for selfish ends. All moral fulfilment reaches this crossroad proper to a realist anthropology. The second section presents an analogous disjunctive in the political sphere: either the democratic will which is guided by the common good or the isolation fostered in the XX century by nationalisms and by the colectiviste State. Choosing the former entails discarding all psychologist (like in Nietzsche) and socioeconomic (proper to Marxism) reductionism and respecting the intrinsic dignity of the person.

9

Techniki siebie według Seneki

75%

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2012

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tom 22

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nr 2

23-31

EN

In the article the technologies of self-reflection described by Seneca in his moral essays are discussed. The analysis is based on Foucault’s distinction between two conceptions of technologies of the self created in Antiquity and Early Christianity. One of them is related to an idea of self-studying and auto-creation with reference to social (or religious) rules, what was the main principle in Christian system. Different conception concerns technologies of the self understood as a care of the self in absolute meaning. It is an idea in which happiness and good of an individual are formulated from the subjective point of view. Senecan concept of selfworking is the specific fusion of these two conceptions. Mnemonic technologies discovering Nature’s order in a human being are connected with independence on external world of objects. This stoic view modified by Seneca, who had focused his attention on a role of will and conscience in an examination of the self, is the main issue discussed in this article.

FR

L’article traite de la notion d’auto-réflexion décrite dans les essais de Séneque. La base de l’analyse est la distinction faite par Foucault, qui a identifié deux catégories des techniques de soi. Considérant les concepts auto-défini dans l’Antiquité et au début du christianisme, Foucault indique la méthode de Séneque comme l’idée reflétant ces deux catégories. Dans ce concept Séneque combine la conception stoicienne de la nécessité de découvrir les principes de la nature chez l’homme avec l’idée d’indépendance par rapport au monde extérieur, tant en physique et mentale. Cette méthode exige un engagement de volonté et de conscience, que Séneque définit comme un témoin et un juge d’ humain. Une création de soi dans le systeme de Séneque a été conçu pour développer une attitude de consentement a la réalité crée par fatum. Travailler sur soi doit conduire a une situation d’etre en harmonie avec soi-meme compatible avec une situation de consentir a des conditions de fatum.

10

Representative Turn : New Way of Thinking about the Relationship between Representation and Democracy

75%

Mottlová M.

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tom 65

|

nr Special Issue 1

113-121

EN

The three reviewed books constitute part of a representative turn that attempts to restore the value of representation to democracy in changed circumstances under which representative democracy operates, such as the rise of new actors (non-governmental organizations, social movements), non-electoral forms of representation or the existence of representatives beyond boundaries of the nation-state. I argue that the authors of representative turn manage to respond to current challenges by conceptualizing representation as a dynamic process of making and receiving representative claims that include new forms of representation while still keeping a significant role of traditional formal representative institutions.

11

Przysłówki mimo woli i mimowolnie. Spojrzenie diachroniczne

63%

Żochowska N. , Kopernika U. M. , Natalia Żochowska. Ur. 1984 r. w Toruniu. Ukończyła filologię polską na UMK o. k. s. d. z. z. j. Z. s. s. p. w. c. n. i. m. P. m. i. w. c. L. C. i. w. P. J. , natalia.zochowska@wp.pl

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2015

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tom 4

EN

Lexical units mimo woli i mimowolnie, functioning in the modern polish, are object of this article. Tidying up of certain historical facts concerning these two adverbs (and preposition mimo) helped with formulating hypothesis concerning it saying, that unit mimo woli semantically most probably derives from adverb mimowolnie. It “inherits” after it feature, which I am calling the identity of subjects, and which is for it, as for lexical unit, constitutive. The look at the history of studied expressions served also explaining, where from one of mistakes turning up at definitions of unit mimo woli is getting down. Majority of dictionary definitions of this expression - apart from the row of phrases close in meaning for the individual defined – contains the structure ‘wbrew woli’. Before preposition "mimo" meant both ‘bez’ as well as ‘wbrew’ – where in second from these meanings doesn't form the lexical unit with the noun a "wola", what's more, in our times isn't appearing in this meaning even in structures. By it today there is functioning a structure "wbrew woli". Appearance of the ‘wbrew woli’ in definitions of the adverb used in the contemporary Polish "mimo woli" most probably results from assigning to him the former significance – from the time, when wasn't still lexical unit.

