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1

Pluralistická koncepcia hodnoty poznania:

100%

Nuhlíček M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2020

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tom 68

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nr 4

551-566

EN

The paper presents a pluralistic solution to the epistemological problem of the value of knowledge. In the first part, the starting points for the discussion on the value of knowledge are mapped out, including the key assumptions that knowledge is valu- able (1) distinctively, (2) universally and (3) necessarily. It then summarizes the most important routes to take towards solving this problem, which, however, bump up against an inability to satisfy all three of these assumptions at the same time. The second part of the paper presents an alternative pluralistic view of the value of knowledge, which is inspired by M. Weiner’s concept of knowledge as a “Swiss Army Knife”. Paradoxically, however, this approach simultaneously denies all three assumptions about the value of knowledge, which it explains as a variable and contextual quality of knowledge. However, as it ultimately turns out, this explanation might be fully in accordance with common intuitions about why knowledge is valuable.

2

Phenomenology of Evidence: Promises, Problems, and Prospects

100%

Heffernan G.

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nr 3

9-24

EN

According to Ricoeur, phenomenology is “for a good part the history of Husserlian heresies.” In this paper, I argue that, at the crossroads between a possible “topography of heresies” and a potential “geography of horizons,” phenomenology of evidence takes “the road to renewal” in pursuit of knowledge of knowledge and truth about truth. In doing so, I suggest that phenomenology of evidence is not “heresy” against “orthodox” or “analytical” theory of knowledge. Rather, in so far as it is required by a phenome-nological description of knowledge, phenomenology of evidence represents critical heterodoxy in the face of dogmatic orthodoxy. As such, it serves as a first step on “the road to renewal” of reflection on truth. Thus phenomenology of evidence emerges as one of “the many faces of contemporary phenomenology,” and as a very bright one indeed. In support of this position, I present arguments in the form of ten lessons from phenomenology of evidence for contemporary theory of knowledge.

3

Practical KnowledgeVersusKnowledge as Practice

88%

Danka I.

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nr 4

397-407

EN

The main thesis of this essay is that practice is superior to a "theoretical vs. practical" distinction. In this sense, every sort of knowledge is essentially "practical"; so-called "theoretical" knowledge is an historically overemphasised borderline example of the practical. Based mostly on Wittgenstein's view, I shall gradually refine an opposition between theoretical and practical knowledge by analysing some related dualisms on an active, processual, communicative and applicative concept of knowledge. Then I will provide some arguments as to why knowledge as a practical matter in this sense should be seen as, both logically and temporally, prior to the distinction.

4

Marek J. Siemek and His Interpretation of the Idea of Transcendentalism

88%

Lisak A.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2016

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nr 2

205-216

EN

The paper discusses with critical intent Marek J. Siemek’s conception of transcen-dental philosophy. Firstly, theory of knowledge does not belong to the epistemic level of reflection (Siemek’s stance) but it is precisely the other way around; namely, it is due to transcendental philosophy (critique of cognitive faculties) that it was possible to distinguish metaphysical, ontological and epistemological questions. Secondly, tran-scendental philosophy enables us to discriminate between the ontological and epistemo-logical questions (Emil Lask, Edmund Husserl) and, as a result, to take up within its scope traditional epistemological questions such as adequacy of cognition. Thirdly, Siemek’s Fichtean interpretation of transcendental philosophy is untenable. It overesti-mates the role of spontaneity and practical moment in the constitution of the world and underestimates the receptive moment in cognition. It seems that more plausible way of understanding transcendental philosophy can be found in the writings of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism where within the field of transcendental consciousness more objectified meanings and subject as such are being constituted.

5

From Constructivism to Logic Programming : an Homage to Mario Ornaghi

75%

Ferrari M. , Fiorentini C. , Momigliano A.

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tom Vol. 161, nr 1/2

1--7

EN

In this brief note, we outline Mario Ornaghi’s contributions to the field of computational logic to celebrate his 70th birthday.

6

Max Brod - Felix Weltsch: Anschauung und Begriff : Grundzüge eines Systems der Begriffsbildung

63%

Vrtílka P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2019

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tom 67

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nr 1

121-133

EN

This review study is concerned with the recently published second edition of the philosophical work Anschauung und Begriff. Grundzüge eines Systems der Begriffsbildung, the authors of which are members of the “narrow” Prague Circle: Max Brod and Felix Weltsch. They themselves characterise their work as a “monograph about vague ideas”. A salient feature of their theory is the attempt to determine afresh the relation between intuition and concept, reflecting the ideas of the time in philosophy and experimental psychology. The authors are of the opinion that in the sphere of the vague and uncertain, there appear certain observable connecting links: these are intuitive concepts which lack any role in the formation of a scientific concept as it is understood in the neo-Kantian tradition. Study of this work contributes to our understanding of the historical reception of Brentanism in the context of the intellectual milieu of Prague at the time, which was characterised by an overt interplay between Prague German philosophy and literature.

