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Content available Modalne argumenty teistyczne
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nr 14
5 - 14
EN
The aim of Oppy’s paper is to provide a general ground for rejecting all kinds of modal theistic arguments. The author claims that all such arguments are question begging – before proving the existence of God (defined as a being which exists in every possible world) theistic modalist must assume it when choosing his account of logical space (no matter which modal theory it relies on: Lewis’ modal realism, ersatz modal realism, combinatorialism or fictionalism). Two concrete arguments, Plantinga’s ontological argument and Leftow’s cosmological argument, are examples given by Oppy – both have premises which justification must refer to a non-modal question “Does God actually exist?”, concerning the nature of logical space. Oppy rejects suggestion that problems with modal theistic arguments show that there is simply something wrong with our standard modal analyses in terms of possible worlds. According to Oppy, problems with higher-level judgments about the nature of logical space are problems with propositional attitudes, not with modality, and they need an analysis distinct from the analysis of ground-level modal judgments.
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nr 39
29-69
EN
This essay is about how four deeply important Kantian ideas can significantly illuminate some essentially intertwined issues in philosophical theology, philosophical logic, the metaphysics of agency, and above all, morality. These deeply important Kantian ideas are: (1) Kant’s argument for the impossibility of the Ontological Argument, (2) Kant’s first “postulate of pure practical reason,” immortality, (3) Kant’s third postulate of pure practical reason, the existence of God, and finally (4) Kant’s second postulate of pure practical reason, freedom.
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nr 3
19-37
EN
The article compares three religious a comparison of three approaches to religion: Christian theism, atheism, and moderate theism – a concept built by the author of the article and presented in its first part. Moderate theism is one possible approach to the Supreme Being, within the framework of the classification formed by the intersection of two criteria: the beginning or a lack of the beginning of the existence of the Absolute and the end or a lack of the end of the existence of the Absolute. The author proposes the thesis that moderate theism, i.e. an approach which presupposes that the absolute does not have a beginning of its existence but that there is an end to it (it is eternal regressively but not eternal progressively) may be a concept which in a specific manner generalizes theism and atheism. What is more, a comparison of moderate theism with Christian theism and with atheism allows us to suppose that the concept of moderate theism avoids the weak points of both theism (i.a. the problem of reconciling human freedom and responsibility with the existence of a caring Good-shepherd, the problem of religious violence) and atheism (i.a. the problem of satisfying the existential need to exist after death, the problem of the ultimate justification of moral norms). The author also presents in his article a mercy-based argument for the current non-existence of God, which constitutes a philosophical justification of moderate theism.
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86%
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tom 27
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nr 3
329-350
EN
A metaphysical system engendered by a third order quantified modal logic S5 plus impredicative comprehension principles is used to isolate a third order predicate D, and by being able to impredicatively take a second order predicate G to hold of an individual just if the individual necessarily has all second order properties which are D we in Section 2 derive the thesis (40) that all properties are D or some individual is G. In Section 3 theorems 1 to 3 suggest a sufficient kinship to Gödelian ontological arguments so as to think of thesis (40) in terms of divine property and Godly being; divine replaces positive with Gödel and others. Thesis (40), the sacred thesis, supports the ontological argument that God exists because some property is not divine. In Section 4 a fixed point analysis is used as diagnosis so that atheists may settle for the minimal fixed point. Theorem 3 shows it consistent to postulate theistic fixed points, and a monotheistic result follows if one assumes theism and that it is divine to be identical with a deity. Theorem 4 (the Monotheorem) states that if Gg and it is divine to be identical with g, then necessarily all objects which are G are identical with g. The impredicative origin of D suggests weakened Gaunilo-like objections that offer related theses for other second order properties and their associated diverse presumptive individual bearers. Nevertheless, in the last section we finesse these Gaunilo-like objections by adopting what we call an apathiatheistic opinion which suggest that the best concepts `God’ allow thorough indifference as to whether God exists or not.
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