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1
Content available Nothingness of Pascal
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EN
Pascal intuited nothingness very much as did King Solomon in the Bible. He experienced a clear and convincing vision of human being as a mere speck of dust in this enormous and infinite universe. He felt that in the face of eternity we, humans, are powerless and worthless creatures and belong to nothingness indeed. Seeing such powerlessness, helplessness, emptiness, vanity of humankind and tragedy that they bring sufficed Pascal to awaken and to realize nothingness. To add to King Solomon’s words in the Bible ‘vanity of vanity, all is vanity’ Pascal stressed that ‘human is no more than a reed, but a thinking reed’. Pascal was a supporter of the principle of nothingness as he both realized nothingness being the origin of all creation as well as he strove for that infinity. His ideas by far precede the advent of the Big-Bang theory, being the beginning of the world out of nothingness, as well as conform with the description of the world creation from the Bible’s ‘Genesis’. Here, I would like to present Pascal not only in the light of the prevailing view of his dialectics on the Church, but also as a supporter, conscious or not, of the nothingness principle. In European philosophy, the thinkers that are associated with the development of the concept of nothingness are existentialists, the most famous of which were Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre to list only a few. However their philosophical systems would never have a chance of being created, if there was no Pascal, who laid the foundations for them long before. By many thinkers Pascal had been looked down upon for his strong attachment to the Church and resulting from his religious belief that casts a shadow on his work. Still, if looked at from the nothingness principle perspective, that work of his cannot be underestimated.
EN
The article is a phenomenological approach to the phenomenon of nothing nessexperienced at the intersection of the spheres of religion and politics, on the example of Adam Mickiewicz's messianism. The essence of messianism of Polish poetis a metaphor as Poland as the Christ of nations understood not as literary fiction, but a real relationship between the Polish people and Christ, the relationship that its fulfilled in the establishing by Poland nation millenaristic realm of everlasting freedom. In messianism of polish poet one can capture two form through which nothingness reveals. The first one is forgetfulness of divine revelation penetrating the political sphere and exclusion from communion with God that constitute the realm of politics as a sphere of anti-divine, demonic. A second form is cleansing and separating force of nothingness in relation to the realm of sin, the power of nothingness, which appears as essential part of sanctification of Polish nation. Nothingness linked to religious-political sphere appears as anambivalent phenomenon, both negative and positive in its power.
EN
When we talk about a perfect being, we can mean two mutually non-excluding states, although accentuated differently. A perfect being is, first, a being that lacks nothing, and therefore the distinguishing feature of such a being is, above all, immutability. In Christian Antiquity we find such a concept in those thinkers who emphasized the perfection and immutability of the Divine Being, as exemplified by the thought of St. Augustine with his noological argument for the existence of God, understood as the supreme, unchanging Truth. In a certain sense, it can be said that this idea of a perfect being culminates in the thought of St. Anselm of Canterbury in his ontological proof, which presupposes that God is to that extent perfect that He cannot be conceived as non-existent. In another sense, the perfection of God is understood above all as the incomparable intensity of His mode of existence, the essential expression of which is infinity. This current of thought was rooted in Neoplatonism, and especially in Plotinian philosophy. We find this very idea in Aquinas, for whom the Being of God is a pure, infinite – because unlimited – Being, whose fullness of perfection is expressed in the Name: ‘I Am who I am’. For Duns Scotus, the proper concept of God is the concept of infinite being, with infinity understood as the specific modus intrinsecus of God's existence. This concept of God’s perfection culminates in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa, for whom God is the absolute Maximum and Minimum, to which one can draw nearer through mathematical symbols raised to infinity. Another way of expressing God’s perfection is through negation of being; because of the otherness of God’s mode of existence, it is more appropriate to call him Nothingness. We find this type of thinking in the philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena and Meister Eckhart. This article presents, on selected examples from Christian Antiquity and the Middle Ages, these three concepts of God: (1) as a Perfect Being; (2) as Nothingness, (3) as an Infinite Being.
EN
The silence in Beckett’s plays can be interpreted in many different ways. It often shows the anxiety of the characters faced with the vacuity in their lives. Left to themselves, they hardly manage to let go during these recurring silences (marked in an obsessional way in Beckett’s texts with the word “pause” as an absolute punctuation in the theatrical language). So they really feel the silence as the “arising of nothingness”, a sort of gateway to finitude. This silence is also the one appearing among Beckettian couples to reveal the aporia in language: inability to communicate, “doing” instead of (impossible) “saying”. This Beckettian “doing” is shown in a conspicuous gestuality which conveys a certain materiality to this silence as well as it tries desperately to fill it. Thus Beckett’s characters act and give silence some substance, incarnating therefore a full-fledged character. Finally, silence can also embody the religious, at least the expectation (of the divine? in Godot particularly?). This silence grows solemn and reveals a suspension in the speech and characters in search of a follow-up. Silence then becomes the opening of an area where everything is possible since nothing has been said yet, implicitly expressing fantasies of joy and salvation.
