The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the system’s unconditional security.
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We propose a new key sharing protocol executed through any constant parameter noiseless public channel (as Internet itself) without any cryptographic assumptions and protocol restrictions on SNR in the eavesdropper channels. This protocol is based on extraction by legitimate users of eigenvalues from randomly generated matrices. A similar protocol was proposed recently by G. Qin and Z. Ding. But we prove that, in fact, this protocol is insecure and we modify it to be both reliable and secure using artificial noise and privacy amplification procedure. Results of simulation prove these statements.
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