DE

Die vorliegende Rezensionsstudie ist der aktuellen zweiten Ausgabe des philosophischen Werks Anschauung und Begriff. Grundzüge eines Systems der Begriffsbildung gewidmet, dessen Autoren, Max Brod und Felix Weltsch, Mitglieder des engeren Prager Kreises waren. Diese bezeichneten ihr Werk selbst als „Monographie über verschwommene Vorstellungen“. Ein wichtiger Grundzug ihrer Theorie ist die Bemühung um eine neue Bestimmung der Beziehung von Anschauung und Begriff, in der zeitgenössische Denkströmungen der Philosophie und der experimentellen Psychologie reflektiert werden. Die Autoren vermuten, dass in der Sphäre des Vagen und Unbestimmten gewisse beobachtbare Zwischenglieder entstehen, d. h. Meinungsbegriffe, die nicht im Zusammenhang mit der Bildung des wissenschaftlichen Begriffs stehen, so wie er im Neukantismus aufgefasst wird. Interessant ist ein Studium dieses Werks hinsichtlich der Rezeptionsgeschichte des Brentanismus im Kontext des damaligen intellektuellen Umfelds Prags, in den nachweislichen Beziehungen zwischen der deutschen Philosophie und Literatur in Prag bestanden.

7

O skepticismu a filosofii u Davida Huma:

63%

Janoušek H.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2020

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tom 68

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nr 4

623-633

EN

The study examines Zuzana Parusniková’s book David Hume, Sceptic. It first examines how the book situates Hume’s philosophy in between radical scepticism resulting from the scrutiny of human knowledge and natural belief that cannot be shaken by sceptical doubts. Hume accepts radical scepticism and the limits it sets for human understanding. However, a practicable philosophy must submit itself to belief in the common world and offer a useful examination into the principles of moral and social behavior and common life. This finally results in philosophy becoming a guide for a happy life. In the second part, the study employs Hume’s concept of the love of truth to show a deeper link between several functions of philosophy, and, by interpreting Hume’s view of the relation between abstruse and easy philosophy, it criticizes Parusnikova’s interpretation of abstruse philosophy.

CS

Text studie analyzuje knihu Zuzany Parsunikové David Hume, Sceptic, jež klade filosofii Davida Huma do rozporu mezi radikální skepsí plynoucí z reflexe lidského poznání a přirozenou vírou, jejíž genezi nedokáží skeptické pochybnosti narušit. Hume přijímá radikální skepsi i meze, které stanovuje lidskému rozumu. Praktikovatelná filosofie se však musí podřídit víře ve společný svět a prospěšně zkoumat principy lidského jednání a soužití ve společensko-morální oblasti. Vposledu se filosofie stává návodem ke šťastnému životu. Ve své druhé části zde předkládaná studie využívá Humovu koncepci lásky k pravdě, aby ukázala hlubší souvislost mezi funkcemi filosofie u Huma, a na základě výkladu Humova pojetí vztahu obtížné a snadné filosofie kritizuje autorčin výklad epistemologické funkce obtížné filosofie.