EN
As a literary work, Jean Paul Sartre’s theatrical arts gathered together in a Polishpublication namedDramaspropagates and illustrates in detail the real philosophicalmasterpiece which isBeing and Nothingness. Inspired by the author’s philosophicaldoctrine, dramas were made to show the existential thought. In that way Sartre-philosopher inBeing and Nothingnessreveals his thought in a explicative way. On theother hand, Sartre-playwright by writing dramas creates unrestricted realities whichcan be in various ways projected into the readers’ imagination, and there his generaltheses find detailed application. Philosopher wanted to show the philosophical truththrough literature, and he was very consistent about it.Being and NothingnessandDramascould be treated as sources of knowledge about his philosophy, just like hisnovels or works about his literature. Sartre uses his philosophical program to realizehis ideas for prose. It appears that philosopher did not divide the notion between“philosophical literature” and “literary philosophy”.Sartre is the creator of the theater of situations because characters from hisdramas find themselves in concrete situations and they have to make specific decisions. The dramas of the philosopher have a moralistic tone because we see inthem Sartre’s concept which says that humans may reject the role which societygave him. Man can choose the authentic existence. Philosopher’s mission was toinfluence the readers of his works. He desired to convey to people the truth abouthuman freedom. In conclusion, Sartre’s dramas are a kind of theatrical phenomenon,because as a philosopher he interested the spectator as much as an playwright.
EN
In their paper ‘Zilch’, Oliver and Smiley claim that the word ‘nothing’ can be used as a singular term and that ‘nothing’ as a singular term and the word ‘zilch’ are empty terms, which fail to refer to anything. In this paper, we propose that ‘nothing’ as a singular term and ‘zilch’ can be used to denote null things such as absences, null objects or nothingness. We also claim that, pace their interpretation of Heidegger’s ‘das Nichts’ as an empty term, it should be understood as such a singular term that refers to nothingness.
EN
Nishitani and Neoplatonism both argue that overcoming the nihilism of non-being requires a confrontation with, and cultivation of, the experience of nothingness. This paper argues that the appreciation of nothingness is best realized in the practice of dialectic into dialogos, as adapted from the Socratic tradition. We argue that dialectic equips the self for the confrontation with nihilism, and is best suited to transforming the privative experience of nothingness into a superlative, collective experience of no-thingness. The practice of dialectic into dialogos exapts the nature of the self as a synthesis of being and non-being, and possibility and necessity, in and through its relationship to others, and to its own otherness within self-transcendence. Dialectic into dialogos can thereby become a central philosophical practice for responding to our contemporary meaning crisis by affording a generative process of meaning-making that can lead to personal and cultural transformation and communion within the culture – renewing communitas for new communities.
Verbum Vitae
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2022
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tom 40
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nr 2
423-445
EN
It is not seldom that some authors try to compare the doctrine of Zen Buddhism with the doctrine of Saint John of the Cross with the intention of finding some parallels. The most striking similarity seems to be the term “emptiness” (nada – John of the Cross and sunyata – Zen Buddhism). The difficulty of the comparison stems from the fact that in both cases this term has an experiential meaning, i.e. it describes subjective feelings one has while following the spiritual path. Therefore, the intent of the paper is to capture the metaphysical and epistemological meaning of this term in order to facilitate the comparison. This effort has led to the conclusion that in both doctrines the essentially different meaning of emptiness reflects their different understanding of the ultimate reality. Consequently, meditational techniques which both forms of spirituality adopted to achieve the ultimate reality exclude each other, and the semantic proximity of Zen Buddhism and John of the Cross is misleading.
EN
Nothingness is a multifaceted problem. The basic difficulty connected with it emerges in the philosophy of language, as it hardly possible to name and find an appropriate term for that which does not exist. The problem proper arises when we are to justify nothingness, to support its fact in a rational, and at least partly, also in a scientific mode. Reflection on nothingness is taken up today in six cultures: in the philosophical thought of the West (Heidegger, Sartre, Welte, Neher), in Jewish theology, in Christian theology, and in Hinduistic, Buddhist and Taoistic thought. In each of those traditions the issue of nothingness is associated with a different context. In the West it is considered philosophically in ontology, where it serves to explain the problem of being (Heidegger) or to contradict what is considered as being (Nietzsche). In theology nothingness manifests itself in several contexts: in connection with the doctrine of creation out of nothingness (creatio ex nihilo), where it appears as that which did not exist previously or as that which might have existed but from a later perspective is defined as nothingness “with respect to what is at present” and when God is considered to be Nothingness.