PL

Przedmiotem artykułu są funkcjonujące we współczesnej polszczyźnie jednostki mimo woli i mimowolnie. Uporządkowanie pewnych faktów historycznych dotyczących tych dwu przysłówków (a także przyimka mimo) pomogło w sformułowaniu hipotezy mówiącej, że tożsamość podmiotów w znaczeniu mimo woli s e m a n t y c z n i e pochodzi od przysłówka mimowolnie. Spojrzenie na historię badanych wyrażeń posłużyło również wyjaśnieniu, skąd bierze się jeden z błędów pojawiających się w definicjach jednostki mimo woli. Większość słownikowych definicji tego wyrażenia – oprócz szeregu wyrażeń bliskoznacznych jednostce definiowanej – zawiera konstrukcję ‘wbrew woli’. Dawniej przyimek mimo znaczył zarówno ‘bez’ jak i ‘wbrew’ – z tym, że w drugim z tych znaczeń nie zleksykalizował się i nie tworzy jednostki języka z rzeczownikiem wola, co więcej, współcześnie nie występuje w tym znaczeniu nawet w konstrukcjach. Funkcjonuje za to dzisiaj konstrukcja wbrew woli. Pojawienie się komponentu ‘wbrew woli’ w definicjach używanego we współczesnej polszczyźnie przysłówka mimo woli wynika najprawdopodobniej z przypisywania jemu dawnego znaczenia – z czasu, gdy nie był jeszcze jednostką.

12

Czy poznanie jest wyższe niż miłość? Uzasadnienie wyższości intelektu nad wolą w ujęciu Tomasza z Akwinu

63%

Zembrzuski M.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2014

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tom 3

75-97

EN

Thomas Aquinas in his works sympathizes with the priority and thus superiority of intellect over will definitely. Presenting various ways of arguing he intends to point out the perfection of intellect, which becomes perfect in its act of cognition, it assures the proper action of will. Because of its object – truth about reality – as well as final and formal causation intellect moves will which aims to good. Only in the situation of such an object of intellect, which somehow exceeds human cognition potencies, will could acquire superiority over cognition. Thus a man only in an act of love of God is able to love by will that, which he cannot cognize. In other cases, particularly in case of natural cognition of sensual reality, in which man grasps an essence, cognition always goes before volition. Stressing superiority of intellect over will is not a matter of introducing into the consideration of their mutual relations additional topic. It is crucial problem, which allows proper understanding issue of freedom in Aquinas’ account.

13

Krytyczna rola filozofii w ukazywaniu selektywnego kształcenia i wychowania młodzieży na przykładzie fenomenologii Dietricha von Hildebranda

63%

Lendzion A.

Roczniki Pedagogiczne

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2013

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tom 5(41)

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nr 1

026-039

XX

The following article includes an analysis of human emotions concept, according to The Phenomenology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. This phenomenology is an example of an explanatory and critical role of the philosophy in an evaluation of upbringing and educational attitudes. A neglect of inward feelings leads to the selective formation of a person in the educational and upbringing process, based on the reductionist concept of man. A rehabilitation of human emotions is connected with an appreciation of higher feelings in upbringing, in which an enculturation, socialization and personalization are considered complementary. The three basic forms of contribution in values (i.e.: values embodiment, unification and creation) also have a significant meaning in upbringing. An analytic and pragmatic reason overgrowth and will overestimation lead to an emotional reduction. A “humble, righteous and loving I” is the source of the feelings which are adequate to cognised values. Issues of the human emotions complexity, an attitude towards values, an inharmonious development of human cognitive, aspiring and emotional spheres as well as the personal “I” are analysed in the phenomenological approach that emphasises an intentionality in human – world relations, an objective character of the values existing in a non-subjective world and essential dimension of the experience of a person.

14

My Body—My Lived Body

63%

Böhme G.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2014

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nr 4

44-53

EN

In this essay about the philosophy of human corporeality Böhme asks about the sense of the I—body relation. He enters a polemic with Hegel, who wrote about the self- appropriation of the own body in acts of will, and points to passive acts of bodily sensing like experiencing pain or fear as that which builds an awareness of the own body’s “mineness.” Böhme calls this awareness affected self-givenness, linguistically articulated by the pronouns “mine” and “me,” which are genetically precedent to awareness and the pronoun “I”. Against this categorial background Böhme considers the argumentative role both these philosophical models of the I—body relation could play in contemporary debates on the diverse cultural forms in which the human body has been commercialised.

15

ПІЗНАВАЛЬНО-ТВОРЧА САМОРЕАЛІЗАЦІЯ МОЛОДШИХ ШКОЛЯРІВ ІЗ ДЦП І СТАН СФОРМОВАНОСТІ ЇХ ЕМОЦІЙ, ВОЛІ, ІНТЕРЕСІВ, ПОТРЕБ, ЦІЛЕЙ, МОТИВІВ І МОТИВАЦІЇ

63%

Тетяна З.

