The present article centers its focus on the conceptual clash involving selected definitions of the human and the non-human within the field of sign theory, particularly examining two nearly paradigmatic perspectives: structuralist semiology and Peircean semiotics. The text’s argumentation critically departs from the conventional viewpoint put forth by Ernest Cassirer. This perspective, widely prevalent not only in the humanities but also in the social sciences (e.g., M. Weber, T. Parsons) and even the natural sciences (e.g., T. Deacon), frequently regards the “symbol” as the defining boundary between the human and the non-human. The discussion further delves into the context of structuralist anti-humanism, which endeavors to redefine subjectivity by drawing from structural linguistics. Offering an alternative perspective to both Cassirerian and structuralist views of representation, the article introduces the semiotics of C. S. Peirce. According to John Deely, who serves as the primary source of inspiration for this paper, Peirce’s semiotics opens the door to a distinct, inferentialist, and methodologically more comprehensive understanding of the sign and the symbol, reshaping the understanding of the relationship between humans and the world inhabited by entities that, while they do not possess language, are capable of making inferences and employing signs – whether they be animals or machines. These nonlinguistic, non-representational yet communicative entities largely remained inconspicuous within structuralist semiology. Asubjective structures, seemingly waiting to be infused with human meaning, to be fully represented within the concept of language, to become subjects in a supposedly universal science of signs. At this juncture, the text departs from structuralist premises and, aligning with Peirce’s perspective, follows Deely in proposing that what sets apart human comprehension of signs from other forms of sign-interpretating agencies is the capacity to understand the sign as a sign. In essence, this represents the unique ability of human animals, even if unconscious, to engage in semiotics.
Celem artykułu jest próba odczytania sposobu funkcjonowania nie-ludzkich maszyn w dyskursie growym, skupiona na rzeczywistej i literacko-filmowej historii komputerów szachowych. Szachy i sztuczna inteligencja wchodzą w przestrzeń tekstu, przekraczają pierwotny obszar zainteresowań – informatykę – i dzięki innym językom opowieści otwierają się na nowe konteksty. W tekście przedstawiono wieloaspektową, posthumanistyczną analizę gry jako medium nieantropocentrycznych i upodmiotawiających narracji Innego. Historia szachów i komputerów szachowych oraz ich tekstowe przedstawienia stanowią egzemplifikację zmian ludzkich kategorii oraz relacji człowiek-technologia.
EN
The essay offers a reading of the place of non-human machines in the game discourse, focusing on computer chess’s real as well as literary and film history. Chess, as the Drosophila melanogaster of artificial intelligence, a special case facilitating the study of the entire field, allows for going beyond the primary area of interest – computer science – and entering the realm of the text, where new languages of storytelling and new contexts present themselves. The paper discusses a multifaceted, posthumanist analysis of the game as a medium of non-anthropocentric and empowering narratives of the Other. It also sheds new light on the ongoing paradigm shift in human categories and human-technology relations.
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