8

Suárezova teorie poznání a její vztah k tomismu

63%

Heider D.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2011

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tom 59

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nr 6

865-896

EN

Suárez’s theory of knowledge, worked out in his On the Soul (1621), presents a significant philosophical addition to the famous Metaphysical Disputations (1597). Even if On the Soul was published posthumously, its basic thoughts were developed, by Suárez himself, as early as in the first half of the 1570’s. For this reason this work of pure philosophy provides the indispensable context for Suárez’s metaphysical reflections. The article presents the fundamental characteristics of Suárez’s theory of knowledge, with emphasis on knowledge of reason, and with a view to its critical relation to Thomist theory. It is above all Thomist theory which Suárez was addressing. Next to the brief presentation of the historical context of the work and a sketch of the basic anthropological tendencies connected with Suárez’s particular form of dualism with regard to the question of the soul and body, the author presents four basic characteristics of Suárez’s theory of knowledge. 1) Suárez’s theory of knowledge is characterised as a doctrine that puts emphasis on the vital nature of knowledge. The whole principle of knowledge cannot be considered without the factor of the attentive soul; passive reason, as really identical with active reason, cannot be treated as passive primary matter; the intentional species represent extramental objects only in an embryonic way; intentional connections of the knowing subject with the known thing can be understood as, at most, an accidental one. All these theses are clearly signs of non-Thomism. 2) Suárez’s theory of knowledge is characterised by direct cognitive realism. The rejection of the expressed species (species expressa) really distinct from the cognitive act and the rejection of the definition of a formal concept as that in which (id in quo) we grasp extramental things, shows that Suárez unequivocably advocates a conception of direct realism. He views Thomist theory as approaching too closely to an undesirable representationalism. 3) Suárez’s teaching is further characterised by a theory of the sympathy of cognitive potencies having their root in a common soul. It is this theory – widely accepted in Renaissance philosophy – which understands the relation between sensory and rational knowledge acausally. Suárez conceives it in contrast to the Thomist theory which works with a causal understanding of this relation. 4) In the final part of the study Suárez’s epistemological theory of the direct rational knowledge of material individuals is presented. Thomist teaching on the reflexive rational knowledge of individuals is rejected by Suárez for the same reason as Thomist theory on the real distinction between the concept and cognitive act: both offend against direct realism and thus also against the objectivity of our knowledge. The author comes to the negative conclusion that Suárez’s theory of knowledge is positively not primarily inspired by Thomist theory. The main influence – one which the author does not attempt to elaborate – seems to be the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. At the same time attention is drawn to some of Suárez’s themes that are taken up by modern philosophy, such as occasionalism, innate ideas, predetermined harmony and the unity of apperception – these bring Suárez close to the conceptions of early modern rationalists.

9

Argument Williamsona przeciwko KK-tezie

63%

Lisowski G.

Diametros

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2017

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nr 52

81-95

PL

KK-tezę wyrazić można jako następujące twierdzenie: "Jeżeli podmiot wie, że p, to zawsze jest w stanie wiedzy o tym, że wie, że p". Teza ta w historii filozofii przyjmowana była jako pewnik, jednakże we współczesnej epistemologii budzi ona liczne kontrowersje i jest istotnym elementem sporu dotyczącego modelu wiedzy. Jednym ze znaczących głosów przeciwko KK-tezie jest argument Timothy'ego Williamsona, opierający się na zaproponowanej przez niego zasadzie bezpieczeństwa wiedzy. Przedstawiona niżej polemika z argumentacją Williamsona składa się z dwóch części - w pierwszej pokazuję, że zasada bezpieczeństwa wiedzy jest niezgodna z modelem wiedzy Freda Dretskego. W drugiej wskazuję natomiast na nieścisłość zaproponowanego przez Williamsona sformułowania zasady bezpieczeństwa wiedzy, która pozwala na podważenie tezy, według której implikuje ona fałszywość KK -tezy.

EN

The KK-principle can be defined as follows: “For any subject x: if x knows that p, then she is always in a position to know that she knows that p”. This principle has been widely accepted in the history of philosophy. However, in contemporary epistemology it is considered controversial and regarded as an important part of the debate concerning the nature of knowledge. One of the arguments against the KK-principle has been presented by Timothy Williamson and it involves the so-called “safety principle”. In this paper, I argue against this account. My argument consists of two parts: in the first part, it is argued that the safety principle presented by Williamson contradicts Dretske’s account of knowledge. In the second part, I claim that the safety principle, as defined by Williamson, is not precise enough, which enables one to argue that it does not contradict the KK-principle.

10

Diagnostics of "UUUU…" type situations in systems

51%

Przystupa F. W.

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tom Vol. 12, nr 3

36-48

EN

During the functioning of systems sometimes unknown events occur - being by nature dangerous, redoubtable and destructive events. The possibility of a preventive observation by diagnosing methods assures minimizing the consequences of such events. In the case of a sometimes appearing disturbing process of the UUUU type: Unforeseeable (probability), Unexpected/Sudden (time), Unknown (knowledge) or Ungovernable (increments), diagnostic generally is not introduced in the functioning of technical systems. As usual, because of lack of consciousness and awareness of the character of action in such a specific situation, one behaves and acts ineffectively or even wrong. The methodological ordering of diagnosing in UUUU... situations in technical systems will permit to improve diagnosing by utilizing already existing possibilities or by building new tools for conscious, new conditions