EN
The topic of this article is a description of the experience of spacial Nothingness that occurred during Andrzej Stasiuk’s trip to Mongolia in summer 2010. He presented this experience to his readers in two reports published in „Tygodnik Powszechny” in February and March 2011. The author of this article distinguishes between Stasiuk’s different interpretations of Nothingness. He examines Stasiuk’s reports on his Asian trip against the criteria of so¬ called ‘modern travelling’ (MacCannel, Wieczorkiewicz). The author of the article concludes that the types of Nothingness described by Stasiuk lead to a mystic experience of the kind that was described by Jacek Bolewski as an apophatic one („Nic jak Bóg”).
11
Content available Dziewięć uwag o filozofii
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EN
The question as to what is philosophy invites us to look from a number of sometimes opposing perspectives. 1) The question of what philosophy is should find the complement of what it is for you, and what your philosophy is. A reliable answer may be unattainable for many. 2) An assessment of who a great philosopher is could only be made by a philosopher equal to him. There is doubt about the list of great philosophers found in philosophy textbooks. A practical solution: those who have influenced for centuries, to whom all eras refer, are included among the great philosophers. 3) Philosophy is the art of thinking. It cannot be taught in school, which is designed to provide practical skills. School is not the place where thought is born. For thinking can be born in refraining from action, in silence. 4) The elitism of philosophy is not only an opinion about Martin Heidegger’s thought, among other accusations formulated by Jürgen Habermas. Similarly, Plato in his school wanted to form an elite of those who see and understand more. 5) The object of philosophy is the totality of what is, talking about everything. This raises methodological problems. All the more so because philosophical thought wants to transcend these limits, wants to reach beyond all that is given. To enter virgin, uncharted territory. 6) The sin of philosophers, as Friedrich Nietzsche wrote, is the cult of eternalisation. This cult mummifies. Glorification itself is such a killing. In philosophical thinking, the absolutisation of values must be avoided. For it takes us beyond life, beyond what is: it is the deprivation of life. 7) Life in its vital element is slipping away. Its affirmation means saying goodbye to Parmenides, to “take pleasure in uncertainty rather than certainty” (Nietzsche). Philosophy conceives itself as a lofty and serious thing. It has no room for humour, for laughter, as Nietzsche demanded. 8) Since everything has its end, philosophy too experiences its end. The memory of its great history remains, but it only confirms the irreversibility of the passing of the old worlds. Even the best reading of Plato’s dialogues will not bring back that lost world. 9) The task of philosophy today is to rethink the nature of finitude. It has been thought of as a negation of the infinite, as a relative concept without its own autonomous content. Discovering another way of thinking, looking, anticipating another way of understanding finitude, is the real challenge
EN
This contribution examines the effects that a philosophical consideration of nothing has on the debate between theism and atheism. In particular, it argues that surprising conclusions that arise from a close analysis of the concept of nothing result in three claims that have relevance for that debate. Firstly, that on the most plausible demarcation criterion for science, science is constitutionally unable to show theism to be a redundant hypothesis; the debate must take place at the level of metaphysics. Secondly, that on that level, an increasingly popular atheistic response to the question “Why is there something rather than nothing” commits one to rejection of the presumption of atheism. Thirdly, the presumption of atheism is in any case unsupported. The arguments for these claims are only sketches, with the hope for further development in future.
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Content available Nietzschego oblicza nihilizmu
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PL
This article presents the main issues relating to the Nietzschean interpretation of nihilism in its diverse and ambiguous manifestations. Furthermore, it attempts to show the relationship between the rejection of strictly metaphysical discourse and aestheticization of thinking, accomplished in the work of the German philosopher. With such a perspective the article attempts to defend the validity of the „transvaluation of values” thesis.
EN
The Old Testament reveals the truth about God’s creation of everything from nothing. Christianity has accepted this revelation and Christian thinkers have further developed this concept. The Christian Neoplatonist Eriugena, in particular, considered the creation and nothingness out of which God made everything. Interpreting the biblical description of creation in the context of his own philosophical system, Eriugena came to the conclusion that nothingness is the perfect fullness of the goodness of God, who created all the qualities of human nature. A perfect creature was created in a perfect man. The error resulting from an unreasonable choice caused man to get rid of perfection and exist in an imperfect form. The concept of creating everything from nothing in a human being seems to be a prelude to Eriugena’s reflections on the incarnation of the eternal Logos – the Word – God the Son, which makes it possible to return to the state of perfection.
