Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Trójfilar bezpieczeństwa ustrojowego uwarunkowania aksjologiczne

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Kurek-Sobieraj J.

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tom nr 4

11--23

PL

Warunkiem bezpieczeństwa ustrojowego państwa jako podmiotu realizującego zadania o charakterze wewnętrznym i zewnętrznych jest prawidłowe ukształtowanie relacji pomiędzy trzema ośrodkami władzy jakie tworzą władza sądownicza, ustawodawcza i wykonawcza. W zasadzie właśnie stabilność władzy rozumiana jako prawidłowe ukształtowanie relacji pomiędzy trzema kluczowymi ośrodkami powinna być postrzegana w kategoriach aksjologicznych jako dobro determinujące bezpieczeństwo ustrojowe a tym samym bezpieczeństwo polityczne państwa na arenie międzynarodowej oraz w ramach realizacji polityki wewnętrznej. Trójpodział władzy jako zasada funkcjonowania państwa ma charakter uniwersalny i wywodzi się z ponadnarodowych tradycji konstytucyjnych. Nie jest ona typowa jedynie dla państw demokratycznych. W zależności jednak od historycznych doświadczeń i politycznych koncepcji różnie przebiega ukształtowanie schematu relacji pomiędzy ośrodkami władzy. Bezpieczeństwo ustrojowe państwa to nie tylko współpraca, ale przede wszystkim utrzymujący się zdrowy poziom napięcia i wzajemnej kontroli pomiędzy trzema punktami oparcia „trójnogu bezpieczeństwa ustrojowego”.

EN

The correct relation between three powers - judiciary, legislative and executive – is a necessary condition of a constitutional security of the State. In fact, the stability of power understood as a correct “shaping of relations” between the three key centres of powers should be perceived in axiological terms as a goods determining the constitutional security as well as political security of the state on the international arena and in the implementation of domestic policy. The separation of powers as a principle of state functioning is universal and stems from supranational constitutional traditions. It is not typical only of democratic countries. However, depending on historical experiences and political concepts, the pattern of relations between the centres of power is shaped differently. The constitutional security of the state is not only about cooperation, but above all about maintaining a healthy level of tension and mutual control between the three points of support of the “tripod of constitutional security”.

2

W poszukiwaniu władzy stabilizującej porządek konstytucyjny (część II)

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Bożek M.

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nr 2(151)

7–38

EN

In modern constitutionalism, the systemic stabilization is represented in its two aspects. It is the primary systemic value of the constitutional order as a whole, guaranteeing the realisation of other values. In this context, it is most often understood as constitutionality and efficiency of the constitutional order. Systemic stabilization may also be regarded as a separate legal sphere of the state’s activity, i.e., in this case the activity of organs of the state, whose purpose is to guarantee the constitutionality and efficiency of the constitutional order. As a separate sphere of the state’s activity, it may only be distinguished within a parliamentary system. This is due to the specific form of the principle of separation of powers. Among various state organs capable of exercising this legal sphere, head of state and constitutional court are most often listed. However, as proven by the analysis of the manner of fashioning the office of the head of state in the parliamentary system, stabilization of the constitutional order may at most be regarded as one of its systemic functions. The core of the head of state’s activity in this model of governance is representing the state in its external relations and before the society. Hence a thesis may be formulated, that in a parliamentary system, head of state is a separate power — the representing power (authority). Most arguments are in favour of vesting a constitutional court with systemic stabilization as a separate legal sphere of activity. The activity of a constitutional court displays numerous particular features that can not be assigned to the classic powers in the state. In a parliamentary system, a constitutional court is a holder of a separate state power–power stabilizing the constitutional order. At the same time, this does not preclude its legal status of a judicial organ.

3

Konsolidować, nie konsolidować… Głos do dyskusji o połączeniu korpusu służby cywilnej i pracowników samorządowych

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Włodyka E. M.

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2022

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tom 92

179-196

EN

The paper explores selected issues related to the possibility of establishing a selfgovernment civil service in Poland. The analysis was carried out from the perspective of recognizing selfgovernment administration (public administration at the level of local government) as public administration conceived in terms of formal and doctrinal assignment of public administration being part of executive power in the classical triad of power division. Empirical data were demonstrated illustrating the characteristics of appointments as the basis of the employment relationship in the civil service corps, and periodically of the local government employees, as a factor stabilizing staff fluctuation in public administration. The main objective was to find an answer, on the basis of the collected data, to the research question whether local government administration should become a permanent element of professional public administration as an element of the civil service corps.

4

The Structuralist Study of Constitutional Law : a New Paradigm in Teaching Law

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Piacenti L. G. , Borges de Oliveira E. A. , Ryndack J. M.

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nr 2(78)

211-223

PL

Przedmiotem artykułu jest przedstawienie strukturalnego studium nauki prawa konstytucyjnego, opartego na założeniu o trzech fundamentach neokonstytucjonalizmu. Wizja systemu prawnego polega nie tylko na postrzeganiu prawa jako całości, ale także na przedstawieniu z perspektywy prawa fundamentalnego, które służy jako podstawa interpretacyjna. Przyjmuje się, że prawo konstytucyjne w szerokim znaczeniu obejmuje teorię konstytucyjną i prawo konstytucyjne. Dzieli się ono na trzy części: podział władzy, równowagę między władzami i gwarancję praw. Wszystkie pozostałe zagadnienia są podporządkowane tym trzem podstawom. Obejmuje to organizację władz, kontrolę konstytucyjności i prawa podstawowe. Taki format pozwala na holistyczne spojrzenie na prawo konstytucyjne i konstytucje.

EN

The aim of this paper is the structuralist study of constitutional law teaching: the organization of constitutional law based on the three foundations of neoconstitutionalism. The systemic vision of the legal system involves not only perceiving the Law as a whole but visualizing all this from a fundamental law that serves as an interpretive basis. It’s conceived that constitutional law, in a broad sense, encompasses constitutional theory and constitutional law. It’s subdivided into separation of powers, balance between powers, and guarantee of rights. All other themes, in this regard, would derive from these three bases. It involves the organization of powers, control of constitutionality, and fundamental rights. Thus, for example, the study of the organization of each of the powers, the control of constitutionality and fundamental rights, correspondingly. This format allows a holistic view of constitutional law and the constitutions.

5

Podział władzy podziałem suwerenności. Rozumienie zasady suwerenności ludu i zasady podziału władzy od XVII do XIX w.

84%

Ludwin F.

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2016

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tom 61

141-172

EN

The aim of the article is to analyse a relation between the principle of separation of powers and the idea of sovereignty of people from the 17th to the 19th century. The research examines conceptions of the separation of powers formulated by most significant thinkers for the development of this idea (John Locke, David Hume, Montesquieu, and Benjamin Constant). Moreover, some remarks referring to the separation of powers that are present in a thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Alexis de Tocqueville are taken into account, too. The article shows that for the majority of researched thinkers the idea of separation of powers is, more or less, connected with a division of sovereignty. It means that it is possible to fully realize an actual separation of powers only in a state where at least legislative and executive powers are vested in separate institutions that have radical different kind of legitimization, for instance a legislative body is elected by people, but the executive is exercised by a hereditary king. Under such circumstances various powers are essentially separated and independent from each other. All in all, the separation of powers in its original meaning has in principle only moderate democratic character and is not fully applicable in democracy.