The aim of this article is to present Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) as a major political institution in contemporary Turkey. Established in 1924 to oversee mosques and supervise religious practice, Diyanet as a state organization was obliged to guard the republic’s secular identity. Although Turkey was ofcially declared a secular state in 1937, successive governments have granted Directorate new responsibilities, attempting to manage religion in accordance with their own political interests. In the early 1970s, Diyanet began operating in Western Europe where its local branches provided religious services to the Turkish diaspora. Two decades later, the institution expanded its influence to regions with which Turkey had historical and cultural ties (e.g. Balkans, Central Asia). After Justice and Development Party (tur. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi − AKP) came to power in 2002, Diyanet has become one of the main instruments of its foreign policy by promoting Turkish version of moderate Islam abroad. In this context, the fundamental goal of Turkey is to achieve a status of leader among Muslim countries. At present, the almost unlimited budget of the Directorate and its global scope of activities testify to the institution’s importance for President Erdoğan and the AKP.
The article falls within the political science of religion, a “transactional” perspective. A critical point at stake here is preserving the political system, which officially draws on socialist ideas, and Hochiminhism, which consists of the deferring of liberal democracy. A historical background of the emergence of Catholicism in Vietnam has been shown, which proves that Catholics operated under the shadow of anti-national and anti-patriotic accusations. This narrative was additionally strengthened during Indochina’s war when the ruling Communist Party required consolidation around nationalist and communist ideas. The change brought by the reform of Doi Moi, which on the first plan put up economic liberalization followed by greater tolerance and openness, but without changing the party system. Catholics enjoy greater freedom; they can also join the Communist Party, which, in return, expects stabilization and support for the political system. New forms of cooperation with religious groups have been developed. However, some of them are still criticized, including limitations related to the registration of religious groups and control by the state apparatus.
In the paper I present the vision of a relation between the state and religious denominations and the status of atheists and free-thinkers delineated in the political thought of the Christian Social Party (Christlichsoziale Partei), active in Austria-Hungary and the First Republic of Austria, Christian-democratic, after 1931 influenced by Italian fascism and inclining towards authoritarianism. I infer it from its propaganda materials (books, brochures, press articles, leaflets, posters) and legislation enacted under its governmentI also show the impact of the social, cultural and political context on the postulates of the Christian Social Party with regard to religious policy.
Utraciwszy status dominującej formuły legitymizacyjnej w świecie zachodnim, religia została też instytucjonalnie oddzielona od państwa i, w myśl ideologii liberalnej, zepchnięta na margines życia publicznego. Pomimo tych niesprzyjających okoliczności, religia – zarówno jako system idei i norm, jak i w wymiarze instytucjonalnym – zdołała obronić się przed marginalizacją, zapewniając sobie szczególny status wśród innych ideologii. W nauce objawia się to swego rodzaju metodologicznym agnostycyzmem, nakazującym traktować twierdzenia religijne jako niewspółmierne z naukowymi, a zatem niepodlegające krytyce. W polityce, organizacje religijne uzyskały w wielu państwach zachodnich szczególną pozycję, a wolność religijna została ukonstytuowana jako szczególny przypadek swobody wypowiedzi. W swej działalności politycznej organizacje religijne stosują zarówno metody identyczne z innymi aktorami politycznymi (lobbying, masowa mobilizacja itp.) – co nadaje im legitymację w ramach demokratycznych systemów politycznych – jak i specyficzne strategie religijne. Działania te są w artykule analizowane głównie na przykładach polskich i amerykańskich. Uzbrojone w takie narzędzia, religijne podmioty polityczne mogą wywierać znaczący wpływ na demokratyczne systemy polityczne.
EN
In contemporary Western world religion has long lost its status of a default legitimating formula and has been relegated, in liberal political philosophy, to the private sphere. Institutionally, religious organizations have been largely separated from government institutions. Despite these adverse circumstances, religion – both as a system of ideas, values and norms and in its institutional expression – has adopted effective survival strategies guarding it from social and political marginalization. Religion has been accorded special status among other ideologies. In science, it results in a sort of methodological agnosticism, which treats religious and scientific statements as belonging to two incommensurable spheres. In politics, religious organizations are often granted special legal status among other political actors and religious freedom has been constitutionalized as a special case of general freedom of expression. As judicature and political practice show, religious arguments can often trump non-religious claims when fundamental value conflicts arise. In their political activity, religious organizations have used strategies characteristic for other political actors (lobbying, mass mobilization etc.), thereby gaining democratic legitimacy, as well as unique, religion-specific strategies. Armed with these and other empowering tools, religion can continue to influence democratic political systems in significant ways.
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