PL
Stary Testament objawia prawdę o stworzeniu przez Boga wszystkiego z niczego, a chrześcijaństwo przyjęło to objawienie i chrześcijańscy myśliciele rozwinęli tę koncepcję. Chrześcijański neoplatonik Jan Szkot Eriugena prowadził rozważania dotyczące stworzenia oraz nicości, z której Bóg uczynił wszystko. Interpretując biblijny opis stworzenia na gruncie autorskiego systemu filozoficznego Eriugena doszedł do wniosku, że nicość jest doskonałą pełnią dobroci Boga, który dokonał aktu stworzenia wszystkiego w ludzkiej naturze. W doskonałym człowieku powstało doskonałe stworzenie. Błąd wynikający z nierozumnego wyboru spowodował, że człowiek pozbył się doskonałości i zaczął istnieć w niedoskonałej formie. Wraz z człowiekiem do gorszej formy istnienia zeszło również całe stworzenie, które w ludzkiej naturze powstało. Koncepcja stworzenia wszystkiego z niczego w człowieku wydaje się stanowić wstęp do rozważań Eriugeny dotyczących wcielenia odwiecznego Logosu – Słowa – Boga Syna, który umożliwia powrót do stanu doskonałości.
JA
本論文の目的は、西田幾多郎(1870–1945)によって確立された哲学である京都学派の後継者の一人、西谷啓治(1900〜1990)が提唱したキリスト教の仏教的解釈について分析することである。西谷の主張を理解するためには、キリスト教における神の概念と神と人間の関係性についての彼の考察が重要である。 西谷の解釈を前にすると疑問を呈することがあるかもしれない。しかし、実存的信頼性の啓示が仏教だけでなく、あらゆる宗教的な生活と繋がりをもっていると西谷は言っている。従って、西谷はキリスト教の真の教えを考究しつつ、それを何らかの形で自己の思想体系へ組み込むことを試みた。さらに、この宗教的経験の概念こそが西谷のキリスト教に対する思索の中で重要な役割を果たしたと考える。 西谷の哲学は絶対性と相対性の関係だけでなく、宗教的経験もが西田幾多郎の“自己同一性絶対矛盾の論理”に基づいて理解されている。つまり、西田の理論は実存的且つ宗教的側面から把握しなければならないことを注視する必要がある。 上記の枠組みにおいて、西谷のキリスト教の神と神の愛に対する解釈、すなわち全能と遍在と、そこに西谷が付与する新しい意義を分析する。
16
Content available Sartre i Améry o dobrowolnej śmierci
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PL
Problem dobrowolnej śmierci jest obecnie tematem szeroko omawianym nie tylko w naukach humanistycznych. Ten artykuł poświęcony będzie tej kwestii w kontekście teorii filozoficznej Jeana Paula Sartre'a i Jeana Améry’ego. Obaj, jako egzystencjonalni myśliciele, łączą kwestię dobrowolnej śmierci z kwestiami wartości życia i jego wyższości. Początki ich rozważań są naprawdę blisko, ale ich ostateczna odpowiedź na pytanie o dobrowolną śmierć różni się. Kwestię dobrowolnej śmierci badamy pod względem kategorii racjonalności, irracjonalności i absurdu.
EN
The problem of voluntary death is currently highly discussed topic not only in the humanities. In this short article, we devote this issue in the context of the philosophical theory of Jean Paul Sartre and Jean Amery. Both as existentialist´s thinkers link the issue of voluntary death with the question of value of life and its superiority. Their starting are indeed close, but the final answer to the question of voluntary death differs.Voluntary death issue we examine in terms of categories of rationality, irrationality and absurdity
17
Content available Mallarmé et les paradoxes de la vanité
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EN
This article analyses a polysemous term of vanity in Mallarmé ’s idea and œuvre. This concept shows paradoxes of Mallarmé ’s creation: a misunderstood poet accused of being vain who was torn between the dream of glory and the self-devalu-ation. It was in the autoreflexive art par excellence, where Mallarmé saw his satisfac-tion and found the sense of life. After the experience of spiritual crisis and the discov-ery of worthlessness of language, Mallarmé, finding in the Nothingness the resources of poetry, decided to extend the illusion of literature. “Digging into the line”, he built the poetics of vanity which is a synonym of futility or void where the sense of word is replaced by the language sonority. What is more, while fighting against the poetic impotence, Mallarmé, due to writing about Vanitas, immersed into death to create an “ideal tomb” for his late son.