Педагогічні науки: теорія, історія, інноваційні технології

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2016

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nr 8(62)

241-263

EN

The article analyzes defects of emotions, will, interests, necessities, aims, motives and motivations, which complicate cognitive-creative possibilities of self-expression and self-realization of pupils of junior forms with child’s cerebral palsy, with an easy mental defectiveness, delay of psychical development and normal intellect. The author of the article applies heuristic-synergetic methodology of research, theory of the functional systems of P. C. Anokhin, theory of L. S. Vyhotskyi about the areas of development and compensational processes in the system “personality”, principle of “tomorrow gladness” of A. S. Makarenko, gestaltpsychology. The author defines the essence of self-expression and self-realization of the person in the process of using of heuristic-synergetic medic-psychological-pedagogical method of stimulation of habilitation of system “personality”. Synergetic method of habilitation includes synergetic methods of stimulation of habilitation in the system “personality” – there are synergetic methods of stimulation of the habilitation which is a method of stimulation of the person’s own activity, directed at the process of prevention of self-organization (origin and perfection) of the system “defect” owing to hastening of self-organization of the system “personality” and acquisition of the highest quality as a result of replacement of the less perfect elements on more perfect elements and forming and expansion of hierarchical levels after joining of new elements. This method oppresses self-destroy and stimulates self-organization of biological, psychological and social subsystems of the system “personality”, realizing external management and provide internal management of the process of habilitation of the person, assisting in the strengthening of new emergent qualities of biological, psychological, social subsystems of the system “personality” and in the achievement of system aims of habilitation in a self-expression and self-realization of pupils of junior forms with child’s cerebral palsy during an educational process. Healthy pupils, pupils with bad eyesight and hearing impairments, pupils with easy mental defectiveness and delay of psychical development, pupils with child’s cerebral palsy can use this method. In future it is necessary to frame correctional, rehabilitational, compensational, over-compensational methods of heuristic-synergetic medic-psychological-pedagogical technology of management of vertical processes of development, habilitation, correction, rehabilitation, compensation, over-compensation in systems “personality” and “defect”.

16

Dlaczego czynimy zło? Trójpodział przyczyn zła moralnego według św. Tomasza z Akwinu

63%

Belina-Prażmowska P.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2014

|

tom 3

113-127

EN

In the first part of the paper anthropological basis has been presented and it intends to show, that for a proper human being development a harmony between his faculties and dominion of intellect should occur. The lack of the harmony and lack of surrendering the other faculties to the intellect, reduces man to moral evil, causing or overmuch reign of feeling in act of decision, or deprivation of will. In the second part I have presented the possible mistakes in particular human faculties, which are causes of moral evil. So, ignorance in reason, malice of will and sins performed because of weakness influenced by feelings. At the beginning I have pointed out, that saint Thomas Aquinas sees all of them as a intellectual malfunction. In conclusion in should be said, that Thomas as a representative of intellectual ethics, focuses on intellectual aspect of human action and even he perceives evil as a kind of intellectual shortcomings. He does not deny irrational element in a man, but he points out the necessity of surrendering it to the will and intellect, so a man is able to grow in perfect inner harmony of senses, will and intellect.

17

Die Bedeutung des Willens und die Erfahrung des Sollens bei Immanuel Kant und Karol Wojtyła

63%

Waleszczuk Z.

|

2014

|

nr 1(36)

129–150

EN

By the ignorance of the motives of the critical philosophy Kant’s, many interpreters see his aim not in the rescue, but in the destruction of metaphysics. Kant’s practical philosophy is often misunderstood, as long as the expositors deny the unconditional validity of the moral law, “the only factum of pure reason”. The article tries to point out the similarities (the importance of free will and the experience of duty) in the thinking of Karol Wojtyła and Immanuel Kant. The moral experience, the demand of duty of the categorical imperative (Kant), personalistic standard (Wojtyła), shows the importance of self-determination/will decision towards the human act. Although Wojtyła admits in his work „person and act“, that just the Kant studies have helped to emphasize the will as a self determining factor of the person and the primacy of the will to the feelings, there is no lack of interpreters who like to overemphasize the great influences of Thomism and phenomenology (such as Max Scheler) on the thinking of the Krakow philosopher. Many interpreters ignore the cantian approach without comment. The goal of the article is therefore at least begin to fill this glaring omission. Wojtyła’s and Kant’s thinking is determined by the question of the freedom of the people. In the practical affirmation of the possibility of free actions – in the deed – the morality and dignity of human, which points to the unconditional – God – immortality of man – is revealed. Also Wojtyła, in the sense of Kant, stresses that the mind itself and with its own power is unable to reach the deity and man must engage on the uncertainty and the abyss of faith, when he leaves the island of pure reason. For Wojtyła, the ability to free, responsible, self-determining act is a sign of the inviolability of personal dignity and for Kant (similar to Augustine and Thomas) a determination of each person to the realization of the highest good. The two thinkers see the people in the light of the experience of duty – commandment of love – that can materialize only through action and deed. For Kant, implicitly for Wojtyła also the deference to God is done explicitly by the act.

