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Content available Problem konceptualizacji doświadczenia metafizycznego
100%
Kołodziejczyk S.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2011
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nr 15
59- 98
EN
The critical approach to metaphysics has usually two dimensions: methodological dimension on the one hand, and semantic one on the other. From the methodological point of view a main problem of metaphysics can be defined in terms of lack of proper procedures that may lead to the verification of metaphysical theses. The semantic criticism is based on the assumption that all conceptual schemata of a scientific domain should be characterized as having two semantic properties: meaning and reference. Critics argue that metaphysical concepts have the real problem both with reference and meaning. In this paper I argue for a different approach to the aforementioned problems. My claim is that metaphysics is in trouble because a metaphysical experience essentially goes beyond the descriptive power of conceptual schemata. I analyze that thesis in two perspectives: nature and function of experience in general as well as limits of conceptualization as a main cognitive activity. In the third part of the paper the idea of fundamental concepts of metaphysics will be introduced as an illustration of the main thesis of my paper.
2
Content available remote Problem konceptualizacji doświadczenia metafizycznego
100%
Kołodziejczyk S.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
nr 15
59-98
EN
The critical approach to metaphysics has usually two dimensions: methodological dimension on the one hand, and semantic one on the other. From the methodological point of view a main problem of metaphysics can be defined in terms of lack of proper procedures that may lead to the verification of metaphysical theses. The semantic criticism is based on the assumption that all conceptual schemata of a scientific domain should be characterized as having two semantic properties: meaning and reference. Critics argue that metaphysical concepts have the real problem both with reference and meaning. In this paper I argue for a different approach to the aforementioned problems. My claim is that metaphysics is in trouble because a metaphysical experience essentially goes beyond the descriptive power of conceptual schemata. I analyze that thesis in two perspectives: nature and function of experience in general as well as limits of conceptualization as a main cognitive activity. In the third part of the paper the idea of fundamental concepts of metaphysics will be introduced as an illustration of the main thesis of my paper.
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