FR
L ’article analyse la notion polysémique de vanité dans la pensée et dans l ’œuvre de Mallarmé. Le concept dévoile les paradoxes de la création mallarméenne : le poète jugé obscur et accusé de vanité, était déchiré entre le rêve de gloire et l ’autodé-valorisation. C ’est dans l ’Art auto-réflexif par excellence qu ’il projetait sa satisfaction d ’artiste et trouvait un sens de la vie. Mais ayant vécu une crise spirituelle et décou-vert la vanité du langage, Mallarmé a choisi de prolonger une illusion de la littérature en trouvant dans le Néant les ressources de sa poésie. À force de « creuser le vers », il construit donc une poétique de la vanité qui reste synonyme d ’inanité ou de vide où le sens des mots est relayé par la sonorité du langage. En plus, tout en luttant contre la stérilité poétique, à travers l ’écriture des Vanités, Mallarmé s ’immerge dans la mort afin de créer un « tombeau idéal » pour son fils disparu.
EN
The article analyzes Gershom Scholem’s kabbalistic philosophy through the notionof nothingness, being a crucial notion of Jewish kabbalah. I argue that Scholem’s thoughtmight be called the “two dimensions of nothingness” which correspond to the concepts ofcreation and revelation. I analyze the nothingness of creation against the backgroundof the Lurianic kabbalah whereas the nothingness of revelation is analyzed through theprism of Franz Kafka’s literature. The result of the analysis is the original interpretation ofScholem’s thought, in which nothingness fails to connote nihilism, having instead a substantialpotential of productivity.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą analizy kabalistycznej filozofii Gershoma Scholema w kontekście pojęcia nicości, które odgrywa w żydowskiej kabale kluczową rolę. Stawiam tezę, że myśl Scholema można określić mianem „dwóch wymiarów nicości”, odpowiadających pojęciom stworzenia i objawienia. Koncepcję nicości stworzenia omawiam na podstawie kabały Luriańskiej, będącej dla Scholema jednym z głównych źródeł inspiracji, zaś nicość objawienia odczytuję przez pryzmat twórczości Franza Kafki, której Scholem również poświęcił wiele uwagi. Pozwala to na oryginalną interpretację myśli Scholema, w której nicość nie konotuje nihilizmu, lecz zdradza znaczący potencjał produktywności.
PL
Seeing of emptiness and mystical experience - the case of Madhyamaka: The problem of Buddhist religiosity is one of the most classic problems of Buddhist studies. A particular version of this issue is the search for mystical experience in Buddhism. This is due to the conviction that mystical experience is the essence of religious experience itself. The discovery of such an alleged experience fuels comparative speculations between Buddhism and the philosophical and religious traditions of the Mediterranean area. Madhyamaka is the Buddhist tradition which many researchers saw as the fulfillment of such mystical aspirations in Buddhism. In this paper I specify the standard parameters of mystical experience (non‑conceptuality, ineffability, paradoxicality, silence, oneness, fullness) and I conclude that they either cannot be applied to Madhyamaka or that the application is only illusory.
PL
Stanislas Breton podjął temat metafizycznej zasady w swoich dwóch książkach: Du Principe i Être, Monde Imaginaire. W pierwszej z nich autor zaprezentował rozbudowaną analizę pojęcia zasady, które w tradycji filozoficznej pojawiało się w wielu kontekstach: metafizycznym, naukowym (metodologicznym) oraz teologicznym. Druga praca Bretona jest, z jednej strony, kontynuacją analiz Du principe, z drugiej strony stanowi śmiałą i oryginalną prezentację spekulatywno-urojeniowej strategii myślenia o zasadzie. Niniejszy artykuł podejmuje zadanie zrekonstruowania pojęcia zasady określonej przez Bretona jako „urojone-nic” (rien-imaginaire). Autor artykułu przedstawia dwa nurty myślenia podejmującego kwestię zasady: ontologiczny, oparty na kategorii logosu i ontomitologiczny, inspirowany mitem i poezją. Po omówieniu różnic między tymi dwoma prądami myślowymi autor przedstawia i omawia wprowadzone przez Bretona pojęcie urojonego-nic, śledzi przy tej okazji związki pomiędzy filozoficznymi pomysłami Bretona a ontologią Martina Heideggera. Artykuł kończy się analizą bajki jako oryginalnej formy ekspresji urojonego-nic.
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