18

Na czym polega orientacja na dobro w działaniu?

63%

Czyrnek M.

Amor Fati

|

2016

|

nr 2(6)

49-67

EN

The article explained why we can say that the action is oriented to the good. By clarifying the meaning of the good in general, good ontological and subsequent refinement of moral goodness shown how to understand those targeting the good and why it could not be otherwise. Further present structure of the cognitive powers and the nature of the ultimate goal served to deepen understanding of the issues. Orientation on the good in action will therefore rely on the fact that the will of necessity is aimed at goal, and the goal is always a good within the meaning of the ontological.

19

Miejsce woli w zagadnieniu ludzkiego działania w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu

63%

Zapisek D.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

|

2012

|

tom 1

109-121

EN

When we talk about human`s action in view of Thomas Aquinas, in the first place is a concept of „intelectualism”. The most of well known continuators of Aquinas thought underline that the key of understanding problem of free action first of all is knowing the action of intellect, because intellect is highest of human`s potencies. In fact in Aquinas opinion intellect is the most perfect potency of human being. However the problem of action of will seems to be the starting point in explanation of humans` free action. In the views of polish thomistic philosophers for example J. Woroniecki, M.A. Krąpiec, S. Swieżawski, this question is presenting and explaining by schema of process of making free decision (liberum arbitrium). Nevertheless when we study the Aquinas texts, we can make the conclusion that the most important in explanation of what is human`s free action are principles of this action that is intellect and will. For Aquinas essentials are principles of cooperation of intellect and will, range of interaction these potencies and field of autonomy both potencies.

20

Rozum myślący w służbie woli

51%

Kiełbasa J.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

|

2017

|

tom 65

|

nr 3

99-125

PL

Punktem wyjścia artykułu jest rozważanie i konfrontowanie ze sobą różnych znaczeń terminu „wola”, formułowanych i dyskutowanych w XII-wiecznej antropologii. Znaczna część tych historycznych dociekań poświęcona jest takim zagadnieniom, jak charakterystyka i specyfika działania ludzkiej woli, jej odniesienie do całej dziedziny pragnienia (w szczególności do pożądania zmysłowego), zwłaszcza zaś wzajemne funkcjonalne i hierarchiczne relacje między wolą a rozumem jako władzą poznawczą. Na podstawie porównawczej i krytycznej analizy tekstów źródłowych z epoki (w tym dzieł Anzelma z Canterbury, Bernarda z Clairvaux, Hugona ze Św. Wiktora oraz ważniejszych zbiorów sentencji znanych i nieznanych autorów) autor artykułu bada poglądy tych i innych ówczesnych myślicieli na temat przynależności woli do sfery racjonalności w człowieku, udziału intelektu w jej wyborach i decyzjach z jednej strony, a zarazem jej autonomii i możliwości samoporuszania się z drugiej. Swoje badanie koncentruje na tym, w jaki sposób XII-wieczni myśliciele próbują wyjaśnić fenomen wolnego wyboru czy też wolnej decyzji i odpowiedzieć na pytania dotyczące właściwego podmiotu, źródła, przyczyny sprawczej bądź koniecznego i wystarczającego warunku ludzkiej wolności. Czyni to w kontekście średniowiecznych dyskusji i sporów między woluntaryzmem i intelektualizmem antropologicznym.

EN

A starting point of this paper is a consideration and confrontation of the various meanings of the term “will” formulated and discussed in twelfth century anthropology. A significant part of this historical research is devoted to such issues as the characteristics and specific activity of the human will, its relation to the whole domain of the desire, particularly that of the sensual desire, and especially the mutual—functional and hierarchical—relationship between will and reason as the cognitive faculty. On the ground of the critical and comparative analysis of the text-sources (including the works of Anselm of Canterbury, Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh of Saint-Victor, as well as the collections of sentences of known and unknown authors), author of the paper explores the views of just mentionnned and other thinkers of this time on the belonging of the will to the domain of human rationality, on the participation of the intellect in the will’s decisions and choices, one the one hand, and on will’s autonomy and its possibility of self-moving, on the other. He focuses his scrutiny on how the twelfth century thinkers try to explicate a phenomenon of free choice or free decision and to answer to a questions concerning a proper subject, source, efficient cause or necessary and sufficient condition of the human freedom in the context of the medieval disputes between voluntarism and intellectualism in the domain of anthropology.